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The dissertation is an investigation into several of

the epistemological problems involved in the study of human
action.

I

have assumed that what a person does

to what happens to her

-

-

as opposed

involves a conceptual component.

This assumption has lead me to three questions

»

1)

how are

political concepts linked to political action; in particular,
what is the relation between moral concepts and political
action; 2) how do persons acquire political concepts; 3) what
is the significance of some political concepts being essen-

tially disputed.
I

have attempted to show that political concepts are

linked in one direction to explanatory theory

-

concepts such

as 'liberation' involve an explanatory theory of what a liber-

ated life would look like and what inhibits liberation
in another direction to the passions.

I

-

and

have explicated two

contending theories of concept acquisition

-

the inductionist

approach in which persons learn those concepts and rules already embedded in social practise, and the cognitive develop-

V
mental approach which attempts to explain
the acquisition of
critical consciousness.
I have linked these contending

images

of concept acquisition with contending
conceptions of the
justificatory term liberation.
'

I

have termed these alternative approaches to
political

action the True Believer and Moral Agent models.

Each carries

within it a contrast model which serves to highlight
desirable
and undesirable features of human action. The
True Believer
contrast model is the model of rational liberal
politics

a

politics of self-interest constrained by the rules of
liberal
democratic procedures. The Moral Agent contrast model
is

heteronomous political action, or action guided by an
uncritical
acceptance of existing norms and rules.
Finally,

I

have applied these alternative images of pol-

itical action to the Women's Liberation Movement in an
attempt
to both illustrate the importance of conceptual disputes
in

politics, and to demonstrate the manner in which our under-

standings of what can be a rational basis for human action can

blind us to alternatives to which other understandings are open.
I

have attempted to show that the problem of interpretation is

not a problem for political analysts alone, but also for Move-

ment activists.

If analysts do not share the concepts deployed

by actors as justifications for action, those actions will remain opaque.

And for actors, rational political discourse will

be impeded to the extend that conceptual frameworks are not

shared.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
Over fifty years ago Sigraund Freud asked the question
"What do women want?"

Freud raised this question during an

earlier period of feminist activity, and although he has

subsequently been held responsible for the counter-reformation

which followed upon the heels of nineteenth century feminism,
his question remains a vital one.

Today, in this second wave

of American feminism, we need to ask once again

"What do

i

women want?"
At root this is an epistemological question

know what motivates other people's actions?

i

how can we

My assumption

is that what we do is to bring to bear our understanding of

what we think can motivate any person in our attempts to

understand what a specific person has done or says she will
do.

We bring to bear on any specific action we encounter

our understanding of what we think persons* interests, reasons,
purposes, wants, intentions, etc. can be.
I

also assume that every attempt to understand political

motives must come to grips with at least the following elements
1)

Because political action is often justified by an

appeal to moral concepts (e.g., interests, justice, equality,
1

freedom),

every attempt to understand political action must

reach some understanding of what these concepts mean and how
Both perspectives I develop are theories of action as
opposed to behavior i.e., both treat persons as rulefollowers. The difference between them rests on their
understanding of how persons learn and follow rules. I have
excluded other possible modes of explanation, in particular
a thorough-going behaviorist explanation.

V,

\

2

persons acquire them.

Human action always includes a con-

ceptual component! distinguishing between what a person does
and what happens to her involves us in investigation of the

reasons that lie behind the activity.

In a limited sense,

"thinking makes it so," or at least possible.

What a person

does in part depends on what she believes is possible for

her to do.

Her beliefs are the conceptual tools she

brings to bear on her own understanding of the circumstances
in which she finds herself and in which she must decide and
act.

Action, then, is delimited in part by the concepts

which one can deploy in understanding, reasoning about and
deciding among alternatives.

I

shall argue that the con-

cepts we use, especially our moral concepts, are embedded
in our social relationships, are bound up in the way persons

interact and thereby learn to view each other and themselves.
I

shall also argue that different theories of concept acquis2

ition pick out different features of the same concepts.
example

I

The

shall use in the final chapter of this dissertation

is the Feminist concept of •liberation

1

.

I

shall want to
3

show that 'liberation' is an essentially disputed concept,
and that this dispute revolves around different explanations
There is another side to human activity which analysts
Indeed,
like Freud have pointed to - the unconscious side.
our conscious reasons may be rationalizations of our unconscious ones.
I want to be clear that the notion of action
does not exclude unconscious motives, that the focus on justification in this dissertation does not preclude rationalization.
2~,

William E. Connolly, "Essentially Contested Concepts in
Politics," Amherst, Massachusetts, 1973 (Mimeographed.)

3.

3

of human development, different images of human flourishing

which flow out of the two perspectives on action
develop.

I

shall

We need to see how different conceptions of

•liberation* are rooted in different understandings of what

can be a political motive f in different understandings of

persons and their possible interests, and in different images
of social life.

Human action implies consciousness, a knowing agent.
It is tied to our understanding of persons and their reasons,

wants, interests, purposes.

If persons are social and historic-

al creatures, if their reasons, wants, interests are rooted

in their social life, then actions embody a social and his-

torical dimension.

Both the idea of the person and of the

activities in which persons engage change with time and place.

Human action takes place within history and at the same time
human beings make history through their actions.

Our reasons,

wants and purposes are both rooted in social life and guide
our efforts to change that life.
I am indebted to several writers for helping me to clarify
In particular, I have found the
this aspect of action.
Hampshire, Thought and Action
Stuart
useful
most
following
Press,
Viking
1959) Alasdair Maclntyre, "A Mistake
(New York,
Science," in Peter Laslett and W.G.
Social
about Causality in
Politics and Society , second series,
Philosophy,
Runciman, ed.,
1962). and Against the SelfNoble,
(New Yorkt Barnes and
Schocken,
1971); R.S. Peters,
Images of an Age (new Yorki
ledge and Kegan Paul,
Rout
The Concept of Motivation ( London
the Science of
and
Charles Taylor, "Interpretation
I958)
Man," Review of Metaphysics 25 (September, 197D»3-51» and
"Neutrality in Political Science," in Laslett and Runciman, ed.,
Philo sophy. Politics and Society third series; Peter Winch,
195o)i
The Idea of a Social Science (New Yorkt Humanities Press,
Press,
G.H. Mead, Mind. Self and Society (Chicago University

Wl

i

I

t

;

,

1

1962).

k

If there is some relationship between social life and

individual consciousness, we need to understand how it is that

persons in the same society come to have different ideas,

including moral ideas.

How do persons change their minds,

develop new interests, and new reasons for action?

How is

critical thought possible?
2)

Because moral concepts have reference to the idea

of injury, political action always draws upon an explanatory

theory which fleshes out this idea and establishes whether
and how the injury can be remedied.

Understanding the ex-

planatory theory adopted by political agents is essential to

understanding their actions,
3)

Political action also includes an affective element.

Although action involves reasons, we need to have other kinds
of commitments in order to carry through on our reasons for
action.

(I

want to be careful to point out that having both

reasons and affective commitment does not entail action.)
To understand political action, then, requires that we

understand the relationship between reason and passion.
What

I

shall do in this dissertation is to illustrate

how two contemporary perspectives on political action treat
these issues.

These two perspectives are what

I

am calling

political action.
the True Believer and Moral Agent images of
is some reEach of these perspectives assumes that there

consciousness.
latinnship between social life and political

5

Each is concerned to show how persons change their minds,

develop new interests and new reasons for action.

And

each establishes the kinds of interests which can form
the basis for rational political action.

These alternative perspectives are neither mutually

exclusive nor are they exhaustive of the possible explan-

ations of political action.

They are meant to be suggestive

of the thesis that political action can be and is conceived

of in quite different ways and that there are serious

implications in these differences.
The True Believer perspective is derived from Eric

Hoffer's work but it is also found in the work of such

widely respected social scientists as William Kornhauser
and Gerhard Lenski.

It rests on what I call the induction

approach to socialization, an approach which posits a preexisting social order into which persons must be inducted
in order to become human.

two stages

-

This socialization occurs in

primary and secondary

-

each of which makes its

special contribution to political motivation.

Secondary

socialization which occurs in multiple and open groups is
especially important in the development of those egoistic
interests and liberal moral-political reasons and rules which

form the basis of autonomous, rational political action as
conceived from this perspective.

These interests, reasons

and rules delimit what constitutes an injury and establish
legitimate channels for redress of grievance.

When these

6

multiple and open groups are absent, persons lack the
clearly articulated interests and the liberal values

which undergird rational politics.
down, persons lack standards

i

When society breaks

these are potential True

Believers, non-autonomous persons who may seek meaning in

political movements which encourage blind obedience rather

than critical choice, authority rather than freedom,
movements which satisfy irrational rather than rational 'needs

1

The True Believer perspective assumes either that

action flows directly from the passions
conditions

-

under anomic

or that egoistic reasons produce action guided

by the rules of liberal politics
conditions.

-

-

under ordered, pluralist

The Moral Agent perspective posits a different

range of social relations and of human motives.

Theorists in the Moral Agent mode have a clear interest
in explicating the ways in which consciousness develops .

They do not assume that persons either join a radical
political movement because of irrational 'needs

1

or else

engage in rational political actions utilizing norms already

embedded in social practice as their justification.

They

assume that persons can develop ideal standards which establish

new and rational 'needs

1

or 'interests* and which they may

utilize to evaluate existing norms.
This perspective is heavily indebted to the work of Jean

Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, especially to their theories
of concept acquistion.

Piaget 's and Kohlberg 's theories of

.

7

of moral development help us to understand how
persons can
be socialized not just to know the content of social

rules,

but to understand the purpose of these rules and
therefore to

be able to criticize those rules which help to constitute

their social life.

Persons can learn that rules are not

immutable facts, that they can be altered in light of

developing needs, wants and purposes, in light of developing
interests and moral principles.

As we shall see in Chapter

II, this perspective allows us to see rational political

interests which move beyond the egoism of the True Believer

model tov/ard what

I

shall call a 'social interest'.

It

provides ideal standards for evaluating existing social
practises, standards which flow from the principle of

respect for persons.

New reasons for action need not be

the product of a conversion induced by emotion, but may be

the product of new cognitive abilities

-

new factors into account in our reasoning
new emotional or affective commitments.
spective

abilities to take
-

coupled with

Indeed, the per-

assumes that our cognitions, including our cogni-

tions of what constitutes an injury to persons, can develop
and that this development is internally linked to our

emotional development.

For example, perceiving injuries

where once we saw none gives rise to feelings of resentment
arid

indignation where once we felt none.

Moreover, our

perception of an injury often entails that we have certain
feelings about persons.

8
I

should like to be clear that when

I

True Believer or Moral Agent perspectives,

refer to the
I

am also

referring to contrast models either implicitly or explicitly
built into each.

Built into the fundamental assumptions

of any theoretical model is an alternative conception
of

how things could be and ought to be.

It is this alternative

which sets off, or highlights the crucial features of the
model being developed.
model.

This is what is called a contrast

It is always used either implicitly or explicitly

in political discourse i there is no way to avoid its

use since every model and every argument contains within it
a conception of its opposite.
The selection of a contrast model is possibly one of
the most important choices one can make in political analysis

and discourse, not only because the contrast model acts as
a standard for evaluating the model under consideration, but

also because it sets the limits within which phenomena can
vary.

Thus, for example, in his work on social stratification

and class conflict, Ralf Dahrendorf argues the inevitability

of class conflict because he cannot conceive of alternative
social structures in which there would be no such conflict.
He has no model of a classless society, a society in which
there is no subordination-domination structure.

Arguments

favoring the establishment of such societies are delegitimized
by the very terms in which his theory is couched.

In a

similar manner, models of political action can delegitimize

9

certain types of motives or miscategorize them in terms
the model establishes.
In political analysis or argument, then, we need to

be particularly clear about both the fundamental assumptions

undergirding the argument and the range of possible alternatives which the model opens up.

As we shall see in the

next two chapters, the choice of a contrast model of rational

action sets off and highlights the undesirable features of
alternative modes of action.

If, for instance, we accept the

True Believer model and its built-in contrast, we delimit
the range of rational political action in such a way as to

delegitimize possible rational motives and actions picked
out and highlighted by the Moral Agent model.

There ere several important implications of the thesis

that political action can be understood in different ways.
First, the perspective one adopts undergirds a specific

interpretation of social movements, both in terms of the
social and psychological roots of these movements, and the
demands made by movement adherents.

It delimits a range of

possible rational motives for political action and excludes
other motives as either irrational or as not really ad-

dressing the problem.

The perspective we adopt also

establishes an image of the ways in which ideas are held and

acted upon which has serious implications for our under-

standing of the openness and developmental possibilities
of a political movement.

In Chapter IV

I

shall attempt to

10

illustrate how these phenomena operate with respect
to our
understanding of the contemporary Women's Movement.
But it is not only theorists who bring to bear
alter-

native conceptions of political action in their
analysis
of political movements

i

activists also bring different con-

ceptions to bear in action itself.

They fall subject to many

of the same conceptual distortions and limitations as their

counterparts in the social sciences, but theirs are obviously
more important in terms of the development of movement

strategies and tactics.

Therefore, it is necessary that we

look not only at different explanations of the Women's
Movement, explanations which flow out of the theories of action

developed in Chapters II and III, but also to look at the

ways in which political agents deploy these same intellectual
tools in shaping, understanding and justifying their actions.

£hey will justify these actions in terms of conceptual distinctions which flow from different perspectives and this has
serious political implications.

It can lead to serious in-

ternal conflict which may produce schisms and defeat the
Movement, but more importantly it can produce false moves, move

persons in harmful or retrograde directions.
that persons can mistake their interests.

The point is

Women can want

things which in the long run may fail to satisfy their human
needs.

These wants can flow from several sources

-

from the

dehumanization produced by oppressive conditions, from an

undeveloped moral perspective, or from an inadequate explanatory

11

theory.

In Chapter IV

I

shall attempt to show how
different

conceptions of female 'liberation'
are more or less adequate
in terms of their recognition of
the relationship between
•needs' and oppression, the moral
principle of respect for
persons and explanatory theory. These
conceptions are of
•liberation' as 'equality of opportunity'
,

and 'dis-alienation'.

'authenticity,

Understanding the distinctions between

these concepts of 'liberation' is,

I

think, crucial to under-

standing the Women's Movement in its historical
reality.

Understanding the developmental relationship between
these
concepts and between these concepts and our theories

of the

rise of Feminism is vital to our ability to grasp the
ways in

which the Women's Movement has changed.
What I will do in the final chapter is to demonstrate

how different women in the contemporary Women's Movement
utilize different justifications for action because they are
at different points in their cognitive development.

This should

not be taken to mean that they may not engage in the "same"

actions for different reasons

- e.g.,

both radicals and

liberals may support the Equal Rights Amendment but for

different reasons, one as a progressive reform (although this
has been debated), the other as a final goal (although liberals

have changed and moved on to new demands).

Nor should it be

taken to mean that any of the individuals selected as examples
6f these different levels of cognitive development have not or

cannot move on to new positions.

Feminism rises and falls with

12

historical and social changes which affect the
emotivecognitive repertoire through which persons experience
their
lives.
Indeed, Feminism itself is one of the ways in
which

women's lives are affected.

We should expect changes in the

Movement ideology and we should not take what is
presented
in the final chapter of this dissertation as a static
image
of contemporary American Feminism.

This dissertation is not meant to be an impartial laying
out of alternative explanatory frameworks.

I

am committed

to the notion that some frameworks are more adequate than
others, that some upon us up to perceiving alternatives to

which others are profoundly closed.

I

shall argue that many

contemporary social scientists and many political actors accept
explanatory frameworks unselfconsciously, thus limiting their
perceptions of alternative modes of thought and action.

comparing the Moral Agent and True Believer modes,

I

In

shall

argue that the former is more adequate in just that sense

that it allows us to conceive of more possibilities, that it

allows us to understand developing meanings, alternative
images of human possibility.

CHAPTER

II

THE TRUE BELIEVER

Perhaps the best way to lay out the True Believer model
of political action is to let the model-builder himself,

Eric Hoffer, identify the characteristic features of ex1

tremist politics.

I

will quote at length from the profound

short book, The True Believer

,

whose purpose is to show

that all extremist movements, whatever their ostensible

differences in ideology, time and place, "...draw their
early adherents from the same types of humanity; they all
2

appeal to the same types of mind."

The following passages

pick out those characteristics of personality and of mind which

distinguish these types of humanity from rational persons and
describe the conditions under which True Believers are likely
to emerge.

Basic Motivations

-

Irresponsibility and Frustration

•Not to reason why' is considered by all mass movements the mark of a strong and generous spirit....
People whose lives are barren and insecure seem
to show a greater willingness to obey than people
who are self-sufficient and self-confident. To
the frustrated, freedom from responsibility is
more attractive than freedom from restraint.

There is in us a tendency to locate the shaping of
Success and
our existence outside ourselves.
It may be that Hoffer limits his description of extremism
to mass conditions; however, I think it is more fruitful to
treat his model as a description of "extremist" as opposed
Then we can ask a serious question to "normal" politics.
can extremism occur in non-mass societies?

T^i

Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York
1958), preface.
2.

3.

Ibid., pp. 108-9.

i

Mentor Books,

Note the built-in contrast model.

14

failure are unavoidably related in our minds with
the state of things around us. Hence it is that
people with a sense of fulfillment think it is a
good world and would like to conserve it as it is,
wh He the frustrated favor radical change .
The exaltation of the true believer does not flow
from reserves of strength and deliverencei he has
been delivered from the meaningless burdens of an
autonomous existence.

Comparison with Rational Politics
There is a fundamental difference between the appeal
of a mass movement and the appeal of a practical
organization. The practical organization offers
opportunities for self -advancement, and its appeal is
mainly to self-interest. On the other hand, a mass
movement, particularly in its active, revivalist phase,
appeals not to those intent on bolstering and advancing
a cherished self, but to those who crave to be rid of
an unwanted self. A mass movement attracts and holds
a following not because it can satisfy the desire for
self -advancement, but because it can satisfy the
passion for self-renunciation.

Anomie and the True Believer
The milieu most favorable for the rise and propagation
of mass movements is one in which a once compact corporate structure is, for one reason or another, in a
state of disintegration.?

Ideas and Political Action

-

Security and Insularity

...the effectiveness of a doctrine should not be judged
by its profundity, sublimity or the validity of the
truths it embodies, but by how thoroughly it insulates
the individual from his self and the world as it is....
IT.

Ibid ., p. 16.

5.

Ibid ., p. 117.

6.

Ibid ., p. 21.

7.

Ibid ., p. 45.

8.

Ibid ., p. 76.

15

Moral Ideas and Extremism
The fanatic cannot be weaned away from his cause
by an appeal to his reason or moral sense. He
fears compromise and cannot be persuaded to
qualify the certitude and righteousness of his
holy cause. But he finds no difficulty in
swinging suddenly and widely from one holy cause
to another. He cannot be convinced but only converted.
His passionate attachment is more vital than the
quality of the cause to which he is attached.

Assumptions undergirding the model

I.

.
.

The True Believer model is a model of human actioni it
is an attempt to explain how persons acquire motives for

what they do.

As such, the model rests on the assumption

that there is a relationship between social structure and
structure of mind, that particular social conditions are linked

with particular psychological states or motives

-

mass move-

ments with fanatical, irrational memberships arise under
social conditions of anomie; practical organizations based
on rational motives develop under conditions of integration

and order.

Implicit in the model is a theory of development

or socialization, a theory which undergirds the theorist's

classification of action as mature and rational or immature
and irrational.

I

think it is important to start with this

theory of socialization and then move to investigate its
implications for our understanding the role of the passions,

moral judgments and explanatory theory in political action.
9^

Ibid.

,

p.

81.

16
I. a.

The social conditions under which True

Believers and rational political agents appear

While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to go
into the theories of alienation and anomie at any length, the

True Believer model clearly rests on a theoretical base in-

herited from Durkheim rather than Marx.

This means that the

model relies on a picture of an integrated society
organic or mechanical

-

-

either

where culture determines action in

an orderly, predictable manner.

There is little problem of

mass unconventionality in such a society; rather there are
cases of individual deviance.

When such a society breaks down,

however, persons are left in a state of psychological turmoil,
and it is this turmoil which underlies the actions of the

True Believer.

More specifically, when a mechanically

integrated society with a clear authority structure disintegrates, one had better hope than an organically integrated

society with a clear division of labor within which persons
and groups pursue self-interested goals constrained by social

structures which set limits to their actions appears.

Other-

wise one will find the chaos of anomie and the anarchy of
unlimited desire.
Robert Tinker argues that Durkheim' s image of a moral
10~i
order is one based on altruism and affective ties and is
distinctly different from bourgeois egoistic morality. His
notion of a moral order - one based on "equivalence and
reciprocity in exchange relations" - is atvariance with
classical liberalism. But his organic conservatism is
compatible with the view of authoritarian morality I am
drawing here. For Durkheim, moral education "...must inculcate a spirit of self-discipline and obedience to the social

17

In both The_T>u e Believer and a later
work The Ordeal
of Change , Hoffer draws vs a picture of
anomic chaos and

pluralist order.

Anomie, which results from massif ication,

produces the True Believer, "...an immature individual...

torn from the warmth and security of a corporate
existence
and left orphaned and empty in a cold world."

In a sense,

however, this orphanage is valuable since it forces the un-

developed person out of the social womb and into a chaotic
existence where s/he needs to discover an autonomous self.
"The crumbling of a corporate body, with the abandonment of

the individual to his own devices, is always a critical
12

phase of social development."

However,

order, so that, paradoxically, the true basis of a genuine
personal autonomy is created." For Durkheim, as well as
for liberals, morality is necessary since persons have
insatiable needs which must be constrained. But for Durkheim
morality is the natural order? amorality or anomie is a
pathological condition under which persons act like some
liberals* image of the egoist. For Durkheim, then, some
liberals are mislead in believing that we need to provide
persons with reasons for being moral? man is by nature a
moral being insofar as he is a social being. Amorality is
what requires explanation. Robert pinker/ Social Theory and
SocialJ^olicy (l^ew York: Crane-Russak, 197171
11.
By pluralist order, I do not mean the sort of nurturant
community described by Robert Paul Wolff in "Beyond Tolerance"
(Robert Pnul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert T/iarcuse,
A Critique of Pure Tolerance /Boston Beacon, 19687, pp. 3-52) but
that pluralism which serves as the touch-stone of mainstream
American political science - the pluralist order in which one
finds a clear division of labor, a separation between elites
and masses, lower rates of participation in valued social
projects among the masses with value placed on higher elite
participation, broad disparities in income and power, etc.
t

Eric Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change (New Yorki Harper
12.
and Row, 1963)» p. 9.
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The newly emerging individual can attain
some degree
or stability and eventually become inured
to
burdens and strains of an autonomous existencethe
wnen he is offered abundant opportunities for only
selfS
0n
8elf ' r all2ation
He
needs
environment
^:
in wMJh achievement,
9
+
acquisition, sheer action or the
JL^i
development
of his capacities and talents seems
within
easy reach.
It is only thus that he can acquire the
self-confidence and self-esteem that make an
individual
existence bearable or even exhilerating i 1 3

Pure chaos is inimicable to human development.

In order to

arrive at the reasoned constraint which marks the
mature

political actor, persons need to experience the 'liberating

5

effects of plural structures with their varying roles
and
constraints.

While this pluralism, or division of labor,

produces conflicting interests and 'class' conflict, it also
produces a rational conception of one's own interests and

their limits,

Moreover

*

knowledge that there are many stan-

dards, many interests, many rights and duties, produces

tolerance, reasonableness, and an ability to see one's
opponents' position in a bargaining situation.

achievement of limited ends

Finally,

produces gratification and a

willingness to abide by the rules of the game one plays.
Hoffer's image of the social conditions under which

human development takes place is compatible with the theory
presented in a much more scholarly sociological piece,

William Kornhauser's The Politics of Mass Society

.

There,

Kornhauser identifies four types ef social organization
totalitarian, communal, mass and pluralist
Tj;

Ibid .

-

-

and he links
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each type with four concommitant
forms of culture end
four motivational schemes.
In communal society culture is fixed
but differentiated
by status i i.e., there are fixed standards
of action which
differ for each segment of society.
Traditions support a
motivational scheme based on clearly defined
rights and
duties in turn, the diverse cultural structure
is supported
by the motives obligation and shame. Persons
do not move
from one status to another and do not learn
motives which
are linked to statuses into which they are not
borni however,
i

they do learn that each status depends on all the
others and
they share a sense of obligation to each other, feel
shame when
obligations are not met. These affective commitments
derive

from something greater than the individual herAimself and
that is

her/his sense of membership in a larger collectivity

from which flow authoritative commands.

This is a tradition-

directed, other-directed, group-centered society, perfectly

compatible with Hoffer's image of the corporate, mechanically

integrated society.

Another form of fixed culture in which persons are also
other-directed and group -centered is totalitarian culture.
But totalitarian culture is uniform and so too is motivation

with the exception of the motives of those few in positions of
ultimate authority.

Here we find not diversity and legitimacy,

but monism and coercion.
s>fhe is

motivated by fear.

Totalitarian man is submissive
S/he is separated from any
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larger purposes and therefore separated from her/himself.
This mode seems most compatible with Hoffer's
image
of immature motivation, and indeed the True Believer
is
the result of a transition from communal to totalitarian
society.

However, Kornhauser 'a third variant

person

- is

-

mass society and mass

more a capturing of this transition and of

immature motivation.

In mass society, unlike communal or

totalitarian society, culture is fluid Hike totalitarian
i

society, however, it is uniform and like totalitarian man,

mass man is self-estranged, anomic, suggestible and manipulable.

Lacking uniform standards, having no direction, mass man
searches for a collective identity which s/he may find in

totalitarian movements.

HerAis motives

lie in "...over-

coming the diffuse anxiety which accompanies the lack of self14

confidence."

S/he is an

impotent leveller, a populist, the

victim of mass culture, and s/he does not know her/his own
interests.
The alternative to these rather undesirable variants of

social life and political motivation is pluralist society
and the clearly articulated interests which flow from it.

By pluralism, Kornhauser means a structurally diffuse society

with a diverse, fluid culture.

There is much social differ-

entiation, both vertical and horizontal; culture is fluid
buti non-anomic since there are standards,

they may be.

diverse though

There are many standards to which persons can

William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society
(New York | Free Press, 1959). p. 108.

Tthi
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be exposed as they move vertically and
horizontally across

social divisions in a mobile society.
In a pluralist society. .the inner cohesion
of
local groups and cultures provides a firmer
basis for self-relatedness, and the diversity
of
groups and cultures permits the individual
to form
a distinctive self-image.
Social and cultural
alism invites the development of differentiated plurautonomous individuals, for variety in
institutions
and values encourages individuals to compare
different models of conduct and to integrate
elements from several models into a distinctive
identify. -o
.

Persons have opportunities to play many roles and to
develop

an understanding of the various motives accompanying
these
roles.

Indeed, the pluralism Kornhauser describes is the

condition under which autonomous individuality develops.
The motivational basis of this autonomy is self-reliance

and guilt

-

self-reliance as the outgrowth of exposure to

a variety of standards; guilt as the product of the inner-

directed internalized commands of conflicting authorities
(as contrasted to the outer-directed guilt of communal man).

This image of the mature individual in a pluralist,

order is compatible with what

I

call the inductionist theorv

16

of socialization.

This theory is particularly useful for

our understanding the ways in which persons acquire the

interests and character traits which undergird the selfreliant, autonomous, liberal political agent.
15.

Ibid.

,

pp.

109-110.

16,
A paradigm case of this approach to socialization is
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction
of Reality (New Yorkt Doubleday, 1966).
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The inductionist theory of socialization begins
with

primary socialization which usually takes place in the
home.
There the child develops certain character traits like
ego-

strength and self-control which make the constrained pursuit
of self-interest possible, and also learns the realism
which

undergirds constrained egoism as parents constrain herAim
from the pursuit of egocentric wants and introduce her/him
into an understanding of what s/he can legitimately demand.

Secondary socialization occurs in a less highly charged
emotional context, but it builds on both the basic personality
developed in the home and the sense

fif

guilt the child has

acquired when s/he fails to conform to parental expectations.
Persons learn role-specific character traits
efficiency, sportsmanship and the like

on the self-control learned earlier.

-

-

punctuality,

traits which build

They are also given

specific content to the reality principle by their participation
in groups which give

rise to specific self-interests.

It is

these interests that mature individuals bring to politics and

which form the basis of rational political demands.

Persons

also develop a sense of self-esteem rooted in the social value

placed on groups to which they belong.
Secondary socialization, then, results in persons who
are firmly committed to the pursuit of private interests and

to the defense of group interests since their own interests
are so clearly implicated in the well-being of the groups to

which they belong.
to fly apart.

Why?

Yet such persons do not cause society

Because pluralist societies are held
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together by certain structural safeguards and by rule3
of the game which all members learn as part of
their social-

ization.

These structural safeguards, as Kornhauser describes
them, include a division of labor between elites and non-

elites which permits elites to uphold standards of decency,
civility, and tolerance in the face of non-elite's lesser

development as autonomous, rational agents (Hoffer would un-

doubtedly take offense at this, yet he calls for a strict

separation between working class and management in order to

maintain a healthy tension).
structural safeguards

Elites are constrained by other

they are accessible (non-elites get

-

to choose who their elites are to be), and they are plural

(elites compete with each other for 'votes' and thereby

constrain each other).

they only try harder

-

Non-elites can get to be elites if
there is equality of opportunity.

This all assumes that a division of labor is necessary for
the achievement of everyone's interests! i.e., that a division

into elites and non-elites works to the benefit of all since

elites are those best qualified
equal opportunities

- to

-

through the operation of

perform valued social functions.

Another structural safeguard is the existence of
numerous voluntary associations through which persons are
linked to the larger society and through which they pursue

and satisfy their self-interests.

These associations serve
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to protect non-elites from elites and give non-elites
a sense

of freely contracting into the social order.

They are valued

primarily as a means of social control both of elites by
non-elites and as a means

dampening down irrational

ol*

political demands on the part of non-elites.

Participation

in these associations is essential to the working of liberal

democracy since

M
. .

.non-participation results in lack of

exposure to information and indoctrination concerning democratic falues, and in the lack of habits of discussion, debate,
negotiation, and compromise

-

modes of conduct indispensible

17

to democratic politics."

Participation, then, is essential to our learning the

rules of the game which help keep pluralist societies from

degenerating into a war of each against all.

These rules

establish the legitimate means for the pursuit of selfinterest and constrain persons from engaging in alternative
means.

These are the normative rules of a politics of bargain

and compromise, norms of political conduct and political

justification.

For example, persons learn that it is leg-

itimate to lobby a Congressman in pursuit of one*s self-

interest but not to offer him a bribe.

They also learn that

they can make appeals to moral ideals like equality of

opportunity to redress a perceived imbalance in the distri-

bution of desirable social positions, but that they cannot
VT*

Kornhauser, Politics , p. 73.
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appeal to justifications like being
one of God's chosen
people.

I.b,

Moral development

Politics, then, is more than the pursuit
of selfinterest. It is this pursuit through the
use of legitimate
means. Since some of these means are moral,
it is important
that we look br fly at the theory of moral
development

which undergirds the distinction theorists in
this mode
make between immature and mature politics.
The fundamental assumption upon which this
theory of

moral development rests is that persons' springs to
action
are self-interested (although self-interest is a
social

product).

These egoistic interests are not naturally con-

strained since persons can seldom take into account the
interests, needs, wants and purposes of others, first

because they have direct knowledge only of their own needs,

wants and purposes, and second, because they naturally put
these above the interests, needs, wants and purposes of
others, except in rare cases of altruism.

Theorists in the

True Believer tradition, therefore, assume that for persons
to live together, their basically conflicting egoistic

interests need to be controlled and constrained by the

introduction of a moral code and its accompanying feelings
of guilt.
In different social systems this constraint has different

content, but essentially the ethical system begins as something
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external to the individual! it stands on the social
level,
both apart from and in conflict with the individual
motiva18
tional system.
Ethical considerations act as constraints
on persons' ••natural" inclinations.
But ethical constraints do not remain entirely
external.

Socialization internalizes these controls; moral growth,
on this view, consists of the building up of a repertoire
of internalized controls through identification with
parents

and other authority figures.

The development of a Superego

presents great conflicts, however, because the Superego
conflicts with pre-existing needs, wants and purposes.

morality is learned in a situation of intense conflict

Since
-

conflict between the demands of self and the demands of

authority figures and therefore of the Superego

-

it becomes

heavily laden with emotion, and particularly with guilt which
is the controlling passion in moral behavior.

The psycholo-

gical basis of moral growth is fear, or anxiety over the loss
of parental approval and love.

This results in guilt when-

ever the individual disobeys the parent-authority.
This primary socialization produces an authoritarian

morality.

The moral attitudes of others, particularly those

with whom the person has strong and conflicting emotional
attachments, are introjected.

In order to win praise, the

child (and under anomic conditions, the fanatic) learns to

anticipate the moral attitudes of others, those ego-ideals with
See Thomas Nagel. The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1970; for a discussion of this conflict.

TE~9
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whom s/he has emotional attachments.

9

Failure to live up

to these ego-ideals results in
guilt and self-punishment

Kornhauser's communal 'shame'

-

-

emotions which provide the

motivational basis for a morality of authority
and conformity.
This conventional morality is the
introjected moral code of
one's society.
It is a morality of content,
of duty and

obedience.

It rests on the need immature individuals
have for

authority, an authority provided by the social
order.

Since this form of morality is so profoundly
authorityoriented, when society breaks down - as in the
case of

"

massif ication

-

the individual is left with a repertoire of

controls which are inappropriate to the new situation.

This

individual has no clearly defined interests which flow
out of
her/his specific group memberships, but only vague wants
and s/he has no legitimate means even for the pursuit
of these

wants.

H/she is a potential True Believer.

When social

authority breaks down, such an individual may turn to new
authorities for moral constraint.
its content

i

Conformity simply changes

the form remains the same.

Since there are no objective standards of morality,

individuals have no rational basis for choosing between al-

ternative moral codes. 'Choice* will be entirely emotional
that code which fills 'needs'

-

-

and through a conversion

process, the new code takes on the same status of authoritative

reality as the old.

What is commanded by the new authority

is what ought to be.

J.C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society (London
±\T.
19^5). P. 43.

i

Duckworth,
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We have, however, looked only at the effect of
primary

socialization on moral development.

In a pluralist society

persons will have the opportunity to move beyond this
author-

itarian morality to a mature, inner-directed, autonomous
morality.

Secondary socialization means not only exposure

to specific roles, but exposure also to non-familial social

norms.

In the family the rules for making decisions among

conflicting wants are often too rooted in specific personalities
and in their emotional relationships to each other to serve as

guides in general social relationships.
•in

What persons need

order to engage in a rational politics constrained by

moral considerations are impersonal, non-emotional rules for
choosing among interests.

These are the rules of the game

of a politics of bargain and compromise among conflicting

self-interested individuals and groups, and include moral-

political justifications for action like the principle of
equality of opportunity.
If authoritarian, immature morality is learned by

immature individuals in relatively authoritarian

social

relations, mature, autonomous morality is learned by devel-

oping individuals in social situations where there are con-

flicting authorities and where persons have opportunities to
experience the constraints of various authorities.

As the

individual is exposed to conflicting standards, s/he develops
independent, mature judgment

i

increasing sociality and

individualization result in autonomous morality; authoritarian

morality gives way to a morality of obligation based on the
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recognition of the rights and duties of plural
statuses and
roles. What is owed me and what I owe
others is defined

by

our location in the social order.

Since it is assumed that

society is open and pluralist, and experienced
as fair by
its members, engaging in the life of that
society is experienced as a benefit. When we do not meet our
social obligations we feel guilt because we have failed to
abide by
standards and social arrangements which benefit us.

Guilt,

then, underpins the mature morality of autonomous
individuals.
.(We

have also learned specific character traits like honesty,

fair-play, integrity, etc., which make it possible for us
to
live up to our obligations and to feel guilty when we do
not.)
One further point needs to be made about morality in this

model and that is that there is a rather sharp dichotomy
drawn between egoism and altruism and therefore between

justice and benevolence.

Altruism is possible in personal

relations where there is a great deal of emotional investment
on the part of the participants, e.g., in relations between

mother and child.

But altruism is far less likely in social

relations in general, and indeed is not necessary for a practical moral code.

Practical, everyday morality does not

require that we love our sisters jit only requires that we

constrain our own actions by some consideration for their
rights and what we owe them.

Just action is tempered by our

knowledge that our interests often conflict and that it is
in our interest to be accomodating; it cannot be based on
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the building of relationships in which we may
all be said
to have a mutual interest. Justice and
benevolence are dichotomous - the former requires balancing of
conflicting inter20
estsj the latter requires that we love our
fellows.
II.

Alternative images of political acti on

We are now ready to develop some of the points
that have
begun to emerge about the role of ideas and passion
in political
action.

I

shall lay out the True Believer model and its con-

trasting image of rational politics in terms of the role of
passion, explanatory theory and moral ideas.
II. a.

True Believer motivationi the primacy of passion

Starting out from the fact that the frustrated predominate among the early adherents of all mass movements
and that they usually join of their own accord, it is
assumed 1) that frustration of itself, without any
proselytizing prompting from the outside, can generate
most of the particular characteristics of the true
believer; 2) that an effective technique of conversion
consists basically in the inculcation and fixation of
proclivities and response indigenous to the frustrated
mind. ^i
i

Hoffer's True Believer rests on the notion that under

certain social conditions, particular passions arise which
Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New Yorki McGraw20.
Hill, 1966).
Note the following passage
"Pragmatic morality
is the basis of all popular moral codes, and is based on the
recognition that men need one another, and therefore condemns
many kinds of harmful actions, especially those which threaten
to undermine the social order.
Ideal morality, by contrast,
has never been accepted as the basis of any popular moral code,
since it not only condemns harmful actions but requires that
men love others and they love themselves and without regard
to possible rewards." p. 30.
t

21.

Hoffer, The True Believer

,

preface.
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act as the springs to action regardless of the reasons
or

ideas which are used to rationalize action.

la

*

This passion

frustration^ when individuals cannot develop selves

with which they can live, when they cannot establish clear
interests and discover the means for pursuing them, they are
frustrated.

Under anomic conditions individuals may re-

spond by joining social movements which rid them of an
unwanted, ill-defined self, or a self which cannot satisfy
its cravings legitimately.

behavior is overwhelming.
emotions

-

The impact of affect on political

We find here a language of the

anxiety, frustration, self -hatred

-

and we are

left with a sense that social movements serve to sharpen

individual feelings of discontent, are expressions of
individual anxieties and frustrations which happen ts be
felt by a great number of persons

-

albeit persons suffering

the effects of the same social condition.

The frustrated,

the anxious, grab onto a movement to ease their emotional

problems.

The motivating drive is tension reduction, physical

•need* reduction, homeostasis, or seme other •cause' actually

quite unrelated to reasoning, a cause which flows from

within the individual, although conditioned by the social
22

milieu.

Indeed, we have moved away from a description of

human action and toward a description of human behavior
See R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation ( London
22.
Rout ledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) for a discussion of motives
as causes.
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extremist action begins to look rather more like something
that happens to a person than something he or she does.
There are several important implications of this view
of political action.

Since it rests on implicit assumptions

about the type ©f social order under which persons can develop as autonomous individuals with selves they can accept, it

establishes a justification for particular social arrangements
and actions designed to promote them.

The underlying dissat-

isfaction which leads to extremist action, however, is with
the self and not with society.

To say this is to de-legitimize

claims of the True Believer against existing social arrangements

Motives spring from the depths of mental and emotional
ill-being.

This sense of sickness and irrationality comes

out in Hoffer's lexicography of motivation

j

for example in

'Anxiety* is the sort of

his use of the term •anxiety*.

attitudinal concept which is most closely akin to a pure
emotion term} it has, in normal usage, no close or necessary

connection to reasoning.

Anxieties, primarily about one-

self, give rise to 'needs* for change independent of any

theory of or plan for social change, and any evaluation
of social structures as they are presently constituted.

Hoffer moves from the concept

*

anxiety* to the concept

•frustration* without indicating any possible differences

between the two notions, particularly the role of cognition
and beliefs in the latter.

Although both 'anxiety* and
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•frustration

1

are seen as connected to social conditions,

they remain at the level of irrational passioni
as springs
to action they flow from individual emotions
rather than
from any rational source which could be rooted
in an

understanding of those social conditions.
This focus on anxiety and frustration has
repercussions
in our understanding of the role of ideas in extremist
action, both explanatory and moral ideas.

Building on the

assumption that passion is the spring to extremist action,
the True Believer theorist constructs an image of the way
1

ideas are held and acted upon which excludes the possibility

that rational discourse can take place within a political

movement and between movement adherents and their opponents.
It also excludes the possibility that movement members might

not all have the same motives for their actions.

Since

extremist ideas are parasitic on the emotions of •sick
individuals, rational discourse is seriously impeded.

1

Ideas

serve emotional needs regardless of their content, and
serve the same needs for all movement adherents.

key term is 'anxiety*

Again the

an idea's acceptability flows not

i

out of its meaningfulness but out of its ability to satisfy

psychological needs.

Ideas are used to support

conceptions which reduce tension.

those self-

Content and meaning are

irrelevant so long as the idea system is closed, complete
23

and security producing.
The way in which ideas are held and acted upon is very
important to the development of a political movement. If
23.
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When people are ripe for a mass movement,
thev are
^usually ripe foran effective movement,
and
not
solely for one with a particular
doctrine or

program.

^

Movements are interchangeable, ideology
serves to obfuscate
practical reasoning and isolate the
individual from truth
about her/himself and the environment.
Indeed, this is

exactly why the True Believer finds an
ideology attractive,
th « ff ctiv «ness of a doctrine should
?
not be
5
S,'J
judged
by its profundity, sublimity or the
validity
of the truths it embodies, but by how
thoroughly it
insulates the individual from his self and
the world
as ix is.
The Movement is a substitute for an unwanted
self; the ego
becomes attached to it in a total, passionate,
extravagant
26
and uncompromising manner.
Such attachments do not bode

well for rational discourse and open-minded
evaluation of
counter-evidence and alternative considerations.
The True Believer becomes attached to new ideas
through
a conversion process.

for a new identity.
emotive structure

-

Persons who hate themselves search
The come to the movement with a cognitive-

that of mass man

-

which does not facil-

27

itate rational choice.

Rather it facilitiates imitation

ideas are held rigidly they become dogma.
If ideas are held
in an open and self-conscious manner, the movement can change,
members can be rationally persuaded to change.
24.

Hoffer, The True Believer

25.

Ibid ., p. 76.

26.

Ibid .

,

p.

,

p.

25.

24.

See Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New Yorki
2?.
Basic Books, i960) for a discussion of these structures.
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of any identity which appears to bring
security.

The

closed mind is "open-to any and all influences
from without
which appear to meet the need for security,
especially
ideas which offer an excuse for failure
and a promise
of a better world to come.

Re-socialization to these new ideas occurs in a
rigidly
authoritarian structure which parallels the family
in its

28

emotionality.

This structure reinforces the "needs"

of the converts for order and discipline.
.

The ideas

themselves are used as manipulative tools whose
purpose
is "...to instill in ^movement/ follcwers a
facility for

united action and self-sacrifice..." and produce a willless particle whose passions can be channelled and
directed
29
by effective doctrine.

Doctrine, however, must come from somewhere and this
is the function of the "men of words."

The talkers and

thinkers
... prepare the ground for the rise of a mass
movement
by discrediting prevailing
1)
creeds and institutions and detaching from
them the allegiance of the people; 2) by
indirectly creating a hunger for faith in the
hearts of those who cannot live without it, so
that when the new faith is preached it finds
an eager response among the disillusioned
masses?
by furnishing the doctrine
3)
and the slogans of the new faith? 4) by
undermining the convictions of the 'better
people,
those who can get along without faith
t

1

-

See Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality for a discussion of "alternation.
2~F^

29.

Hoffer, The True Believer

,

p.

79.
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so that when the new fanaticism
makes its appearance they are without the capacity
30
to resist
it.

The thinkers create the tools of
manipulation, they use
ideas to play upon the emotional needs
©f the weak, the

insecure and the frustrated.
But are these thinkers, then, not the
source of some
kind of rationality in mass movements?
Indeed not, for
to round the circle of passion, the thinkers
themselves
are motivated by frustration.

Whatever the type, there is a deep-seated craving
common to almost all men of words which determines
their attitude to the prevailing order. It is
a
craving for a clearly marked status above the
common run of humanity. 31

When the established order fails to satisfy this
craving,

when men of words have no meaningful work through which
to
satisfy their drive for status, they turn their frustrations
outward and create ideas designed to undermine the hated,

frustrating order.

However much the protesting man of words sees himself
as the champion of the downtrodden and injured, the
grievance which animates him is, with very few
exceptions, private and personal. 32
These frustrated,

for fanaticism.

'alienated

1

intellectuals are primed

They do not seek to educate their followers

but to indoctrinate them.

"They do not want freedom of

conscience, but faith - blind, authoritarian faith.
30.

Ibid ., p. 128.

31.

Ibid ., p. 121.

32.

Ibid ., p. 122.

They

-eep away

the eld order not t.
create a society of free
md
independent men. but t.
establish uniformity,
individual
anonymity and a new structure
of perfect unity." 33
with
themselves at the hel*!
Furthermore, the ideas which
these
alienated intellectuals develop
are non-rational since
they
are unconstrained by the
considerations of practical
politics,
the politics of balance
and compromise. Mass action
is unconstrained by the give and
take of conflicting ideas
which
flow out .f plural structures.
And mass man is open to any
and all influences from outside,
unprotected by *. sheltering
structures of an integrated society.
If ideas appeal to True Believers
because of pre-

existing emotional needs, so too
do moral ideas.
like justice, equality, freedom,

Concepts

etc., fir>« r «.t in

emotional needs of frustrated, self
-hating individuals, they
are used to justify - or rather to
rationalize - the actions
of fanatical intellectuals and their
authoritarian followers.
t
,Ba
WOr S needs the sanction of ideals and
ii:
5 !?
2
the f^
incantation
of
words in order to act forcefully.
a ?' C0 and » and c °nquer, but he must
feel
.!i sf
5 n th
sa
ese hungers he does not cater to
S
y;
SIJ?
o petty sell.
Jj
a
He needs justification, and he seeks it
in the realization of a grandiose design,
and
solemn ritual of making the word become flesh. in the
Thus
he does battle for the downtrodden and
disinherited and
for liberty, equality, justice and duty
3^

T
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Moral ideas are used roanipulatively as
goads to action and
as rationalizations of less worthy
motives. They
are

parasitic on the passions.

Sometimes the language of

political action is altruistic but this too is
deceptive.
The extremist is rarely, if ever, concerned
about others.
This is a person whose rawest emotional needs
are out there
on the surface, whose motives for action
are entirely selforiented, if not rationally self-interested (as this
model

defines rationality).

While altruism appears to take such

a large part in the motives of political fanatics, their

self-renunciation is a false altruism.

It is not an out-

pouring of love for one^s fellow man, but the rationalization
of one's frustrations with an inadequate self turned out-

ward and made •good' by identification with the humanistic
goals of the movement.

These are sick, unwhole persons who

substitute the movement for their incomplete selves.
chief desire is to escape that self

- and it is

"Their

this desire

which manifests itself in a propensity for united action
and self sacrifice," in what appear to be humane causes.

35

Finally, since there are no objective standards of

morality, but instead socially relative moral codes, indi-

viduals cannot be said to have a rational basis for choosing
among alternative moralities.

conversion

i

•Choice* is more a matter of

the new code takes on the same status of reality

as the old since it is learned under similarly emotion-laden
53^
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circumstances.

What is commanded by authority is
what

ought to be.
But we need to ask whether there
is any relationship
between these moral ideas and the
explanatory theories
which True Believers appear to accept as
a package.
It

does seem that there isi once certain
emotional predis36
positions exist, for example a passion for
equality,

certain explanatory theories are precluded.
Lvalues which. flow out of emotional needs

Thus the

can preclude

.acceptance of contradictory ideas or beliefs.

The re-

lationship between facts and values, however, is
unidirec-

tional.

Evidence cannot be brought to bear on basic value

commitments, commitments rooted in the emotions.
II. b.

The contrast model

t

rational political action

Hoffer draws a sharp contrast between the mass move-

ment adherent and the autonomous, rational political agent.
This constrast is developed most clearly in The Ordeal of
Chan ffg in which he contrasts the immature individual in anomic

society who lacks opportunities for self-advancement with the
mature, autonomous individual in an integrated society which

provides avenues for personal advancement.

This latter

individual is responsible, independent in judgment, a prag-

matist and a realist, complete, self-assured, and self-reliant.
S/he accepts the burden of autonomy, a burden which only
the strong can carry.

W.

Ibid ., p. 37.
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existenCe is heavil burdened
and
y
and can be endured
only when
villi
bolstered by confidence and
self-esteem. 37

bSsefJiJwf
W1 ™ fears

Reasonable politics are pursued
by free individuals not
easily manipulated by extremist
appeals. This free individual is rooted in a social
structure which gives her/him
-...leeway t^tinker, /to/ follow his
hunches and run risks
on his own."
He or she is free to test ideas
again 'reality.
S/he is a distinct indivdual with
a will and judgment of her/
his own.
(All this obviously sets off a
critique of
the

True Believer who renounces self and
personal responsibility,
de-individualizes her/himself in a corporate
body, imitates
rather than originates, is gullible,
propagandizable, etc.)

Hoffer clearly assumes that rational politics
is
politics in the pursuit of self-interest. 39

The key terms

in Hoffer »s model of rational political
action are autonomy
and self-interest, terms which I think Gerhard
Lenski's

discussion of persons as egoists helps us understand.

In

several important ways, Lenski's Power and Privilege
is

radically different from Heffer's (and Kornhauser «s) work.
Lenski is indebted to an intellectual tradition flowing
more from Hobbes than from Durkheim, a tradition which

encourages him to abstract the individual out of social life
and to attribute to this individual universal needs, wants
37.
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Hoffer extends rational self-interested politics to
39.
•class* politics.
In a pluralist society the clear separation
of classes permits each class to pursue its rational selfinterest.
But one wonders why this does not degenerate into

41

and purposes.

Hoffer and Lenski differ in their
view of
man's relation to society and
therefore in ^enr conception of
what comprises a moral order
and why persons obey

this order.
But, despite their indebtedness
to different theoretical
traditions, they reach similar
conclusions about what rational
political action and mature morality
look like.

The philosophical egoism upon
which Lenski constructs

his synthesis of radical and
conservative theories of social
stratification and change is worth our
consideration since it
also undergirds Hoffer's conception of
rational politics and
can be taken as the foundation of the
True Believer contrast
model.
Lenski 's thesis is that the spring to
human action is
the person's interest in his/her own
happiness - defined as the

accumulation of what is valued.
are in scarce supply.

But things that are valued

Since "this is the normal feature of

the world of nature ..".persons are in constant
competition to
obtain these scarce resources, to fill their
insatiable appetites.
It "...follows logically that a struggle
for rewards
...

.

.

will be present in every human society,"

40

an assumption which

is compatible with Hoffer's thesis (adapted from
Durkheim) that
.

some divisions of labor do result in conflict over available
re41
wards or "class conflict."
We find in Hoffer a tempering

open class war. Class war does not erupt because each class
recognizes its usefullness to the whole, and is constrained
by appeals to justice and decency.
40.
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•f Lenski «s view, a move away from
universalizing this
feature of human action, and a rooting
of it in particular
social conditions.

Lenski moves from his assumption that
persons are
fundamentally self-interested to a theory of
social organization. Because persons need each
other in order to pursue
their self-interests, they organize a social
life.
This
image of social life is clearly laid out
in the following
discussion of games.

Children's games afford far more insights into
nature of social organization than is usually the
recognized.
In particular, they demonstrate the process
by which institutions with their elements
of cooperation and morality and their concepts of right
and
justice can emerge from the actions of an originally
unorganized aggregation of individuals each selfishly
seeking to maximize his own personal satisfactions,
x© achieve this maximization individuals are
forced
to work (and play) together, but they find that
this
can be rewarding only if the activity takes place
within the framework of a system of rules which,
above all else, protects the cooperative activity
itself.
This can only be done if certain basic
rights are guaranteed to all of the essential participants. .. .This may seem to entail some sacrifice
on the part of the stronger or abler participants,
but really itdoes not, since the only alternative
is the cessation of the cooperative activity and all
its benefits.
Thus, for them, as for the other participants, adherence to the rules can be accounted for
merely as a form of enlightened self-interest . 2

Again this position is tempered in Hoffer, who would not
agree that persons join or form societies for utilitarian
reasons, or that persons even need reasons for doing what

they are already doing - i.e., participating in an ongoing
%2~»

Lenski, Power and Privilege , p. 27.

^3
Rather, utilitarian persons are
the product
of particular modes of social
life.
Some social groups give
rise to our self-interests,
others - especially
4-3

social life.

"political.,

groups

- are

used by us to pursue these
interests.
Lenski.
view of society is constructed
out of an immutable human
nature, and Hoffer would certainly
find fault with this.
However, I believe that, given
pluralist social conditions,
Hoffer would agree that persons
are motivated as Lenski
suggests - i.e., to satisfy their
self-interests while constrained by that enlightened egoism
which undergirds rational
political action.
One of the egoistic needs which
Lenski picks out as
vital to political action is the
insatiable need for selfesteem;

m

K

Psychological process which causes men to
*? Sree of res P e ct also creates a
SI!?J
demand i!
for more. The desire for status gives
rise

?«;irt +v,?«
h
llmited

enSk

S

ima

? 2? human action rests on
{£w.e
K
drives, motives,
instincts, interests, etc.,
e

the notion that
flow out of
r ni
7 are internal t0 Persons and cause action.
TSS-v? S°
raW n ° conce P tual distinction between
"instincts"
riy ?® «
avoidance
of
ain
tension,
P
hunger,
JSf^J - on \Z
thirst
theone hand, and "reasons., and "motives" e.g., interests, beliefs, etc. - on the
other, either in
terms of how they relate to action - as
"cause" or as
justification" - or in terms of their relationship
to
evaluations.
The spring to action is conceived of as a push
from inside. This assumption establishes a
particular
status for motives as causes for action which individuals
have and it delimits the range within which motives
can
vary - between irrational, emotional pushes and egoistic
self-interested reasons.
In a sense, Lenski's model yeilds an
accurate picture of human motivation; a person must have
a
motive in order to be motivated? egoism is true insofa7~as
the
springs to action must be one's own. Lenski, however,
moves
from this truism to argue that motives originate
in the self
an argument which leads us away from seriously
asking whether
-

»

to an insatiable appetite.^
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conditions, agrees that this
need is a vital element
in political motivation.
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But an individualist society
is not all that radioall
individualistic.
Persons in such societies
are motivated
by a need for self-esteem,
and it is the social ff rou
DS
with which we are identified
which provide a great part
of that self-esteem.
It is upon this group based
esteem
that Lenski constructs a theory
of conscious social change
which attempts to link the direction
of change - from

egalitarian to stratified and vice
versa - with surplus
and scarcity.
This is Lenski s theory of status
inconsistency.
At first it appears that Lenski has
constructed a
theory of socialchange which eliminates
human consciousness
altogether.
But he is not so naive as to do
that.
Both

social change and social maintenance
require the deployment

persons^motions and reasons are somehow related

M.
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38.

to their

^5

of ideas.

For example, ideas can be used
to manipulate
and control persons, to justify
the status
quo; or

ideas can be used to make claims
on the distributive
system, to promote social change
by mitigating the workings
of the distributive "laws.fact, Lenski goes so far
as to argue that ideas can be
used "...to manipulate
the social situation of others,
or their perception of
it, by the exercise of one's
resources and rights, thereby increasing the pressures on
others to act in accordance
with one's own wishes."

m

What Lenski has done is to sneak a
notion of false
consciousness into what is basically a
technological

theory of social change through the back
door.

But what

is most interesting is his explanation
of how false

consciousness can be converted to "real" consciousness,

how some persons can become aware that existing
ideologies
can be utilized to justify demands for social
change.

Recognition of one's real interests seems to be
based on the way in which our group memberships provide
us with self-esteem.

If rational pluralist politics is

made possible by the mutual constraint of competing

plural social groups comprised of members seeking their
self-interests, and if these groups are open to all, we
46,
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need to understand what happens
when persons belong to
groups which support conflicting
demands and expectations,
and in particular groups which
carry differing rewards.
One possibility is that these
persons will be crosspressured and become politically
immobilized, a position
which Hoffer would probably support.
But Hoffer has
ignored the possibility that groups
may be differentially
valued by society and therefore
satisfy individual needs
for self-esteem differently. If
this is the case, then
persons who are members of differentially
esteemed groups
have a clearly defined rational
interest in pushing

for rewards in terms of that group
which is more highly
valued.
This is Lenski's theory of status
inconsistency.

Given a choice, persons who experience
inconsistent
statuses will rationally choose to ignore that
classificati
which demeans them and to focus on the
classification

which raises their prestige, wealth, power, etc.
As we shall see in Chapter IV, the theory of
status

inconsistency is considered especially appropriate to
the case of women in modern industrial society.

Women

are perceived as making demands not as women but as
members
Lenski may still have to come to grips with the crosspressure thesis. Under what conditions do status inconsistencies promote political action, and under what
conditions do they immobilize?
4?.
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of the middle class, i.e.,
as educated professionals,
or would-be professionals, or
as citizens.
Since women
have won the vote and since
few still opt for professional
life, Lenski feels free to
write that "...for the vast
48
majority of women, the battle for
equality has been won."
Whether Lenski's perception of
women's position
in contemporary society is
accurate depends on whether
the category -woman- is perceived
as a group which carries
yrlth it social significance,
i.e., significance in terms
of the social distribution of rewards
and benefits.
And

whether women will perceive inconsistencies
in their
present statuses depends also on whether
this

category

carries significance for them.

It is obvious that Lenski

does not think the category significant;
it is not so
obvious that women agree.
We cannot assume that women wish to
have their

position in a sex-caste system ignored, nor
can we assume
that women believe that they are recognized only
in their
higher statuses. Furthermore, we cannot assume
that

all women who participate in the Women's Movement
are

motivated by a simple desire for higher status in the

48.
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within the existing status system.

If vertical mobility

were all women sought, one might
well wonder why women do not
simply follow Lenski's suggestion
and marry men of higher
status, thus continuing to be
rewarded by society for
ascribed status.

There is a final point which needs
to bo teased out
and that is the point that persons
experiencing status

inconsistencies cannot ceuch their demands
for change in
any language they choose. To be
rational, the demands must
be couched in the language of
ideal-democratic ideologies
(as long as agents are located in
democracies). The nature
of the demands serves as the criteria of
rationality.
A

demand is rational if it utilizes existing rules
of the game
- in the case of the United States, the
liberal-democratic

moral-political rule of equality of opportunity

-

to max-

imize egoistic interests.
The theory of status inconsistency is an attempt
to

account for rational political activism and the use of

political ideology in terms of persons
There seems
WT
of democratic

1

need for self-esteem.

to be an inconsistency in Lenski's recognition
ideologies as valid and his thesis. that inequality
is inevitable.
Democratic ideologies do seem to imply egalitarianism. But if we see that Lenski's version of democratic
egalitananism is the ideology of equality of opportunity
(implying the equal opportunity to be better than others),
the inconsistency is resolved. Persons make demands for
equality of opportunity, which once met - met by the strict
demand for equality at the beginning of the race for status
with no consideration of the resulting inequalities of
condition - leave no grounds for criticizing any resulting
inequalities.

"Men's reactions to the
phenomenon of status
inconsistencyis Lenski-s way of
getting at consols, rational
demands
fr social change which seem to fly in
the face of a distributive law which predicts
increasing inequality with
greater surplus.

in terms of

tt^J

*««»«ncy to think of himself

treating him in terms of his
lowest status or rank.
And so we have a rational
politics of social change, a
politics revolving around whether
others will acquiesce to
our demand for equal opportunities
to be recognized and to
achieve in those positions which
carry higher rewards.
We need only accept Lenski's
assumptions about human
motivation and man's insatiable appetite
for status to find
his description of the politics of
change convincing.
Persons
who experience inconsistent statuses
are likely to make
demands for change because they have an
interest in shifting
the focus of rewards and respect from
stratification systems
in which they are not esteemed to ones
in which they are.
This is not a demand for equality, but for
ignoring some

^

systems of inequality in favor of others.

"Egalitarian"

ideologies appeal to such persons so long as they
redress
50.

Lenski, Power and Privilege

,

p.

86.

50

the balance of inequality in their own
favor.

Others

have an interest in maintaining the status
quo and will
oppose such shifts. Thus one might expect
to find college
educated Blacks pressing for equal opportunities
to become
business executives, and middle class intellectual
women
pressing to become Democratic political candidates with
a certain amount of while male resistence to
both.

The theory of status inconsistency is a model of

rational politics which we can contrast to the True
Believer

model of irrational politics.

It may well be that True

Believers also experience inconsistent statuses

-

e.g.,

Hoffer's intellectual True Believers do have high educational
status but low prestige in the social order they reject.
Indeed, one of the problems Lenski himself has is that he

cannot utilize his own theory to distinguish between rational
and irrational politics.

However, if we focus on the kind

©f demands which define rationality, and combine that with

the notion of status inconsistency, we find that rational

politics must be designed to maximize rewards for the self,
and be couched in

the.

language of the pluralist, bargaining

political game.
This image of politics has certain implications for the

way in which we press our demands.

Because we have all

internalized the constraints of bargaining politics and because we all recognize certain claims as at least potentially
justifiable, we enter politics with a certain amount of

51

willingness to make concessions to
our opponents.

Moreover, in a structurally diffuse
society it is difficult to
hold ideas rigidly. In effect,
pluralism guarantees that
ideas are held with that degree
of hesitency which makes

rational political discourse possible.

It is a plurality

of ideas and the hesitency which
flows from this plurality
which stands behind liberal support
of the political value
•tolerance,
and which serves as the base from
which to
criticize True Believer thinking. The
liberal points to
the danger of impassioned commitment
to one "ideologyto the exclusion of alternative ideas.
Pluralist man,
•

confronted with several conflicting ideas
(seldom are these
seen as ideologies) is a cautious man, waiting
for these ideas
to stand the test of the marketplace,
the
test of 'truth.*

In the real world of liberal politics, it
is assumed that
no idea ever does actually win out, and pluralist
man always
stands somewhat aloof from a full commitment to
any par-

ticular set of ideas.
III.

A preliminary critique

Having set out in detail those criteria which define
the True Believer model of political action and its built-

in contrast model of rational action,

I

am now in the position

of offering a brief preliminary critique.

This critique

forshadows the model of the Moral Agent which

I

will

develop in the next chapter,
but it does not require
any
detailed remarks about that
model.

^

First there are questions
which need to be raised
about
assumptions of egoism, especially
in Lenski -s version of
rational politics. tf e need to
ask whether this egoism
is
trivially true, i.e.. persons
indeed have to have a motive
in order for it to be their
motive. But the more vital
claim that persons largely seek
only to satisfy themselves
although they may do so by
cooperating with others may be
open to more serious criticism.
Lenski may be correct that
persons recognize that they must
cooperate in order to engage
in many kinds of satisfying activities.
However, this need
not limit us to a view of persons
as entirely self-interested,
nor to a view that cooperation is
parasitic on self-interest.
As I shall argue in the next chapter,
this model ignores the
possibility that the very existence of
cooperative activities
creates in persons the kinds of interests
that cannot
be

said to spring either from the self or
to be entirely in the
self.
If this argument is convincing, the thesis
that egoism
undergirds rational action is underminded and
a new dimension
is added to our understanding of human motives one that is

excluded by the contours of the True Believer model
and its
contrast.

Neither Lenski, Hoffer, or Kornhauser are interested in

whether persons can learn to take an interest in the development of others, although they are each interested in how

persons can learn to adapt themselves to the interests of
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others.

It is highly unlikely that any of them
would accept

a theory of moral development which might
move beyond egoism

to "some conception of 'social interests,
•solidarity.'

'community,

•

or

Nor could they conceive of a rational pol-

itics that did not rest on self-interest.

Politics is

rational when it is in the pursuit of egoistic
interests,
irrational if other reasons are offered.

The most para-

doxical thing about Kornhauser's version of the
model is
that he readily accedes to the idea that persons who
have
the least interest in an established order

ically or affectively

-

-

either econom-

are most likely to overthrow that

order, yet he cannot accept this overthrow as rational
when the

society has established procedures for redress of grievance.
Lenski's version, moreover, is asociological and a-

historical, despite the fact that Lenski does see great

variation in social structure and organization.

Lenski

abstracts the individual out of society and posits a universal

human need for self-respect and status.

Without getting in-

volved in a lengthy discussion of the problems of lumping
together needs for self-respect with biological needs like
survival, sustenance, health,

I

think

I

am justified in

See Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism
(Boston; Beacon, I968) for a discussion of 'community.'

5T.

Kornhauser's discussion of "class" politics is interesting.
Unlike Marx, Kornhauser sees class politics as the
norm in pluralist societies because he equates class with
economic interest groups. Class refers to individual interests and conscious states rather than to relationship with
the mode of production.
It is not surprising that Kornhauser
52.

saying that Lenski has
ma de a perhaps unconscious
and
certainly undefended leap
from biological to social
needs.
The implications of this
are profound, because in
doing this
he establishes the foundation
upon which is built the
notion
that inequality is inevitable.
Without stratification
there
would be no status and
therefore no needs satisfaction.
Kornhauser, too, is open to
this criticism.

His

vision of a just society is
an organically integrated
social
order in which stratification
and the division
of labor

works to the advantage of
all.

So long as there is equality

of opportunity and persons
can sort themselves out
according
to their talents, democracy
is preserved.
Since some kind of

stratification is essential to satisfy
human needs, and to
ensure that socially valuable
functions are performed by
those
with talent, ensuing inequalities
are not open to serious debate,

Kornhauser and Hoffer, however, are
not as open to the
criticism of asociality and ahistoricity
as is Lenski.

Kornhauser clearly links motivational
schemes with social
structures, and neither looks for reasons
why persons
cooperate.

That is assumed to be part of what it
means to be

a social being.

Yet both seem to make an error in the

opposite direction and to loose sight of
individuals as
they experience a continuous existence.
As one cultural
form breaks down - when there are marked
discontinuities
sees class conflict as taking shape in
coalition-formation
and compromise under liberal democratic rules.
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in authority or community or when there is a severe crisis
like prolonged unemployment or defeat in war

appear to exist in a limbo.

-

persons

There is a feeling here that

persons do not exist at the interstices of cultural change.
A society having a traditional system of authority
is greatly in need of social formations which can
bridge the transition to a new system of democratic
power.
Otherwise, no group is able to influence
deeply the collective activity and instead of new
values being built into the social structure, there
is merely a cultural vacuum and social atomization.53
i

Change is something that happens to people; society disintegrates, culture changes, personality and motives change.
One cannot quarrel with the sociological sense of a

statement like Kornhauser's, "Personal autonomy does not
5^

develop apart from society and culture,"

but one wonders

what happens to autonomous persons when the pluralist order

which nurtures and sustains their independence is dislocated.
It may well be that they revert to less developed motivational

schemes, but this requires some empirical support.

One also

needs to consider the possibility that persons might develop

another type of autonomy as they engage in the creation of

new roles, rules and constraints.

There is no sense here

that societies may be pluralistic in providing opportunities

for persons to experience different kinds of constraints,
thus providing the tools for dealing with problematic

situations as challenges to present motivational schemes.
Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society
54.
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There is also a questi.n as
t. whether Kornhauser's
motivational typology is complete.
We need to ask whether
•guilt', -shame', 'obligation',
'anxiety', and -selfreliance', as he conceives them,
are adequate conceptual
Pictures of political motivation.
We need to ask where
motives like 'resentment' and
'indignation' can come in.
Nor are these motivational
concepts particularly well
explicated. There is the very
important case of 'frustration'
which we need to consider.

First, it is assumed that frustration
leads to action,
while it may well be that frustration
and tension arise in
the course of action. As Peter
Lupsha has so cogently
argued, frustration theories posit a
"triggering mechanism,"
there is the action, somehow it must
have been caused,

therefore there must have been frustration. 55

Frustration

is a basic emotion, something like fear or
anxiety, which

can directly cause action without any mediating
factors
like an explanatory theory which directs
action toward the
cause of the frustration or which points out
gaps between
ideals and reality which can be closed.

Frustration theory

assumes an immature individual who cannot "ad just" to
the

reality of these gaps.

hidden

i

But,

"...a crucial element remains

when a man is starving, or is denied justice or

freedom, frustration is a sane and reasoned reaction.

Equally

Peter Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence
Some
Psychological Theories vs. Indignation," Politics and Society
*
2 (Fall, 1971)189-104.
55.

i
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and reasoned

these do not mean devoid of
passion can be a man's commitment to
a movement which aims at
56
eliminating hunger, injustice,
coercion.-

Breines' criticism of Hoffer
leads us directly to the
crux of the matter, and that is
the place of explanatory

theory and moral ideas in this model
of political action.
According to Breines, ideas flesh
out and direct emotion
concepts like frustration. Unlike
'anxiety which

is the

"

sort of attitudinal concept most
closely akin to a pure
emotion term like fear and which arises
in a vague, illdefined, threatening environment,
'frustration' seems to.
require a more vivid conception of where
one is and where
one would like to be, some theory of
a 'good society and
one's appropriate place in it. Theorists
in the True Believer
tradition accept the notion that once certain
values are
5

present, certain beliefs are precluded, but they
do not see

that our beliefs can somehow play a role in our
choice of
values, can redirect or reshape or reformulate emotions,

can set limits to what can be valued.

Further, as Breines

suggests, even if ideas do originate in frustrations,
this

ought not to be taken to imply the equivalence of all ideas.
...while one may separate, for purposes of analysis, the
psychological or social origins of ideas from the content and meaning of those ideas, one cannot exclude the
latter without hiding the truth of an idea. It is
just this hiding which Hoffer performs through his
claim that mass movements are interchangeable. 5

Paul Breines, "Would You Believe an Introductory
Critique of The True Believer " ( Boston New England Free
Press, no date), p. 4.
f>6.

t

i

57.

Ibid., p. 5.
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-^Some of the ideas people have are
moral ideas.

I

will

ar^ue that the True Believer model founders
on a conception
of morality as the induction of conventional
guides.
Despite
his own rejection of the idea that there
can be any truth
value in moral judgments, the True Believer
theorist does
buy the conventions of liberal democracy
and is quite
willing to reject as rationalizations of deep,
subconscious

motivations, or as obedience to the commands of
external
authority, the reasons for action offered by the
extremist.

They are not perceived as possibly flowing from
alternative
ideals of a good society.

In many cases this categorization

may be accurate, but in the next chapter,

I

shall suggest

that in at least some cases this is misleading.
Finally, there are untested assumptions made about the

structural constraints of pluralism.

Pluralist structures

are assumed to provide persons with the social bases from

which to pursue their interests without threatening the
social order.

Since there are opportunities to gain ad-

vantages, and because the division of labor is just, right
and necessary, one has reason to play by the rules which

mitigate social conflict.

But the model fails to consider

the possibility of uncompromisable conflict. The very structure

and rules of pluralist society may make it impossible for
some to pursue their interests through legitimate channels.

Interests which flow out of radically different conceptions
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of what ought to be may be totally
incompatible with the
rules which are designed to
further those interests which
are rooted in what is.
And, as Gusfield points out in
his criticism of

Kornhauser, extremism can and does
occur in pluralist societies.
By communicating group discontents,
plural groups

may in fact be essential to the
development of political
movements. One cannot assume that groups
will restrain
conflicts where there are no routine means
for redress of
grievances, and where grievances are not routine.
The belief that participation in the primary
and
secondary associations of society will moderate
conflict arises from this ideological commitment
to pluralistpolitics.
It leads the mass politics
theorist to identify political defeat with
social
alienation, to view extremist movements as
actions
of dis-attached persons, unrelated to
specific
bases or pursuing interests of a discrete socialsocial

base.->°

In the next chapter,

I

will suggest that this is indeed a

misleading assumption and that at least some extremists
are clearly identified with rewarding, meaningful, personally

gratifying groups, and not, as the True Believer model would
have it, groups which satisfy less than rational needs.

Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics,"
American Sociological Review 27 (February 1962), p. 29.
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CHAPTER III
AN ALTERNATIVE IMAGE OF RATIONAL POLITICAL
ACTION
As we at all times occupy a certain position
in space and
perceive everything from a certain point of view,
so we
occupy a certain position within the order of
of social institutions and think of men and of development
their potentialities from this point of view. We know theref
any philosophical inquiry into the conditions of ore' that
and into the essential human virtues, will always freedom,
need to
revised, however adequate it may seem to the particular be
conditions of its time, and to the concepts prevailing
5
in the thought of that time.

Stuart Hampshire

-

Thought and Action

But there is one other motive for intense political
commitment that is of a different moral order. That is the
motive of compassion.
It is possible. to be moved to
political commitment - not by wanting power, not by
seeking some sort of religious fulfillment, not because
one needs it psychologically - but because one chooses
to involve oneself in the plight of one's fellow men.
It is this motive, and this motive only, that I propose
to treat with moral respect.

Peter Berger
I

"Between System and Horde"

-

quote these two passages at length since they seem

to me to represent in broad outline the model of political

action which

I

shall develop in this chapter.

attempt to explicate a model of rational action
I

shall call the Moral Agent

-

Here
-

I

shall

a model

which moves beyond the

True Believer image of rationality as the pursuit of self-

interest, and which permits us to place that image of

rationality in its historical and social perspective.
While

I

do not intend to explicate the concept of 'rationality

1

I da

want

f

illustrate how it is rooted
in our social
life by showing that
persons may experience social
lives
which can move them beyond
egoism and self-interest.
This experience can provide
the basis for rational
political
action quite different from
the liberal politics
pictured
in Chapter II.
I zlB9 want t# draw
relationship
between rational politics and
moral reasoning, and especially to tease out the way
in which our adopting a
particular
ethical theory infects our
political judgments and actions.

^^

I.

The moral agent,

persons and human relationships

In order to explicate the Moral
Agent model, I need
to clarify two issues,
first, what does it mean to
be a
person, and second, what types
of interpersonal relationships do persons engage in. These
are important issues
since I want to claim that our image
of persons undergirds
our moral judgments and because,
we need an alternative
image of human possibility if we wish
to move beyond the
egoism of the True Believer contrast
model.
I

should like to argue that being a person
involves

having certain capacities.
following,

1) to feel

These capacities include the

pain and pleasure! 2) to formulate

intentions, projects and long range goals

i

3)

to enter into

rich reactive relationships! k) to become autonomous.

In

some respects this image of persons is
consistent with the

image developed in Chapter II, but there are
several
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vital differences.
I

should like also to argue that persons can
engage

in relationships which either impede or encourage
the

development of these capacities.
development are what

I

Those which encourage

call 'liberating' relationships;

they are relationships in which persons treat each
other
as having these capacities, and work to promote
their devel-

opment.
I

These are relationships built upon mutual respect.

assume that persons have the capacity to engage in
such

relationships, are capable, for instance of living up to
the demands of a commonly accepted moral code, of being

trustworthy, of fulfilling their obligations, etc.

Why these capacities are important will become clear
as I develop the notion of mutual respect.

That we have

these capacities does not mean that persons do not engage
in other types of very human relationships

-

for example,

relationships of mutual hatred, which, in a sense, are relationships built upon mutual respect since we do treat each
other as having certain capacities like the capacity to knowingly inflict pain.

What

I

am interested in, however, are

the implications for political action of our having the

capacity to participate in relationships of the former type.
These paragraphs demand a great deal of unpacking.

propose to do this in terms of the following questions
1)

what does it mean to be a rule-follower;

2)

what

I

particular rules does a Moral
Agent try to follow,
3)
what other elements are
involved in the actions of
Msral
Agents - how are explanatory
theories and passions

linked
to moral reasons, k) how
and under what conditions
does
the capacity to reason
develop, 5) how does this
model
give us critical leverage
against the True Believer
model,
what are the implications
of the Moral Agent model
for
political analysis.
I. a.

What does it mean to follow
rules

Undergoing both models developed
.is

in this dissertation

an image of persons as
rule-followers.

This sense of

persons rests on the assumption
that, while causal explanations of human behavior may at
times be adequate, a complete

understanding of what a person does
happens to him

-

-

as opposed to what

needs to take into account the
reasons

that person gives or could give for
his or her actions.
These reasons are what constitute
rule-governed behavior/
However, there are many different ways
in which persons can
orient themselves to those rules which
comprise the accepted
•reasons' for action in his or her own
society.
Among these
orientations are at least critical and
non-critical stances
vis-a-vis the rules which constitute one's
social life.
The image of autonomy on which the Moral
Agent model
rests is very much linked to persons' orientation
toward
IT

I am avoiding many of the debates
which revolve around
the distinction between 'reasons' and'causes.'
See, for
example, Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and
Causes,"
in May Brodbeck, ed., Readings in the Philosop hy of
the
Social Sciences (New York. The Macmillan Company,
1968)

pp. ^-57.
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rules.

it rests on the idea that persons not
only are

able to follow the rules which make
action possible

understand the rules which govern conduct
able to subject them to critical scrutiny.

-

-

i.e.,

but are also

True Believers,

rational egoists and Moral Agents all follow
rules, but
only the latter have developed the sort of
critical capacity
I will want to label moral.
To clarify what

rules,

I

I

mean by a critical orientation toward

think it is useful to refer to Piaget »s distinction

between heteronomous and autonomous reasoning or rule'

following.

In The Moral Judgment of the Child

identifies three modes of behaviori

.

Piaget

"...motor behavior,

egocentric behavior (with external constraint), and
cooperation.

And to these three modes of social behavior

there correspond three types of rules

motor rules, rules

i

due to unilateral respect, and rules due to mutual respect."

Motor rules are pre-social; they are rather more lawlike
(causal), in fact, than rulelike.

But with increasing

sociality or constraint by those around her/him, the
individual acquires. an ability to follow rules.

Finally,

when persons experience cooperation between equals, autonomy
and rule-following qua rule-following

critically evaluate existing rules

-

-

or the ability to

develops.

The, indi-

vidual has moved as far from lawlike behavior as Piaget
sees possible.
2~.
Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New Yorki
Free Press, 1965), p. 86.
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T* put this in the language of
child development,
In the first stage of development,
the child has no conception of social rules, indeed,
s/he cannot distinguish between self and what is outside self
and therefore cannot

distinguish between the constraints of
social rules and
the constraints of her/his own body
and the material world.
This inability leads to his/her investing
the social
environment with "divine" authority, with
the same massive
reality as the physical world. In the second
stage, the

,

child can distinguish social rules from
physical laws, but
still sees them as external to self and
transcendently
real.

"So long as the practise is not submitted
to

conscious, autonomous elaboration and remains,
as it were,

external to the individual, this externality is
symbolized
as transcendence."
Society precedes individual; realism

undergirds heteronomous activity.

The child obediently

follows rules, while at the same time perceiving
her/himself
as in fundamental conflict with these rules since
s/he can

neither understand their nature nor assert her/his own
will and evaluate them from the point of view of her/his
oun needs.

Yet these rules are obeyed uncritically.

But "...from the moment that children really begin to

submit to rules and apply them in a spirit of genuine
cooperation, they acquire a new conception of these rules.

Rules become something that can be changed if it is agreed
To

Ibid ., p. 94.

that they should be. ...

if

"

Rules may be altered

^

^
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^

a critical perspective
which reflects an
understanding of
the difference between
what Piaget calls
-constitutive- and
•constituted, rules and what
John Searle calls
'constitutive.
5
and 'regulative, rules.

^

•

Searle himself fi n<Js it
difficult to articulate
distinction he wants to draw
between these two types of
rules.
"As a start, we might say
that regulative rules
regulate antecedently or
independently existing forms
of
behavior, for example, many
rules of etiquette regulate
interpersonal relationships which
exist independently of
the rules.
But constitutive rules do
not merely regulate,
6
they create or define new forms
of behavior."
The rules
create the very possibility of
the activity which is then
logically dependent on the rules.
H * WeVe r ' the distinction is not
all that simple because
Ibid ., p. 95.
J 0h
R ' S ar1
Speech Acts (Cambridge! University
^o^Q
\
?
See also
1969).
Charles Taylor, "Interpretation smri +h»Press 9

^

\

^

discusses this distinctieni
"...we are
ZZZLl-ii
!
I i
normally <induced
to think of rules as applying to
behavior
0Ul bG available *• «s whether
or
rSe
?
existed.
Some
rules

S?tJ

e^-^J

are like this, they are re^ulati™
g
commandments, don't take the goods of
Lo?her?
But there
Q
that kerning the Queen's move in
9
c£ess wMoh
'f' 80 se a ^ble.
n0t
P
If one suspends these
?
rules, ?
or imagines a state in which they have
not yet been
introduced, then the whole range of behavior
in question?
case, chess playing, would not be.
Rules
of this
C?J are
tt constitutive rules."
kind

f^

6.

9

Searle, Speech Acts

,

p.

33.
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there may be several layers of rules
involved. For example,
there are rules which define what
it means to play games,
any games, e.g., rules that one
follows the rules of the
particular game one is playing, that one
doesn't cheat, etc.
But then there are the particular
rules which constitute
the particular game, e.g., the rule
in chess that a pawn
cannot take a piece directly in front of
it.
This rule is
essential to chess playing, unlike the
regulative rule which
stipulates that a player cannot touch a
pawn without moving
it.
This latter rule could be changed without
touching
the core of the game.
It is a regulative rule.

Regulative rules take the form of injunctions,
"though
shalts," while constitutive rules are more closely
analogous
to definitions or descriptions of the activity,

"if our

paradigm of rules are imperative regulative rules, such
non-imperative constitutive rules are likely to strike
us as extremely curious and hardly even as rules at all." 7

But it is upon this distinction that much of what

argue in this chapter is based, for

I

I

shall

shall argue that not

until we are able to see rules not simply as imperatives
but as constitutive of activities which

we.

may consciously

change, will we be able to assess and revise particular

rules and to act autonomously and creatively with respect
to them.

But there is another important implication for politics
of this distinction, and that has to do with the depth of
T*

Ibid

.

,

p.

34.
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debate around and about rules.

To clarify this somewhat,

I think we might look
at the example Piaget uses,

child's game of marbles.

the

Once children have moved
beyond

the motor-rule stage and
have a sense of the meaning
of
rules, we can begin to consider
the implications of the
ways they are oriented towards
rules for discourse. For
these children, the rules of
the game of marbles are
sacrosanct.
None of them can be altered
because they are authoritative
imperatives imposed either by parents
or by bigger children.
It is difficult to see here any
possibility for rational
discourse about changing rules. But
for children in the
third stage, rules can be subjected to
debate in terms of

their understanding of what it means to
cooperate in playing
a game.
It is important to point out that some
of the debated
rules will be more easily revised than
others? e.g., reg-

ulative rules about how far one stands away
from the circle
into which the marbles are rolled may or may
not be heatedly
debated in terms of whether they make for a better or
worse
game of marbles, but constitutive rules about whether
there
is to be a circle at all would - if raised certainly arouse

great passion for to question this rule might be to question
the very game of marbles.

As in political discourse, there

will be debate among children as to what rules are regulative
and what constitutive of the game of marbles, which ones

can be altered wit hout
sacrificing the game, but the
most
serious debates win be over
constitutive rules, although
it nay well be that to
engage in these debates would
require
a more sophisticated level
of cognitive development
and
would rarely be engaged in by
children.

An analogy from politics may be
clearer.

.

The heatednes

of the debate over the distribution
of rewards between organized labor and management, with
each jockeying for position
within a system of rules of bargaining
and compromise and
with each emphasizing those regulative
rules - e.g., legis-

lation

-

which best help their own interests,
is as nothing

compared to the heatedness of debate
over definitions of
politics when these occur. Imagine the
debate which would
ensue were one of the parties - labor
or management - to

question the definition of politics as
bargaining and compromize and to suggest that these procedures
were merely regul-

ative of a particular kind of politics.

Imagine the debate

were one party to propose reconstituting politics
as the
Q
pursuit of common as opposed to self-interests.
Debate, then, can take place at either level of rule-

following, with the most vital debates occurring over
con-

stitutive rules.

However, the ability to engage in these

W.
In "Conceptual Revision and Political Reform," Amherst,
Ma., 1973 (Mimeographed), William Connolly joins this
issue.
He argues that political disputes can revolve around what
constitutes the activity "politics." Convincing our opponent
to adopt our view is to open up possibilities hitherto
rejected and to go a long way toward winning the dispute.
I
would suggest that radical revisions are more likely to come
from those who are not doing very well under existing rules.
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debates requires that we can engage
in what Piaget calls
•true* rule following.
This ability develops at the
third
stage, the stage of autonomy.
Social rules become selfimposed as the conflict between self
and society which was
so pressing in the second stage is
abolished with the development of our understanding of ourselves
as social beings.
But not only are rules now self-imposed,
they are also open
to critical scrutiny from the
perspective of what one now
understands to be the purpose of rules - the
delimiting and
defining of human activity.

Understanding constitutive rules undergirds the
notion
of reflectiveness which is part of the
conception of autonomy

and morality

I

support.

Reflectiveness refers to the way in

which persons hold ideas.

In making political choices, re-

flective persons are aware that their own conceptions
may be
subject to radical revision in light of both the formal
rules

constitutive of the activity itself, and in light of alternative notions of persons their needs and their relationship
to
,

society.

Heteronomous persons are unfree in just the sense

that they are not reflective; they cannot subject the rules,

activities, and principles of their society to a critical an-

alysis based on an understanding of the constitutive rules of
social life and their relation to human needs, wants and purposes.

Zad7 individual is autonomous (at the social level) to the
degree to which he subjects the pressures and norms with which
he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation...."
Steven Lukes, Individualism (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1973)p. 52.
9.

i
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Reflectiveness is part of the social development
of
the autonomous person. As we shall see
below
in the

discussion of

the

conditions under which moral development

can occur, reflectiveness grows out of
social relationships
which permit the development of new cognitive
structures
through which persons perceive the world in
new ways.

Reflective action

-

that action in which Moral Agents

engage (when they are acting upon their best
motives)
is autonomous action.

Unlike heteronomous action

-

-

which

is characterized by 1) a failure to distinguish
self from

other (the person has no sense of self as a reflective
agent able to criticize existing social rules);

2)

com-

mission of the naturalistic fallacy with respect to all
rules (what is, ought to be); 3) action based on duty and

obedience

-

autonomous action is characterized by a sense

of self and of responsibility for one's actions.

Rules are

perceived as social and historical (and therefore alterable),
and the spring to action - the motivation to follow rules

-

comes, as we shall see, not from a conflict between self

and society which society wins, but from a sense of solidarity

with one's fellows.

Rules are not the internalized con-

straints of external authority, but the product of social

interactions and are seen as part of what it means to be a
person.
I.b.

The Moral Agent understands the idea of rule-following.

What kinds of rules constitute morality

Some of the most important rules of conduct we follow

are moral rules.

Moral rules are particularly important

^

^.politics sinoe many of our
pomicai actions

>

moral considerations.

Therefore it is imp9rtant
for us
to understand what
a moral rule ls
io and
how persons orient
themselves toward these
rules.

.

The distinction between
heteronomous and autonomous
rule-following is essential
to our understanding
the distinction between the actios
of the True Believer,
the
rational egoist, and the
Moral Agent. What I want
to do
at this point is to
illustrate the sorts of
reasons one
might offer for engaging
in certain kinds of
actions when
one is applying moral
rules heteronomously and
autonomously
Thas will lead us directly
into a discussion of the
possible
principles which could constitute
morality itself, and the
implications of these principles
for political practise.
Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory
of moral development
helps us get at these issues.
Kohlberg's thesis is that
morality is rather more than a set of
character traits,

role-specific behavior, obligations and
rights, more than
the code already embedded in existing
social practises.
He wants to show that morality is a form
of reasoning which
develops conceptually over time. Kohlberg
identifies
three levels of reasoning, levels which correspond
to

Piaget's motor, heteronomous and autonomous modes
of rulefollowing, although one could debate whether Level
III

ought to include Stage 5 in a society whose moral
code

embodies these principles.

These levels and stages are

set out below, but anyone
interested in a fuller
description
of the stages is invited
to review Kohlberg's work
as cited
in the Bibliography.

r

-

-

Level

I.

Level

II.

Level III.
.

Premorali
Stage 1.
Punishment and obedience
orientation
Stage 2.
Naitve instrumental hedonism

Morality of conventional role
conformity,
Stage 3.
Good-boy morality of
maintaining
good relations and approval
by
y
others

gSi£
Stage
5.

Stage 6.

op^^^^V

Morality of contract, or
individual
rights, and of democraticallv
J
accepted law
Morality of individual principles
of conscience. 1°

These stages are conceptual,
i.e., they involve the developing
ability to make sharper and more
complex distinctions about
persons, punishments and principles.
Thus, for example,
persons at Level III have a more
developed understanding of
persons and their social nature than
those at Level II society is envisaged as a human construction
rather than as
a concrete reality.
In the pre-moral stages, persons obey
rules not out of

any understanding of the social nature of
rules, but either
because they fear direct punishment or because
following a
rule can get them what they want.

These stages are similar

to Piagefs motor-rule stage since persons
actually do not see

Encyclope dia of Philosophy . "Moral Development," bv
}°*
Lawrence Kohlberg.
Obviously theorists who accept an image of society as
11.
having ontological reality apart from individuals will disagree
&
with this claim.
^

7^
themselves as rule-followers
by aS constrained either
by
externa! force or by the
force of their own needs,
(whether
Kohlberg is correct that these
are t„. distinct stages
with
an invariable sequence is
open to debate.) Under
conventional
morality - the level which
parallels Piagefs heteronomeus
morality - reasoning flows
from social convention, one
makes
reference to what others think or
to the demands of society
in justifying one's actions.
At the third level,

however,
one is able to evaluate these
conventions in terms of principles which move beyond convention
and which are based on
an understanding of the purpose
of moral rules. This level
parallels Piagefs autonomous morality,
but again there are
problems since it is not clear to
me how one could distinguish
whether Stage 5 reasoning were autonomous
or heteronomous in
a society where contractualism,
individual rights and demo12
cratically accepted law are embedded in
convention.

T ere are s me r al P">hlems with
Kohlberg 's theorv of
?
5
n
l0pment! irst ' * here i s *he ProMeS of how^ne
know* ?£?
knows
that a person ?
is morally developed.
Is there a differe
ing '^nd,US ng a co " oe P t? As Alston points
;SS
li^
i

™!^

1

($m?£

'

&J.vcn ai»uai,ion without naving it,
«.
- ~
^
but one can have a concept without using it
in a given
t n, "
h l ,e ?*
0wn tests seem t0 6 et
moral reason.5?
f
?!
+
ining
artificial
situations.
In "real-life" situations.
S
a
n0t
ly fronted with the logic of the situation
bn?
out w??h
with its emotional impact, including emotional
ties to persons about whom moral choices need to be made.
This may interfere with pure reasoning at Whatever stage the person
has
reached.
(This may help account for why Kohlberg can see
Martin Luther King as a moral agent but not Stokely
Carmichael:
Carmichael's various hatreds may get in the way of his reasoning capabilities which may really be at Stage
Kohlberg
6.)
.

.

?«W m

,

^

T

^
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While it goes well beyond the
scope of this dissertation
to take on the issue of
whether Kohlberg has legislated
a
°
m rality ' i>e -' ^^ated his Stage
6 principled morality
has ignored important features
of moral development f„„

e

'

e

?era
m6 t0 be im P°rtant conceptual
problems in
00 5 nltlv 8 *!
stages,
problems which flow from
fZZitl .i aichotomxzation
t
of form and content and from his
EES
lack of a sociological theory.
It seems to me that children
n
1 '"?
!"* the f °™ S ° f -ra^reasoning
mg and
ana tharthe
that the distinction between
form and content at
some stages cannot be maintained.
If this is so? then the
Stage theory is far from culturally unbiased.
For example
Kehlberg will have trouble testing moral
development in
an ed
^e lines of Stage 5 morality ?
SSi^i?,
contract liberalism
- since it will be difficult
to tell
8
inaivldu ?I is reasoning from authority the
Im+SSSi ? Preneuncing the
rules of contract liberalism ir rill
C1 1
There is also the Problem of establishing
,
levels of moral? f*
development
in liberal societies which iustifv
*
constituted moral rules in terms of Stage 2
reasons? One
wonders also whether persons will have
opportunities for
exposure to situations which can move them on
to Stage 6
when social rules are organized along Stage
5 principles.
What happens to moral development when the social
structure
confirms the formal mode of rule-perception and
the content
©1 moral principles at lower stages of development.
Can
persons develop the principle of 'respect for persons'
in
a bargaining society where the 'other' is one's
opponent
and where the only reason for putting oneself in his
place
is te try to understand how he might be manipulated"?
There
may be something to Kohlberg 's claim that middle class
children
develop more rapidly than working class children because they
are exposed to more environmental stimuli (and perhaps, as
Peters suggests, because they have more opportunities to
practise reasoning at higher levels), but the question remains
as to whether middle class life experiences promote Stage 6
reasoning, or whether working class children need to go^ through
Stage 5 in order to reach Stage 6.

Jth™^+

oi^nV

"

LIH
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into morality qua morality, thus avoiding
debate over what
constitutes morality - I think that it is
important to develop the implications of his theory of
cognitive development

for political evaluation and action.

If persons do

develop the kinds of cognitive abilities which
Kohlberg
claims for them, what are the implications for
our understanding of political action?
Kohlberg' s claim is that Stage 6 morality is a
critical

perspective from which persons can evaluate any of the
ethical

principles

-

the regulative rules of a particular moral code

Which are already embedded in social practise.
is valid,

If this claim

it is important for our understanding of how

persons can move beyond the social conformism of True Be-

liever morality and develop ideal standards which can serve
to undergird political action.

But what are the principles

which Kohlberg claims persons develop and which undergird
this critical stance?

For Kohlberg, as for Piaget, one's orienation toward
rules develops with an increasing ability to distinguish

oneself from what is external to oneself, and at the same
time to see oneself as a person among persons.

This ability

to see oneself as a person, with the capacity to will one's

own action, makes possible the adherence to certain moral

principles.

First, it makes possible the moral principle

Kohlberg does begin to engage in this debate in an
13.
article entitled "From Is to Ought How to Commit the
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in Koral Development," in Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development.
i

-
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•f prescriptivity or reversibility.

For one who sees

him or herself as a person among
persons and as a chooser,
a -moral* rule cannot be either
that which another wills for
me, nor that which I will for
another but
not for myself.

The Moral Agent cannot formulate a
'moral' rule which
s/he would be unwilling to have
applied by another to
.

.

nira

or herself in a similar situation.

14

The formal rule element at Stage 6
also meets the requirement of universality. Moral rules are
meant to be applied in
a self-consistent manner to all (morally)
similar cases.

There can be no exceptions to the rule except
morally deserving ones..
So far, then, the formal constraints of moral
reasoning

are prescriptivity and universality.

But Kohlberg adds

a further requirement of moral reasoning and that
is the

requirement ©f respect for persons.

which

I

It is this principle

take to be central to the model of the Moral Agent,

and it underlies the two formal principles already described.

For a more thorough discussion of the principles of
moral reasoning, or the moral point of view, see Kurt
Baier, The Moral Point of View (New Yorkt Random House, 1965).
Vf.

According to Kohlberg, Stage 6 is a more developed mor15.
ality because it handles "...more moral problems, conflicts,
•r points of view in a more stable or self-confident way."
It can do this because of the principles of reversibility and
universality. Earlier stages are unable to resolve moral
dilemmas which Stage 6 can handle because they are "...not
fully universal and prescriptive and therefore lead to continual self-contradictions, to definitions of right which are
different for Republicans and Democrats, for Americans and
Vietnamese, for fathers and sons.
In contrast principled
morality is directed to resolving these contradictions in a
stable self-consistent fashion. " (Kohlberg, "Is-Ought," p. 185)
Yet there are problems here for certainly a Nazi prison-camp
^
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Kohlberg argues that moral
development involves the
increasing ability to distinguish
human life as a universal
principle from all other value
judgments about individuals judgments based on wealth, status,
sex, personal relationship,
etc.
-The moral imperative to value
life becomes increasingly
16
independent of the factual properties
of the life in question."
But we need to ask what Kohlberg
might mean by valuing human
life, or, as I shall term it, by
the principle of respect
for persons.
The moral principles of universality
and reversibility
have an internal relationship to the concept
"person." They
both imply treating others as one would
treat oneself the

Golden Rule.

But how does one treat oneself?

I

should like

to argue that we treat ourselves as having
those capacities

listed earlier in this chapter, as having the
capacity to feel
pleasure and pain, as having interests, needs, wants
and purposes, as acting freely on our own choices, as
choosing our

own lives, and as capable of participating in humanizing
relationships.

Thus to treat others as we treat ourselves is to

treat them as valuing, autonomous individuals, capable of

feeling pleasure and pain, of entering into rich reactive relationships, and as capable of development.

official was entirely stable and consistent in his carrying out
of official orders. Is his a developed morality?
Ibid Compare this with Durkheim's moral theory in which
16.
respect accrues to roles rather than to persons.
.
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In his article "Persons and Punishment," Herbert

Morris develops what

I

find to be a fruitful distinction

between what it means to treat others as persons as
opposed
to treating them as things.

1?

To treat another as a thing

is to treat him or her from the outside, to
ignore intention-

ality and responsibility and to seek to manipulate
behavior.

When we treat a human being as an animal or some
inanimate object our responses to 1he human being

are determined, not by his choices, but ours in
disregard of or with indifference to his. And
when we 'look upon a person as less than a person
or not a person, we consider the person as incapable
of rational choice. 10
1

Punishment rests on the idea of persons as rule-followers,
as beings aware of the social basis of rules and of the impli-

cations of breaking rules

-

that one has unfairly advantaged

onself and therefore owes a debt to society (assuming that
the rules are fair).

Punishment rests on choice? following

rules implies being aware of alternatives and assuming that

persons could do otherwise than they do were they to so choose.

Treatment rests on the logic of sickness; it is undergirded

by assumptions of irrationality.

Irrationality, however, is

Herbert Morris, "Persons and Punishment," The Ironist
(October
1968) i475-501.
See also P.F. Strawson, "Freedom
52
and Resentment," in P.F. Strawson, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (New Yorki Oxford University
Press, 1968).
17.

18.

,

Morris, "Persons and Punishment," p. 11.

This notion of choice is problematic since one has to
19#
determine what choices are in fact open to persons. This
is largely a question of individual and social development.

always tremendously difficult
to assess.
Treatment may be
imposed on persons who are
expanding the borders of
rationality and acting as responsible
agents, and who therefore
deserve to be treated as such.
Yet we may misinterpret
their actions and impose treatment
upon them. But if we
ourselves are rational and want
to avoid the possibility
of being so treated, argues
Morris, we will choose punishment
over treatment, and thereby maintain
our freedom to act on
our own determination of rationality. 20

Respect for persons moves us away
from a focus on
individual pathology to a focus on
social pathology, to
the socially imposed limitations on
human development. If
wg find that we cannot0 trpat
-r~-rr~ oi k«««.
^^ ax as range
human vbeings as persons
in our society, we have reason to
criticize the existing social
order. Further, if we discover alternatives
that would open
up new ways of life for persons that we
think would
•

be in

their interest

-

would develop their personhood

-

then to

treat them as persons is to present them with
these alter-

natives for rational deliberation.

21

Respect for persons

undergirds a critical stance on any social system and its
rules, in the same way that the formal principles
of reciprocity
The "idea of 'freedom to act' is problematic, but
I cannot
I get involved in the debate over whether
one is
free' to do x if x is prohibited and one doe3 x
anyway.

20.

nor need

This raises the "before-after" problem ©f revolutionary
21.
strategy, for if persons are under- or undeveloped in the
existing social order, how can they be deliberative about
choosing a new one. The solution is often to impose the new
social order on them until they choose it.
(See ft'aclntyre's
discussion of Stalinism in "A Mistake about Causality in
Social Science," in Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman, ed.,
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and universality serve as criteria
for evaluating moral
rules.
Respect for persons acts as a moral
reason both in
choosing the ends of social change and
the means,
it is

fundamental to a conception of a just
social order, a
conception which can serve as the evaluative
standard for
social criticism.
But if we ought to respect persons, and
especially to
treat them as having needs, wants and purposes
of their own,

isn't this to accept egoism and the image of
social life
which flows out of eglism? Here we need to
consider the

idea that the needs, wants, and purposes of persons
are
not identical with the needs, wants and interests
of

persons in themselves.

To assume this is to make a false

move and to accept egoism as inevitable.
The developmental model rests on the notion that persons
are social and historical beings.

flow out of social relationships.

Motives and interests
If we experience a 'liber-

ated* social order, our interests and capacities will be

those of a fully developed person, a Moral Agent.

In less

than ideal social orders, our motives will be less than ideal.
Under particular conditions, they will more approximate the
egoism and limited cooperativeness of contractual-pluralist
images of human motivation.

Philosophy Pol itic s an d Society 2nd Series /New Yorkt
Barnes and Noble, 196^7^ I think the problem is surmounted
in the thesis I present - to provide alternatives and to
expect persons to consider them as rational beings is to begin
to see their development as persons.
,

,

Morris* conception of punishment assumes equality of
22.
persons, it rests on the notion of breach of contract, of
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Under conditions of liberation,

23

we develop an

interest in our own well-being which
is rooted in a
recognition that we share a life
situation with others.
Our well-being becomes bound up
in the well-being of
others.
Since we see ourselves as
implicated in a web
of social relations through which
we have learned to treat ourselves as a person among persons,
we come to recognize others
as persons with similar interests
and capacities as our
own.
Our well-being is wrapped up in our
ability to develop
our own capacities, but this development
is seen as dependent
upon the kinds of relations we have with
others.
If we perceive our development through the
developmental model if we see individual development as bound
up in reciprocal

cooperative social relations

-

then we come to see that we

have an interest in such relations.

But, since we can only

have reciprocal relations with our equals, we
have an

interest in the development of others.

And, since cooperation

is only possible between persons who need each
other, we
2k
come to recognize our needs in others.

trust, and of reciprocal relations. Morris rests his case
for punishment on the notion of punishment by reciprocity things are put to rights, contracts are restored, persons
are shown how they have harmed relations of trust and sympathy - rather than punishment by expiation.
23.

See "Conditions," below.

"We are led to the notion of the community of humankind,
24.
the members of which enjoy one another's excellences and
individuality elicited by free institutions, and they recognize the good of each as an element in the complete activity
of the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure

Moral development resolves
the tensions between self
and society that individuals
feel at preceding stages,
if
egoism gives persons reasons
to act only when action
is in
their own interest (except
for those rare instances
of
altruism) the notion of social
.
interests casts doubt upon
the claims of egoism.
Needs, wants and purposes
flow out of
social relations, and changes
in these relations result
in
changes in needs, wants, and
purposes, or the -goods' of

individuals and collectivities. 25

Different stages of social

and individual development are
accompanied by different ends.
AS persons move from relations
of unilateral to mutual
respect,
conceptions of -good' change from
the rational life plan
of egocentric competition to the
rational life pl an of
26
cooperative sociality.

u

to all..., the successful carrvine: out of -1110+
0 +u»j.'
is the shared final end of alf
tne members^ society "nd
these institutional forms are prized
as good in
appreciate and enjoy these attributes in ?hemse
one anothe?* '
a
* a fest
in cooperating to affirm jusHns^lull™*
?? follows that the
tuions.
It
collective activity of iustice
is the preeminent form of human
flourishing.
Rawls,
AThe ory of Justice (Cambridge, Belknap Press, John
1 9 ?1)? pp
523-529. How this recognition becomes a 'need*
is discussed
below under "Reason and Passion."

lw

A/m

^

* '

^

On the Marxist view, needs flow out of
25.
relations of
production; on^ the human development model, out of
the structure
of human relationsin general.
I cannot deal with the question
of whether productivity is the basic human
interaction and
whether its structure is fundamental to the form of social
life;
it seems to me that there are other fundamental
relations not
taken into account by economics including relations of sex.
26.

good

Before persons reach Kohlberg's Stage 6, they regard their
as individual and egocentric, except where they perceive

8^

The rational life plan of the moral agent is inseparable

from consideration of the social arrangements under which
all

persons can experience the benefits of a life viewed from
the moral perspective.

A commitment to this conception and

to these principles serves as a guide to political action,

both constraining actions which might inhibit the development of others and encouraging actions which might broaden
an interest in a contractual relationship; i.e., they consent
to social arrangments if these are in their interest.
It is
difficult for such persons to see a 'social good', (this is
the difficult 'pluralists' have with the concept 'public
interest') except as the outcome of conflicts among individual
•goods'.
Having a limited sense of what respect for persons
means, individuals at Stage 5, for example, lack a reason
to regard their own good in terms of the good of others;
theirs is a competitive conception of social relations with
'good' understood by reference to Stage 2 hedonism.
The
result is a society of essentially private individuals
for whom public participation is a burden and for whom
public institutions are means to private ends. These individuals
-do assume certain obligations, but only insofar as these fill
their individual interests and are thus seen from the perspective of enlightened self-interest.

Stage 5 may be an autonomous morality, as Kohlberg claims
(there are problems especially in a liberal society), but it
is not a fully developed morality since it lacks a fully
developed principle of respect for persons. The distinction
between Stages 5 and 6 can perhaps be clarified by looking
at the distinction Piaget makes between the morality of
equality and the morality of equity, both autonomous moralities.
These are differentiated in terms of the concept of persons
implied by each, equality referring to an abstract individual
and lending itself to support of abstract and universal rights,
while equity takes into consideration the different needs
and handicaps persons have arising out of their natural and
social condition. (Piaget, IV'oral Judgment pp. 315-325*)
This notion of equity supports a radical critique of existing
social arrangements based on abstract rights, and lends
credence to the idea that rights are socially specific. It
can undergird claims aginst inequities in the distribution
of rights and privileges by lending support to demands for
compensatory inequalities.
,
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opportunities for others to develop. 2?

Finally, we need to consider
another implication for
action of the principle 'respect
for persons.
i have already
suggested that this principle
undergirds critical evaluation
of existing social arrangements
and supports the establishment of alternative institutions.
But what ought we to do
when other persons express no
interest in altering their
life situation.
The question I should like to
consider
here is whether we are obliged
to treat any of the expressed
interests of others as deserving of
respect.
An interesting
treatment of this issue can be found
in Thomas Hill's article
"Servility and Self-Respect.
.

••

Hill's concern is somewhat different
from my own. His
intention is to defend the thesis that one
has a duty to
The Moral Agent model also rests on
a form of 'consent'
not mean that persons stand outside
social relationships
and choose whether or not to join.
This is to abstract ?he
individual and to construct society upon the
shaky foundations
of universal needs, wants and purposes.
My point is that
moral concepts undergird or constitute social
life - thev
me hing t0 d ° With social co-operation
and make it
^I^i°
^
possible for
persons to live together.
Our moral concepts
are inextricably linked with our knowledge about
the possibilities of human motivation and social
life.
For
instance, if we assume that the facts of human life
are scarcitv
and competition, we will adopt a rather different view
of the possibilities and reasons for action than if
we assume
that persons can develop social interests, can move beyond
egoism and hedonism. Our conceptions of what can form reasons
for action are delimited by our conceptions of human needs,
wants and purposes. If we agree that morality is rooted
in our conception of the person, and if we agree that persons
are social beings, we no longer need to give reasons why
persons ought to be moral, reasons why persons should consent
to a moral order.
If persons are rooted in social life, then
the question "why be moral" is non-sensical. To get a sense
27.

I do
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respect oneself as a person, a
thesis which he claims flows
from Kant's "...contention that
respect for persons, strictly
speaking, is respect for moral
law." The question which
interests him is whether a person
can (morally) refuse to
respect him or herself, i.e.,
act serviley.
By servility
Hill means an attitude of
deference to others, a reluctance
to make demands, to express
one's own preferences or
opinions,
a tendency not to form one's
own interests, values and
ideals'
or to treat these as less important
than those of others. He
offers three paradigm cases of servility the Uncle Tom,
the
Self-Deprecator, and the Deferential Wife and asks whether
"...there are grounds for regarding
^their7 attitudes...
as morally objectionable.

Are there moral arguments we

could give them to show that they ou^ht to
have more selfrespect?" Hill rejects utilitarian arguments
since these

could be used to justify servility if it
should contribute
to the greater good, and he rejects
happiness as a reason

for servility.
The Deferential Wife may be quite happy; but
if her happiness turns out to be contingent on
her
distorted view pf her own rights and worth as a
person, then it carries little moral weight against
the contention that she ought to change that view....
When a person's happiness stems from a morally
objectionable attitude, it ought to be discounted. 28

of this problem, see Kurt Baler* s The Moral Point of
View
Chapter ?. This question can only be raised if persons
exist outside social life which by its very nature is moral.
Morality varies - from heteronomous to autonomous, from
egoistic to principled - with social life, but persons are
moral beings regardless of what form this takes.
.

Herbert Morris, "Persons and Punishment," Monist 52
(October, I968) i475-501.

28.

87

But why is servility a morally
objectionable attitude?
Because, argues Hill, servility involves
a failure to "...
understand and acknowledge one's own moral
rights." Persons
may not press their rights because they
do not understand
them, and we may seek to help them
through moral enlightenment,
but when persons do know their rights
and still do not press
them, this is a moral defect unless
there is some overriding

consideration such as "...a desire to avert
dire consequences
oneself, or even an ambition to set an
oppressor up for
a later fall....- Laziness, timidity, or
"...a desire for some
.to

minor advantage," are no excuse for disregarding
one's own
moral status as a person deserving respect, although

any of

these may be a factor in one's inaction.

To be servile is

to fail to respect ©nself as a person, and if respect
for

persons is central to respect for morality, then not to
respect oneself is not to respect morality, to remove oneself

from the moral order.

Hill argues that we have a duty to

ourselves, a duty to respect ourselves, and that this

implies a disposition to affirm our rights and not to tolerate
abuses.

We may release ourselves and others from their

obligation to respect these rights, but only under special
circumstances.

Failure to respect our own rights is supported

by self-recriminationj failure to respect the rights of others
is supported by censure, and,
29
regret and shame.
29T

IbTdT

I

would add, by feelings of
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There are several interesting
implications for political
action in these arguments. They directly
support the contention that one ought to press for
redress whenever one's
own rights are infringed, and by extension assuming that
respect for oneself as a person implies
respect for the
category persons - one ought to press for
the rights of

others and work to remedy social conditions
which harm
others.

Of course, there may be overriding
considerations

which inhibit action, but the reason for action
remains valid.
II.

Is moral reasoning enough?

In an article entitled "Moral Development

i

A Plea for

Pluralism," R.S. Peters criticizes Kohlberg for making
the
Platonic assumption that knowing the good means doing
the
good.

This criticism is

I

mine the model as a whole.

think valid, but need not under-

What needs to be clarified,

however, is the way in which the Moral Agent model does in-

corporate other elements than moral cogntions, particularly
.the

What

elements of explanatory theory and affective commitment.
I

wish to show is the way in which moral reasoning is

linked to reasoning of another sort

phenomena

-

-

explaining social

and to feelings, or the affective commitments

which are essential to move one to action.
II. a.

Moral reasoning and explanatory theory

It has already been suggested that explanatory theories

89

are linked to metaethical theories
since theoretical assumptions about persons and how they
develop are conceptually
linked to notions of persons and the
'good' society and to
images of what is humanly possible.
For example, the metaethical position that respect for persons
is an integral
part of moral reasoning rests on theoretical
assumptions that
persons can respect each other and that
they can develop the

particular capacities in question.

•

The principles of morality

are supported by a theory of moral
development.

Values have

an empirical element; facts and values
are linked in a theory
of motivation.
If we accept the theory of moral
development
and the notion of good which flows from it, we
also accept
a theory of the social conditions under which
morality can

develop.

This has profound implications for our evaluations

of social life and for our commitment to social change.

in this sense that

I

It is

take Charles Taylor's thesis that an

explanatory theory rooted in a conception of human needs,
wants and purposes, "...secretes its own norms for the
assessment of polities and policies."

30

But not only do ethical judgments rest on explanatory

theories

-

in this case theories of moral development

-

we have seen that the formal principles of developed morality

need to be fleshed out by explanatory theories.

In particular,

Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in P.
30^
Laslett and W.G. Runciman, ed., Philosophy, Politics and
Society , 3rd Series (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1967), p. 48.
For example, if research were to provide evidence against Pia^et's
psychological theory, John Rawls metaethics would be undermined.
Rawls' principles of justice are undergirded by
1
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.

in fleshing out the formal
requirements of Stage 6 morality,
we cannot avoid the intrusion
of social content,
particularly
content about what constitutes
harm or injury to persons. 31
But this content rests on
an explanatory theory, the
explanatory theory which undergirds
society's image of persons.
As an example of this
relationship between theory
and
evaluation, consider the different
evaluations of injury which
flow from our adopting one or
another of the contending
theories of social inequality. One
cannot claim redress for
an injury if inequality is the
result of differential merit
and benefits everyone - a claim which
consensus theorists
like Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E.
Moore make. But one does
have a claim if one adopts the conflict
theorists' view
that inequality is the result either of
the intentional

power drives of individuals (Gerhard Lenski)
or the preservation of the interests of a dominant class
(Frank Parkin,

C.

Wright Mills).

Kohlberg wants to argue that there is a difference
between learning the content of morality and knowing the
formal
rules of moral reasoning.

Morality, for Kohlberg, is a form

assumptions about cultural invariance in the development of
autonomy? if all societies do develop in the direction
of differentiating persons as autonomous and responsible,
support is leant to his thesis.
R.S. Peters, "Moral Development! A Plea for Pluralism,"
in T. Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development , p. 2^7.

31.

of practical reasoning
independent of social content.
But
certainly it might reasonably
be argued that in
order to
understand persons- reasons,
we have to have some
idea of „hat
they are reasoning about.
To use Kohlberg. s own
terms, we
need to know what confronts
them as a dilemma. I
believe
that it is here that Kohlberg
makes a mistake in his comparison of Martin Luther King
with Stokely Carmichael
and H.
Rap Brown.

LUther
JST—
the arrogance

King j0ins a l0 *S ^st of men
who had
not only to teach justice but
to liv2
a
that ° ther men ^elt uncomforLbir
aboS their own goodness,
about
their own justice
In
We
ne h
r
hea^he
question,
wny KiL
King, not
;S? Carmichael
r°
? or Brown?"
It is not +ht
a h S P ° W er
«8^iS?ed.
°
nofa ?h re at h

^

^

,

-

r

™^Z

?"W

STif

who questions the basis on which
men
paltry sense of goodness who dies. 33 erect

'

their"

In the wake of assassinations of
Black Panther and SLA
members, Kohlberg 's assertion becomes
particularly dubious,
but it is still interesting to see why
King epitomizes

goodness for him in a way Carmichael and Brown
cannot.
King is a moral man, a moral teacher, because

he has a

"...concern for the growth of justice in

. . .

society."

...King was a moral leader, a moral educator of
adults, not because he was a spokesman for the
welfare of the Negroes, not because he was against
violence, not because he was a minister of religion,
but because, as he said, he was a drum major for
ed.

Irving Louis Horowitz

(

Oxford

i

University Press, 1958).

Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," in Nancy F. and
33.
Theodore R, Sizer, ed., It'oral Education (Cambridge Harvard
University Press, 1968), p. 66.
i
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justice.

His words and deeds were primarily
designed
America
respond to racial problems in
?
Sen
lce and a ^y particular action
JU
?ooV had
h^H value °£
he took
for ?J
this reason and not just because
of the concrete political end it
might achieve. 3^
e

f

Now

^

'

have no quarrel with Kohlberg's portrait
of King as
a Moral Agent; King obviously made
political choices from
a moral point of view.
But he also made those choices
I

in terms of an explanatory theory which
supported the possibility of certain types of change, and of change
through

particular means.
•

King, as compared to Brown or to

Carmichael, confronted a moral situation in which, as
he
sawj/t, there was no conflict between the value of
human

life and the value of human liberation.

For King, liberation

of the Negro people was possible within existing social struc-

tures because that liberation was largely a matter of changing
attitudes, of moral education in Kohlberg's sense.

(Indeed,

one might argue that King was assassinated as he moved away

from this position, and not, as Kohlberg would have it,
because he was a moral educator.)

For Brown and Carmichael,

however, Black liberation was a matter of structural change,
of power relations, and, given their belief that white persons

had a clear interest in maintaining existing power relations,

violent confrontation became a more justifiable tactic.

Kohlberg himself argues that "...it is sometimes right to kill
because it is sometimes just," but since Kohlberg accepts
King's perception (or at least his own understanding of
King's perception) of what is out there to be reasoned about

W*

Ibid ., p. 68.

-
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what injuries are being done to persons, how and
by whom
he takes King to be a Moral Agent.
Carmichael and

-

Brown,

on the other hand, probably remain enigmas to
Kohlbergi he
does not comprehend their explanatory framework.
The issue here is whether two persons at the
same level

of moral development need, agree on all political
issues.

Understanding h«w development occurs implies a
commitment
to a liberated social order, but persons at
the same level
of development can have different understandings
of how

they got there.

Further, the idea of a liberated social

order implies that persons are not injured

t

injury is certainly

a concept upon whose definition all do not agree.

There are formal requirements for determining whether

something constitutes an injury.

One such requirement is

that the harm not be caused by some natural condition but
that it be the result of human agency (a flood would not be

an injury but if a flood victim is not aided where aid is

available, that person has suffered an injury).

More im-

portantly, what counts as an injury has reference to an

explanatory theory.

If we assume that inequalities are

necessary in order to perform socially necessary functions
and that they therefore work to the advantage of all, then

there is no injury in these inequalities.

However, if we

assume that social inequality is not the inevitable result
of differential merit and the performance of vitally nec-

essary tasks, and moreover is injurious to the development
of at least some persons, then the inequalities are infringe-

ments on persons which carry a claim against society.
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Respect for persons carries
with it certain assumptions
about what it means to be a
person, and these assumptions
in
turn are linked to our conceptions
of injury.
But these
assumptions are also rooted in
different social contexts,
although, if Piaget is correct,
the variation is within
certain broadly defined limits. The
formal principle of
respect for persons is inextricably
linked with the ways
in which societies structure
relationships between persons.
For instance, if we live under
Durkheimian nomic conditions,
we may perceive the needs, wants,
and purposes of individuals
in terms of limits, roles, a division
of labor,
etc.

The

schedule of human needs, wants and
purposes will be radically
different from a schedule developed by
persons who experience
•liberated* social relationships.

The latter will be more

likely to view persons as role creators rather
than role
takers, as having capacities for development
which

ought

to be encouraged, and as being harmed by
alienating divisions

•f labor.

The social context sets the terms in which we

view persons, not so much in the culturally relativistic
sense that every culture sees persons in completely different
ways, but in the structuralist sense that societies structured

along different lines

autonomy

-

-

varying between heteronomy and

encourage radically different conceptions of

persons, and radically different conceptions of what con-

stitutes an injury to persons.
Cultural context also infects our understanding of respect

for persons and injury in another way.

As an example,

let
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us assume that respect for persons means
that every

person must have a fair opportunity to
develop his or
her potential as a full human being.
However,
the

idea of a full human being is bound up
in a social context which places greater and lesser value
on certain
35
types of skills and certain types of
achievement.
In an article entitled "Violence and
the Rule of Law,"

Bernard Harrison argues that every society
carefully defines those spheres in which merit or
achievement is to
be rewarded.

For example, a capitalist society values

and rewards entrepeneurial skills.

If we wish to call

into question this system of distribution of
rewards and

punishments

-

if we wish to move beyond demands for

equal opportunities to develop entrepeneurial skills
and
to achieve in the capitalist stratification
system

-

then

we must post alternative forms of human excellence
and

demand that these excellences also be rewarded.

For example,

we might demand that physical stamina be more highly
rewarded

than entrepeneurial skills, which would result in reversing
the present hierarchy of income, status and power.

Some

alternative conception of persons would cast doubt upon equality
The implications are quite clearly drawn in R. Herrnstein
The Atlantic. September, 1971, pp. 43 - ok, Herrnstein
describes the oligarchy which inevitably develops out of a
meritocracy which is assumedly fair yet weights competition
in favor of those who have inherited abilities.
J5~.

"IQ

,

"

Frank Parkin suggest this alternative in Class Inequality
36.
and Political Order (New Yorki Praeger, 19?1).
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•f opportunity for those whose talents were not
recognized

by the value system built into capitalism.

The broadest

critical alternative would promote the valuing of
any human
excellence, but obviously some achievements will be of
no

value in a given "real" society

-

a master ice-box maker

would hardly be applauded by the Eskimos.

However, this

alternative would provide the broadest interpretation of
respect for persons

i

by adopting this idea

ment is worthy of respect

- one

-

that any achieve-

could perceive structural

•injustices to which one was previously blind.

These struc-

tural injustices are not simply the closing of opportunities

for success in prevailing terms to particular groups or
persons, but the de-valuing of particular skills and modes
of human excellence.

Closed opportunities for groups who

have not hitherto succeeded in established fields might require

compensatory inequalities.

The more radical demand would

require a radical restructuring of basic social values so
that alternative human excellences would be rewarded.

37

Finally, the means by which opportunities are closed and

skills and talents de-valued are perceived through different
The difference is important for distinguishing between
the demands of liberal and radical feminists. However, there
are serious dangers in pressing for one to the exclusion of
the 'other.
Both seem to be essential elements in the stance
of a Moral Agent; both flow out of a theory of human development and respect for persons.
Indeed, there are dangers
in overemphasizing the radical position since it could
easily be subverted into a separate spheres doctrine.
37.

explanatory theories.

For example, in his

The^pf_JusU

John Rawls does not find any
conflict between capitalism
and his principles of justice
because he
does not regard

private ownership of property as
closing opportunities to
persons.
Obviously, much has been said
on the opposing
side and the debate is terribly
important.
And as S.I.

Benn and W.L. Weinstein point out,
"...it is a well-established move in radical argument to
call in question the
hitherto given initial conditions,
like property institutions, by arguing that they do close
alternatives otherwise available, because there is nothing
illegitimate nor
ically absurd in envisaging a social
order in which they
would be absent or at least different."^ 8
II. b.

Affective commitment and political action
the problem of saintliness

Not only does political action involve
a conceptual
S.I. Benn and W.L. Weinstein, "Being Free to
38.
Act.
and Being a Free Man," Mind 80 (April,
1971) 194-211.
,

Much has been said about the implications of
different explanatory theories for Feminist action and intense
disputes
have taken place over' just what constitutes the
source of
injury to women. One's sense of injury is not arbitrary
explanatory theories flow out of our life experiences - our
perspectives are those of social and historical beings and this may have a great deal to do with the debate
now
raging among Socialist, Radical Feminist and Lesbian women.
A good review of these debates on the level of explanatory
theory can be found in Zillah Eisenstein's "Connections
Between Class and Sexi Moving Towards a Theory of Liberati
paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Women's Caucus Panel, New
Orleans, September 4-8, 1973.
(Mimeographed.)
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link between explanatory
theory and moral reasoning,
it
involves an affective element,
the True Believer
version
•t P.litioal action, a sharp
dichotomy was drawn between
the
passionate motivation of the
True Believer and the
reasoned
39
action of the rational
political agent.
it is this dichotomy that I now wish to
call into question by
indicating
aome of the ways in which
emotional and cognitive
development
are linked.

m

Kohlberg suggests that cognitive
and emotive development
run parallel to each other.
In contrast to irrational
emotive theories of moral
development such as those of
k
Durkheim
1
and
?J e
n
e
Vel ° Prnental View h^d s%
Lr'cognition"
and ^ff
anf
"t? are different
affect'
aspects, or perspectives
1" 6
me ? tal events ™at all mental
events
h^t
have t
both cognitive and affective
aspectss and
d th*+
that
of m ta ^^-po3itionrJe fi:c
ts
in
cognitive

S

»

rt^i;^*
a^e^

-

^

Unfortunately, one cannot be entirely
sure what Kohlberg
means in this passage, whether cognition
and affect are
two sides of a "mental event" or
whether reason and affect
are somehow internally linked to each
other.
He is pursuing
a fruitful avenue when he argues
that sentiments include a
I want to be clear that the
39.
model of the rational Bali-H^i
agent developed in the last chapter is
clearly roofed in lalh
a social conception of the person
and in an artLuUted vision
of human needs.
The dichotomy is not between abstract
individualism and social being, nor between abstract
reason
and
emotional needs, but between action constrained
by self-interest
interest
and action compelled by passion.

Kohlb
Fr0m
^i^
Kohlberg, ?o?'
'Stage and
"

is t0 0u S ht »" P. 189i see also Lawrence
Sequence The Cognitive-Developmental
Approach to Socialization," in D. Goslin, ed., Handbook
of"
social Theory and Research (New York, Rand McNplly,
1969)
i
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conceptual dimension, that our
•feelings' are given different
names depending on our stage of
moral development. But this
may mean only that our feelings
remain
the same and that we

change their names.

Kohlberg also argues that affect
is

neither moral or immoral,

"The moral channeling of mechanisms

(of effect) themselves are
cognitive."

This statement

leads one to suspect that Kohlberg
does not see real differences between the emotions as cognitions
develop, but rather
that cognitions channel the old emotions
in new ways. What
Kohlberg seems to have done here is to
reverse the relationship between reason and passion which we
find in the True

Believer model rather than clarifying the
dialectical relationship between the two.
Three things need to be said about reason and the

passions to clarify the model

I

wish to support.

The first

of these has to d© with the internal relationship
between

reasons and passions which is best stated in the following

lengthy quotation from Stuart Hampshire* s Thought and Action
.

/T/he range of the emotions, feelings and attitudes of
mind, identified and distinguished from each other,
changes as the forms of human knowledge develop. We
identify new emotions and attitudes that have never
been recognized before. With a new self -consciousness,
and with the extended vocabulary that goes with it, we
Ibid ., p. 230.

Alston argues that Kohlberg ignores the emotive aspect of
moral judgments. Kohlberg, he says "...is to be given a great
deal of credit for doing some very hard and very unfashionable
thinking on moral thought as a subject of interest in its own
right, and for producing evidence that should force psychologists to take the cognitive aspects of morality seriously as
an important influence on behavior. However, like all
42.
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discover new motives for action
and new obiects
0'1
1 intentio » s are
directed
I
reflectivH
reflective man is aware that he
would have recfr ° m ° ther motives
himself
if he had been born and formed
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have ?ound
o^herr G n
ndTJ
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in
the
now
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Passions, like reasons are not presocial;
they are socially
and historically specific and flow out of
social relationships
which vary with time and place. They are
rather like things
that happen tc us, but that should not imply
that we cannot

be reflective about them.

Reflective persons do not simply

introject socially imposed emotions.

They are capable of

sensing the specificity of their own emotional repertoire
and

reflecting upon alternative possibilities.

This is an ex-

tremely important point for the developmental thesis which
is,

in a way, similar to a movement from culture to culture,

or language game to language game.

If this analogy holds,

champions of the neglected, Kohlberg has not been able to
resist the temptation to overstate his case. From being the
outcast stepdaughter, moral thought must not only be restored
to its rightful place as a sovereign of the court it must be
elevated into an absolute sovereign." William Alston, "Comments
on Kohlberg' s 'From is to Ought,'" in T. Mischel, ed.
Cognitive
Development, p..2?8.
i

,

Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York, Viking Press
43.
1959).

101

then in talking about cognitive development we
need also
talk about emotional development, and this
relationship is

hardly ignored in Piaget 's work.

In a moment

I

will look

at John Rawls' explication of this relationship,
but there

are two preliminary points which need to be drawn out
first.
The first of these also has to do with the internal

relationship between reason and passion.
reasons) are theory imbued

Passions (like

emotion concepts

-

politically

important ones like indignation, for example

-

need to be

j

seen as resting on theoretical assumptions about persons,
that is on beliefs.

Secondly, the theory of moral develop-

ment as constructed by Piaget rests firmly on an emotive
base.

Clarification of Piaget' s image of the relationship

between macro-structures of unilateral and mutual rccpcct and
micro-structures of individual 'needs' helps us get at Piaget 's
sense of persons as social beings, and at his understanding
of the internal links between reason and passion.

For Piaget, moral development must be understood as
the product of an interaction between social structures

-

the

44

ideal types of social interaction

-

and cognitive structures.

Much of the analysis in this dissertation is on the macro
level, but Piaget is very explicit that the child him/herself
is part of an interaction process.
The child's own development
confirms or denies the social environment. For example, the
externality of moral injunctions at the stage of heteronomy
is confirmed by the child's general realism at certain ages.
The child's own lack of a sense of intentionality is confirmed
by punishment meted out in terms of the consequences of acts.
The relationship between society and individual is dialectical.
In some ways, Piaget seems almost to argue that there is a
biological unfolding which is part of human development, but
that this unfolding can be aided or impeded by the social
relations in which the child is implicated. See Piaget,
Moral Judgment p. 84, and Genetic Epistemology (New Yorki
,

W.W, Norton, 1971).
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These cognitive structures, however,
clearly incorporate an
emotive element, and it is this element
which demands clarif ication.

John Rawls version of the Piagetian
model directly confronts Kohlberg's Platonism. Kohlberg
has problems with the
question "Why be moral?" because he has not
firmly embedded
moral reasoning in a total theory of
personality, a theory which
would incorporate the emotional side of
human
development.

He offers the reasoning game as if it were
a choice, as if
one could either take it or leave it.
What Rawls does is
to show that the reasoning game is internal to
one's develop-

ment as a person and is part of the human capacity
to feel
and to enter into rich reactive relationships.

/If/ men did not do what justice requires, not
only would they not regard themselves as bound
by the principles of justice, but they would be
incapable of feeling resentment and indignation
and they would be without ties of friendship and
mutual trust. They would lack certain essential
elements of humanity. 46

For Rawls, morality does not consist solely of reasoning.

47

4
See Phillipa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," Procedings of the
Aristotelian Society 59 (1958-1959) »86-89, for a discussion
of this issue.

z

n>T

John Rawls, "The Sense of Justice," Philosophical Review
46.
72 (July 1963), P. 281.
Indeed, a defense of pure reason is not critical to
neo-cognitivist ethics. Piaget argues that children often
act at a higher moral stage than they can reason at because
they have developed moral habits beyond their cognitive
abilities.
Neo-cognitive ethics and the theory of moral
development does not exclude the development of character
traits nor the role of habituation in morality.
47.
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Moral personality is dual, it involves both
affect and
cognition.
But duality is perhaps a misleading term
since Rawls'
purpose is to show that there are internal
links between

emotion concepts and belief concepts at different
levels
of development.

Wore specifically, Rawls' three stages

•f moral development are associated with
three concepts

of 'guilt'

-

'authority guilt' with heteronomy,

'association

guilt' with an association morality, and
'principle guilt'
•

with autonomy.

Morality is not only identified with different

conceptions of guilt

j

moral development is pictured as

highly dependent upon persons' ability to experience certain
feelings,

'natural attitudes', or 'needs.'

The first stage in the sequence of moral development

Rawls terms the morality of authority (Piaget's heteronomous

morality).

structure

This morality is a product of the 'family'
- a

structure of unilateral respect

- and

it is

based on the first of three psychological laws.
First law
given that family institutions are just,
and that the parents love the child and manifestly
express their love by caring for his good, then
the child, recognizing their evident love of him,
comes to love them.^°
i

Because the child loves the 'parent' and wishes to obey
that parent despite the fact that injunctions are not
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Belknap
Press, 1971), p. %W.
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"understood," s/he comes to accept
parental commands as
obligatory and sees them as massively
real.

Zlt7 is characteristic of the child's
situation that
he is not
a

m

position to assess the
precepts and injunctions addressed to validity of the
him by those
in this case his parents.
both the knowledge and the understanding He lacks
on the
oasis of which their guidance can
be challenged
Indeed, the child lacks the concept
of justification
altogether, this being acquired much later.**
If children love and trust their
parents (if their con-

duct towards them warrant it), then they
develop a need to
obey them and a sense of guilt - "authority
guilt" - which
•arises when there is "...a breach of the
relation

of love and

trust with the authoritative person."

But this morality of

external constraint is unstable because parental
injunctions
are not in line with what children want to do?
if they were,
there would be no

need for them.

Morality at this stage

conflicts with the hedonistic needs of children? there
are

unresolved tensions between self and society which continue
to threaten the equilibrium

of the child's morality.

At stage two, the stage of association morality, persons

develop a sense of what it means to follow rules, and this

tension begins to be resolved as persons come to see the

necessity of cooperative needs satisfaction.

At this stage,

we find a morality of role-taking, a morality of association.

W.

Ibid ., p. 463.

50.

Rawls,

"The Sense of Justice," p. 287.

We might want to call this a transition stage between
51.
heteronomous and autonomous rule-following since it encompasses
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The content of the morality of association
is
given by the moral standards appropriate to
individual's role in the various associationsthe
to which he belongs.
These standards include the
common sense rules of morality along with
justments required to fit them to a person the ad's
particular position; and they are impressed
upon
him by the approval and disapproval of
those
in authority, or by the otherirembers of
the
group. 52

This morality is built upon the feelings of
fellowship

and trust which persons develop from engaging
in cooperative

activities.

Second lawi given that a person's capacity for
fellow feeling has been realized by acquiring
attachments in accordance with the first law,
and given that a social arrangement is just and
publicly known by all to be just, then this
person develops ties of friendly feeling and
trust toward others in the association as they
with evident intention comply with their duties
and obligations and live up to the ideals of
their station. 53

Persons feel "association guilt" when they fail to fulfill

their obligations to friends and associates.

Kohlberg's stages 3-5 and clarifies the distinction between
Stage 5 and Stage 6 moralities. There are important differences between Rawls middle stage and Piaget's transitional
egalitarian stage. For Piaget, children begin to feel the
effects of relationships of mutual respect at about age 7 or
8 andto express this in terms of an absolute equality.
The
transition is not so much a transition from heteronomy to
autonomy at this point, but a change in the sense of equality.
By age 11 or 12, children have moved from absolute equality
to equity.
"Instead of looking for equality in identity,
the child no longer thinks of the equal rights of individuals
except in relation to the particular situation of each." This
opens the way to compensatory inequalities and may be especially important in political judgments.
52.

Rawls, Theory , p. 467.

53.

Ibid ., p. 490.
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It seems to me that this stage of morality
runs

parallel to the autonomous morality developed
in the

preceding chapter.

Especially in pluralist societies

where persons have opportunities to experience
a wide

variety of roles does this stage conform to that
version
of autonomous morality.
Indeed, the following
passage

from Rawls' work could well have been written by
a

theorist in the True Believer made*
Thus the morality of association includes a
large number of ideals each defined in ways
suitable for the respective status or role.
Our moral understanding increases as we move
in the course of life through a sequence of
positions.
The corresponding sequence of ideals
requires increasingly greater intellectual judgment
and finer moral discriminations.
Clearly some of
these ideals are also more comprehensive than
others and maka^quite different demands upon
the individual.
In a pluralist society, persons have the opportunity to

reach the kind of autonomous morality described in the
last chapter.

This is the contract morality we find at

Kohlberg's stage

5.

Yet we need to ask whether this

morality, based as it is on a division of labor and on

role-playing is a truly autonomous morality.
Rawls seems to argue that it is.

In one sense,

The transitional stage

is built upon an understanding of the cooperative basis of

social life.
In due course a person works out a conception of the
whole system of cooperation that defines the association and the ends which it serves. He knows that

W.

Ibid

.

,

p.

468.
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others have different things to do
depending
upon their place in the cooperative scheme.
Thus
he eventually learns to take up their
point of
view and to see things from their perspective. 55
But the purpose of putting ourselves in
the other's position
is to discover what they expect us to do,
that is, to dis-

cover our duties and obligations and to win the
approval
of others.

Thus the morality of association remains a

heteronomous morality, especially to the extent that our
motives for being good are cues from the outside.
J5~.

56

Ibid .

Rawls rests his arguments on a tacit approval of the
division of labor. But if a society lacks a division of
labor, does this mean that moral development will be retarded
Can persons develop under unalienated social structures? If
not, there are serious implications for Marxist theory.
But I think that a commitment to the division of labor is not
essential to this model and that the model is compatible with
a Marxist perspective.
Piaget does speak of a division of
labor also, but his emphasis is always on the differences
in structured social relationships. His argument for
pluralism is not that the more complex and demanding social
roles are, the greater the opportunity for development
through conflict - although this is part of his thesis - but
more that there is greater opportunity for experiencing
relations of mutual respect. Piaget is critical of Durkheim
for failing to distinguish between the two types of social
relations and for treating morality as a unity. He agrees
with Durkheim that our rules derive from our social life,
but he argues that Durkheim lacks a theory of autonomy.
Durkheim is correct about the morality of duty but fails to
develop a morality of autonomy.
"The analysis of the child's
moral judgments has led us perforce to the discussion of the
great problem of the relations of social life to the rational
consciousness. The conclusion we came to was that the morali
prescribed for the individual by society is not homogeneous
because society itself is not just one thing. Society is
the sum of social relations, and among these... we can distinguish two extreme types
relations of constraint, whose
characteristic is to impose upon the individual from outside
a system of rules with obligatory content, and relations of
cooperation whose characteristic is to create within people's
minds the consciousness of idea norms at the back of all
rules." ivoral Judgment p. 395) If we can argue that cooperation need not be rooted in a division of labor, then we nave
an argument in favor of the compatibility of Piaget 's thesis
56.

^

1

(

,
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Autonomous morality is the attachment to
principles
for their own sake rather than for the sake
of avoiding
disapproval or winning approval. At the
stage of principled
morality, persons have come to recognize
the value
for

themselves and others of their involvement
in a wellordered society.
CadS
an acc ePtanc e of ^the principles of
justice/ i
by a .^
third psychological law. This law
states that once the attitudes of love and
of friendly feelings and mutual confidence, trust, and
have been
generated in accordance with the two preceding
psvchological laws, then the recognition that we
and those
for whom we care are the beneficiaries of
an established and enduring just institution tends
to engender
in us the corresponding sense of justice. We
develop
a desire to apply and to act upon the
principles of
justice once we realize how social arrangements
swering to them have promoted our good and that anof
those with whom we are affiliated. 57

w+^H

We develop a concomitant

sense of guilt

-

we will "...

feel guilt for infractions which harm other persons
even

though these persons are not objects of any particular
fellow feelings."

This is principle guilt.

that principle guilt is guilt proper.

"One might say

It is, as the two

previous forms of guilt were not, a complete moral feeling."
It is complete because it is the full expression of human

feelings, and its absence indicates the absence of a kind

with alienation theory. I think we can so argue, and I
suggest the compatibility in my final chapter where I
argue for •liberation as 'dis-alienation.
To make the
necessary arguments here, however, would move well beyond
the scope of this dissertation.
1

•

57.

Rawls, Theory

58.

Rawls,

,

p.

474.

"Sense," p. 292.

58
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of humarmess,

/One/ who lacks a sense of iustice laek«

.

-

fundamental attitudes and capacities
included under
the notion of humanity. .. .Now
the fact that one who
° f 3ust ce
a " d thereby a liabmty
to
\lt*T + a ju dame "tal
attitudes
and
?
cao£
fcities i«
i" taken as a reason
8 n-5
n t ?to be
for actine as
justice idictates. But it has this
bv
understanding what it would be like significance?
not to have*
sense of justice - that it would be
to lack plrt of
we are ied
havLf
*• accept

«i«

-

«

a^ssaj^"

It is this sentiment which makes
it possible for us to feel

resentment and indignation, shame and remorse,
guilt and
responsibility. The capacity to feel these
emotions is part
Pf what it means to be a person, to have
certain human

characteristics and needs.
What

I

maintain here is that our needs, wants, and

purposes are internally related to our activities, to
our

human relationships.

As our activities and relationships

change, so too do our needs, wants and purposes.

But our

needs, wants and purposes are also the grounds from
which

we critically evaluate existing practises.

How is this

possible if they are constituted by those practises?
The key to coming to grips with this thorny issue lies

in our understanding that societies are not unified entities,

experienced monolithically by their members.

Rather, we may

in some of our activities have the opportunity to develop

needs, wants and purposes which allow us to reflect critically

upon other practises in which we engage.
59".

Rawls, Theory

,

pp. 488-489.

If Piaget is correct,
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most of us do develop critical
abilities, do develop the
ability to understand what it means to
follow rules and to

understand that rules can be altered,
and do develop a
•need* to be moral persons.
Persons who experience well-ordered social
lives, to
use Rawls' expression, develop a 'need'
to be moral persons,
persons who experience less than well-ordered
social lives
remain at lower levels of 'needs' development.
Moral
learning, then, is more than formal cognitive
development,
more than the acquisition of concepts. The
idea of 'needs'

encompasses an emotive content as well, a content which
also
flows out the structural features of unilateral
or mutual
respect.

To

paraphrase Rawls' rather extensive discussion,

in a well-ordered society, persons move along in their
mural

development

-

in their development as persons

-

because they

experience or feel the benefits of participating in this
order.

They acquire motives to be good

ability to know the good
,

.

-

- as

well as the

as they experience the value of

_

life organized along the principles of a well-ordered society.

Indeed persons can often act on reasons at a higher stage than
the one they can formulate reasons for on the cognitive level

which means that persons have a 'need' to be good before they
understand what the 'good' is.

Piaget's understanding of

moral development is built upon the very type of emotional
50l

Ibid ., pp. 453-512.

60
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sensitization^which others have argued is
essential te>
moral growth. He maintains that
children experience
the rewards of rule-following and
act out of motives induced by these rewards long before they
can articulate the
abstract principles of reasoning at any
particular level
of development.

The point is that moral learning is
contingent upon

the acquisition of moral feelings which
in turn depend upon
the development of ties of affection and trust.
We do,
as Peters suggests, need to care about moral
principles.

Thus reason and passion are not two forces in conflict
with
each other.

Their relationship is an internal one.

The

moral feelings are not raw emotions channeled by cognitions?
the feelings themselves are made possible by cognitions,

particularly cognitions or beliefs about oneself and others
as persons.

Passions (like reasons) are theory imbuded.

If we

accept this statement, then emotion concepts like 'indignation'
can be seen as resting on theoretical assumptions about
persons, about ourselves and others.
FT.

Peters,

These theoretical

"A Plea for Pluralism."

Perhaps something ought to be said here about 'rewards'
so that the thesis is not interpreted as some variant of
stimulus-response theory. It seems to me that the very
idea of rewards changes with moral development and that S-R
theory is mistaken in assuming an abstract model of pleasureseeking and pain-avoidance. Rewards at the stage of authoritarian morality are the love of parents and avoidance of
punishment; at the stage of association morality, rewards
also consist in the esteem of others. But at the stage of
principled morality, reward lies in reciprocal relations of
warmth and trust, mutual respect and 'personality'.
62.

112

assumptions are also part of our moral
development and
are specific to particular types of
social relations.
Relations of mutual respect encourage our
capacity to
see ourselves and others as persons.

This capacity under-

girds our ability to have certain feelings.

We feel shame

at not having lived up to self -expectations,
and we feel

regret when we fail to fulfill the requirements
of morality,
A man's morality is shown by the type of
question of
conduct that he takes seriously, by the type of
decision about which he is prepared to reflect
carefully, and to entertain genuine and reasoned
criticisms. .. .An expression of regret
is like an expression of envy, admiration,
anger,
fear, or hope, in at least one respect.
It is not
the announcement of a feeling, infallably identified
by its felt quality; it is rather the announcement
of a feeling,
this case a feeling of unpleasure
associated with a thought of the past, together
with the identification of an object and the announcement of an inclination to behave in a certain wav in
the future. 6 3

m

Thus emotion concepts like regret have built into them

certain beliefs about human capacities, in this case the
capacity to act intentionally.

Regret has built into it

certain beliefs about what one ought to do; it implies
the ability to reflect on our past actions, to seek new

reasons for action, although it does not entail action.
We may regret an act and yet continue to engage in it in

the future.
But emotion concepts also have built into them beliefs

about others, beliefs that others are persons like ourselves.
We believe others to be like ourselves in their ability to
63.

Hampshire, Thought and Action

,

pp.

240-242.
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feel pleasure and pain, to formulate
intentions, to feel
affection, trust, etc., and to develop
as autonomous
beings. We have beliefs about the
ways in which others
can be injured, and we have expectations
about the behavior
of persons toward each other.
When persons injure each other
or injure us, we feel either 'indignation'
or 'resentment'.

Both these emotion concepts imply our
understanding of
others as rational, purposive agents, responsible
for their
actions.
If others were not responsible for their
actions
•

-

if we were to believe that they were not actors
in at

least some respects

-

nor indignation.

Our beliefs about others are central

then we could feel neither resentment

to how we treat them and to how we expect them to
treat us.

But since our beliefs about others flow out the types
of relations we have with them, it matters very much what
our

ordinary interpersonal relationships are like.
in form and in content

j

These vary

therefore, our view of others (and

of ourselves) varies in form and content.

If we do not

enjoy the more developed forms of inter-relationships, we

will not enjoy the more developed forms of moral feeling,
including the ability to feel indignation, shame and prin65

cipled guilt.

It is important to look at the structure

P.F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in P.F.
Strawson, ed,, Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and
Action (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968)7 See
pages 84—88 for a discussion of intentionality, responsibility,
and the moral feelings.
It is difficult to imagine what attitudes one might have
65.
toward persons in positions of absolute authority over oneself.
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of interpersonal relationships

-

at the mix of authority

and equality as seen from the point of view
of each party
to the relationship - to understand what
emotions might undergird action in that particular social context.
Insofar as

relationships tend toward equality

- at

least as the injured

party sees her/himself as the moral equal of the
insurer

-

there will be a potential for resentment and indignation

which could provide the motives to action lacking where
one
of the parties - in particular the injured party
.

-

does not

view her/himself or the ©ne who has injured him/her as a person.
Finally, our having certain moral notions and emotions

leads us to expect others to have them also and act towards
us in terms of them.

These expectations lend support to

our treating others as persons and give rise to feelings of

guilt when we transgress their humanity.

"/Q/ne who feels

guilty, recognizing his action as a transgression of the

legitimate claims ©f others, expects them to resent his

conduct and to penalize him in various ways.

He also
66

assumes that third parties will be indignant with him."
This combination of belief and affect is tremendously

important for our understanding of political action.

If

one adopts the position that passions precede values, one will

But since relationships are never pure, resentment and
indignation are possible even in the most authoriarian
societies.
It may, however, be difficult to act upon because
of the differences in power of the parties.
This is important
for social change since it will be difficult to determine
when an oppressed group feels indignation toward its
oppressive if it never expresses this attitude in action.
66.

Rawls, Theory , p. 383.
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have a radically different
conception of political motivation
than if one adopts the view thati

5^? era i'

is a necessary condition and
a
Ur \° f m ° ral feelinS s that the
on 1 v k s a m ^al concept and its person's
assoc?Si5^if
? ?(s)? and
iated principle
thereby makes reierence
reference
to
*°
an acknowledged rignt or wrong. 6?

ex^mti^
.

It becomes clearer how moral
principles can be guides to

political action when one sees that
emotion-concepts are
linked to levels of moral development,
thus giving rise to
different motives for action. If analysts
fail to see this
point, they will tend either to take
passion - e.g.

'frustration*

-

as the only spring to action, or to limit
motives to the

constraints of self-interest, obligation and duty.

We

need to have moved to Piagefs third stage of
development
in order to see that at least some social activists
are

motivated by what Rawls' terms "the sense of justice," and
68

its related "guilt proper."
II. c.
I

Reasons and actions

think it is important at this point to pick up on

several warnings which have been expressed throughout this

chapter that this model of political motivation has reference

W*

Rawls,

"Sense," p. 295.

68.
I want to be clear that if a society is organized in certain ways, it will be very difficult for "guilt proper" to
flourish.
This is the reason, I think, why most political
action in the United Stages is motivated by reasons and
passions at the second of Rawls* three stages? it is rare
to find persons at the third stage, and I would suggest that
it may well be persons who have have been excluded from the
dominant social structures and who are implicated in subcultures who do develop.
I think this is the reason why
the Women's Movement has benefited from its stress on egalitarianism in "consciousness-raising" groups.
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only to potentialities.

To say that a person had a
reason

for action and also the concomitant
feelings is not to say
that s/he acted or will act.
Our ability to perceive
certain kinds of social practises as
injurious, and our
ability to feel certain kinds of
emotions has no necessary
connection to political action.
Indeed, we may have a reason for acting
in a way which
we think would be right and good, and
yet find ourselves acting in quite another way. There are
several reasons for this.
First, we may feel quite indignant about
a particular social
practise, and yet feel powerless to change
it.
Or we may

even feel that were we to know what to do, we
could indeed do
it, but we lack a clear idea of what
to do.
We
lack a stra-

tegy for change.

Or we may feel guilty about a social prac-

tise, feeling ourselves in some way benefitted by
it while

others are injured, and yet fail to act to change that
practise.

An excellent example of this sort of instance is the

phenomena known as "white guilt."

Most liberals have probably

experienced the feeling that they are beneficiaries of racism,
the feeling that somehow they are partially responsible for
its perpetuation, but have not felt that they could do any-

thing about it.
Or we may have very good overriding reasons for not

acting on our moral judgments.

For example,

I

have a moral

reason to go to my Aunt's house when she is ill because she

would be happy to see me.

Now

I

may not be able to go for

any number of reasons, some of which are overriding moral
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considerations

-

my daughter is also ill and

leave her alone in order to visit my
Aunt

are circumstances beyond my control

cannot get out of bed.
in mind

-

I

Aunt lives.

I

-

I

-

cannot

I

some of which

am also ill and

may have non-moral considerations

lack the airfare to get to Chicago
where my
(This assumes that

I

accept the rule that

I

ought to pay for my flight.)

•

Then there is the thorny problem of when
we should be
critical of existing social practises.
Certainly we cannot
afford to be critical at all times; we would,
I

think, go

mad if we did not acquiesce to some extent to
existing
practises.

There has to be some background normality to

frame our critique of specific practises.
A related problem is how much can we affort to
criticize

ourselves.

Can we emotionally afford to be forever evaluating,

regretting and feeling shame over own actions.

To be thor-

oughly self-critical would be to lose sight of ourselves;
we have to maintain a certain level of consistency in our

own self-image in order not to go mad.

However, we may also

have conflicting ideals of ourselves and have to choose

which to live up to.

A brilliant example of a person con-

fronting conflicting ideals is Doris Lessing's character Kate

Brown in The Summer Before the Dark

.

As the result of an

illness, Kate is dissociated from her normal self

efficient organizer of household and business

-

-

responsible,

and is thrust

118

into a condition of relatively
total 'freedom.*
this
condition, Kate meets Maureen,
a young woman confronting
the choice between marriage and
what she perceives as 'freedom.'
Maureen demands advise from Kate who
refuses to respond. She
cannot, for to make the choice in
the terms Maureen sets

m

would be for Kate to repudiate herself.

She recoils from

the madness of self-repudiation and
determines to temper
her(normal) self with a decree of the
radical freedom she
has learned.

There may also be problems resulting from the
ways in
which our emotions can stand in the way of
reasoned and

healthy action.

As Rawls saysi

None of this is to deny xnat our existing moral
feelings may be in many respects irrational and
injurious to our good. Freud is right in his
view that these attitudes are often "punitive and
blind, incorporating many of the harsher aspects
of the authority situation in which they were first
acquired.
Resentment and indignation, feelings of
guilt and remorse, a sense of duty and the censure
of others, often take perverse and destructive forms,
and blunt without reason human spontaneity and
enjoyment. °^

The theory of cognitive development does not deny the

Freudian thesis that persons can get "blocked" at certain
stages in their development, nor does it imply that development means that we leave all prior stages behind as we

enter new ones.

We are who we have been; we do not shed

the needs of earlier stages as we progress to later ones,

although we may perhaps gain a clearer understanding of
Rawls, Theory, 489.
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those needs and a greater ability to control
them as we
come to see their rootedness in a social life
which we

ourselves create.

Nor does the theory of cognitive devel-

opment deny the Freudian contribution to our
understanding of
the unconscious.
Our conscious motives do often conceal

underlying unconscious ones.

Perhaps as we develop a

greater ability to reason, we are simply giving ourselves
more ways of deceiving ourselves about the purity of our
motives.

That we understand the principle of respect for

persons does not mean that we might not use this principle

rationalize actions which serve our far more selfish

-to

interests.

Then there are our "gut" reactions in the face of which
we are often expected to

exercise great rationalitv and

70

control.

These may be an especially difficult problem

in political situations

anger and hostility
-

-

where strong emotions

-

e.g.,

come into play because our interests

and possibly our lives

-

are in danger.

To control these

certainly requires our having developed character traits
like self-control, will-power, and perhaps what we might

call the "habit " of being rational in the face of emotionally
71

charged situations.

Our affective commitments to others

-

See "Robert Paul Wolff, "Marcuse's Theory of Toleration,"
(Summer, 197*0 »4-69-^79, for a discussion of this
problem. Wolff's example is that he would find it impossible
to perform a tracheotomy regardless of how clearly he
recognized its necessity.

70~.

Poli^Y. 6

71.

Peters,

"A Plea for Pluralism,"
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ouzusaring for them
-we

-

will also support us in doing what

perceive is right.

III.

The conditions under which moral development
can succeed

In the last chapter we saw that writers
in the True

Believer mode took successful moral development
to be the
introjection of a variety of external demands. No

one of

these demands determines action; rather conflict
among them
allows a latitude of freedom necessary for autonomous
choice.

The model developed here contrasts that version

of moral development with the theory of cognitive
development, a theory which assumes that development results
from

an interaction between structures at the individual (micro)
and social (macro) levels.

This latter version is in

partial agreement with the pluralist model developed in the

preceding chapter since it is assumed that the greater the
opportunities for varied social experience, the greater
the opportunity for moral development.

The social conditions

for moral development in both models are social structures

which approximate the conditions of pluraLism.
However, there is a vitally important difference be-

tween the images of pluralism upon which each model is built.
Analysts who adopt Piaget's framework place an additional

requirement on social structures and that is that at least

some of these structures satisfy the
criteria of vvhat

Rawls terms a "well-ordered society."

It is not enough

for persons to be exposed to a variety of role-taking

opportunities; the form of role-taking must meet the

requirements of moral development.
While role taking in the form of sympathy often
extends more broadly than the sense of justice,
organized or 'principled' forms of role taking
are defined by justice structures. .. .Because
the central mechanisms of role taking are justice
structures of reciprocity and equality, institutions better organized in terms of justice
provide greater opportunities for role taking
and a sense of sharedness than do unjust institutions. 72
But there are problems with this notion of justice structures.

One problem is that Kohlberg may have so broadened

the concept of justice as to include every possible criteria
of the good society.

If he has done so, he is open to

criticism from those who wish to retain justice as a distributive concept and differentiate it from, for example,
the concept benevolence.

Moreover, if Marx is correct,

and every "justice" structure is constructed to protect the

interests of a dominant class, it is important for Kohlberg
to be clear about what differentiates his "justice structures"

from those which are exploitative.
I

To avoid these problems,

would rather emply the notion of 'liberated social struc-

tures,

'

a phrase which I think captures the essential

features of Piaget's structures of mutual respect.
72l

Kohlberg, "Is-Ought," p. 193.
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For Piaget, it is the quality of
role-taking which is
vital to moral development.
Quality varies with
the

structure of human relationships.

In relationships of

unilateral respect, persons take on the role
expected of
them by those in positions of authority.
The
interests

of the authority remain external to the
individual and

in conflict with his own interests.

S/he does not have

the opportunity to act as though her/his own interests

mattered, nor can s/he take on the role of the authority
since the latter occupies a different social position.

Action is governed by roles set by authority figures.

These

roles are massively real for the individual, especially for
the child whose own cognitive structure is still at the

stage Piaget describes as "nominal realism."
Now, moral constraint is closely akin to intellectual
constraint, and the strictly literal character which
the child tends to ascribe to rules received from
without bears... a close resemblance to the attitudes
he adopts with regard to language and the intellectual
realities imposed upon him by the adult. We can make

Kohlberg is unclear about what he means by justice
73.
structures and how they contribute to moral development. He
seems to suggest that they are valuable because they provide
greater opportunities for role-taking, and he criticizes
Piaget* s focus on autonomy and peer group relations as
confusing the form and content of moral thought.
"There
is nothing more cognitively mature to preferring a peer than
an adult." (Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 22.) What
Kohlberg has done is to misinterpret Piaget' s purpose, which
is not to predict the direction of moral development based on
a logical sequence of concept acquisition, but to understand
the conditions under which morality qua morality might develop.

a al °^ to fix our nomenclature
and shall
««!
S of
S moral
?
speak
realism to designate on the plane of
judgments of value what corresponds to
'nominal
an
Gn verbalism °r conceptual realism
on
2 !v
+tl i?"
* heoretlcal reasoning.
/This
realism/...
r£L?i« both from a confusion between
results
and
objective (hence from egocentrism) and subjective
from
the
intellectual constraint of the adult....? 2 *

The implications of this perception of
moral rules are

threefold

i

1)

duty is heteronomous rather than autonomous

rules are "givens" and obedience to them is all
that counts
2)

moral rules are interpreted literally, or rather
not in-

terpreted at all but simply followed; 3) responsibility
is
objective; i.e., it has nothing to do with the agent's

intentions but entirely with the consequences of the act

itself and whether these consequences are treated by

authorities as "bad.
This heteronomous morality, however, is essential to
our development as moral beings since the conditions of its

acquisition are also the conditions of our acquiring those
character traits which undergird commitment to moral rules.
Parental constraints serve to develop children's will-power

they must control their own wants in the face of possible
punishment.

These are the years of developing ego-strength

and the fact that Piaget casts development in terms of rule-

orientation ought not imply that the model excludes the
development of character traits.
T^U

Piaget, Moral Judgment

,

pp.

110-111.
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In relationships of cooperation
and mutual respect,
persons have the opportunity to take
on the roles of all
the parties involved in the interaction,
and potentially
to play a part in defining those
roles. We do develop

character traits which are specific to our
performing
these roles well, and we develop a sense
of obligation to
others who are also seriously trying to live
up to their
duties.
We develop a sense of commitment
toward others which
constrains us from engaging in actions which would
undermine
the trust and predictability which makes our
lives as social

beings possible.
But our personality is more than the sum of our obligations, and our feelings toward others involve more
than

constraints on actions.
engage in activities

i.e., to play all the roles which

-

comprise the activity

persons among persons.

Having the opportunity to equally

-

opens us up to seeing ourselves as

75

Our actions begin to be defined in

terms of an appreciation of the interests of all parties; it

begins to take into account the way in which we all have a
mutual interest in the action, an interest which

term a "social interest."

I

would

This is not the static external

interest of "society" as opposed to individual interests

rather it is the dynamic interest of persons who recognize
that they are potential creators of their own social life
and that this life ought to reflect and satisfy their de-

veloping needs, wants, and purposes.

As we become aware

There are striking similarities here with Marxist
images of communism.
75 •
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that our development is implicated
in particular types of
interpersonal relations, we begin to sense
that our own
interests are firmly intertwined with
the development of
others as persons? we take an interest
in their development as
they in turn take an interest in ours.
The moral implications of relations
of mutual respect
are also threefold, 1) duty is autonomous rules are subject
to debate and alteration; obedience to
them is voluntary but
based on solidarity; 2) moral rules are
open to interpreta-

tion in light of a commitment to reciprocity
and egalitarianism, 3) responsibility is "subjective"

-

we have acquired a

sense of ourselves and others as having
intentions and projects and we can be held responsible for our acts.

Piaget does not argue that there are invariant se-

quences of moral development, that persons always develop
from one stage to the next, nor that the direction of development is the same for everyone.

But he does argue that

true morality can only flow from relationships of mutual

respect since in relationships of unilateral respect, respect
is for authority roles rather than for persons.

For Piaget,

both the peer group and the parent-child relationship are
justice structures.

But the former rests on the justice of

autonomy and solidarity, the latter on the justice of authority.

If the requirements of justice

social order and autonomous reasoning

-

-

or of a liberated

include respect for

persons, then peer groups ideally better meet these.
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want to be clear that both of
these relationships
are ideal types.
Neither unilateral nor mutual respect
occurs in pure form in "real-life."
I

iS neVer unadul *erated, nor,
therefore,
irSSSJS
is
respect every purely unilateral!
the
most
submissive child has the feeling that
he can? or
could, argue that a mutual sympathy
surrounds
relationships that are most heavily charged
with
authority. And conversely, cooperation
is never
r6,
in any disc ussion between equals,
V
+
th dls Putants
°^ tt
can always exert pressure on
+k!
the other by making overt or hidden
appeals to
custom or authority. Cooperation,
indeed, seems
rather to be the limiting term, the ideal
brium to which all relations of constraint equili-76
tend.

\

^

Peer groups may be adulterated by the
presence of older
'children? parent-child relationships are
adulterated by
parents* awareness that children deserve respect. 77

Structure alone, however, cannot establish the conditions for moral development.

As we have seen in the

preceding section, moral development is contingent upon
the experience of certain types of reactive relationships

between persons,

a.

contingency which raises questions about

the part "warmth" plays in moral development.
7%~*

Piaget, Moral Judgment

,

p.

Kohlberg

90.

Piaget raises the question of why boys between the ages
77.
of 11 and 13 can be so democratic in playing marbles when
real democracy is usually lacking in adult life. His answer
is that boys drop the game shortly after this age and so there
are few older boys around to impose their authority and
adulterate democracy. This condition rarely obtains in adult
life.
"With regard to the game of marbles. .children of 11-13
have no seniors. ... Since they no longer have to endure the
pressure of play-mates who impose their views by virtue
of their prestige, the children whose reactions we have
been studying are clearly able to become conscious of their
autonomy much sooner than if the game of marbles lasted till
the age of 18.
In the same way, most of the phenomena which
characterize adult societies would be quote other than they
.
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rejects the importance of emotions in development and
stresses the role of cognitive conflict
The environment which provides role-taking opportunities is not necessarily a warm, loving, identification-inducing environment, and an environment
deprived in role-taking opportunities is not
necessarily cold or rejecting. A certain minimum
amount of warmth in face-to-face groups or institutions is required if a child or adolescent is to
feel a sense of participation and membership in the
group.
However, the conditions for a child's maximal
participation and role-taking in a group is not that
he receive maximal affection from the group, or that
the group he organized on communal affiliation lines. 78
^

In a sense Kohlberg is correct to downplay the role of

affection.

Rawls, for instance, would agree that as one

moves to the higher stages of development, emotional

attachments to particular persons become less and less
salient in making moral judgments.

Yet Piaget and Rawls

do place greater emphasis on the role of emotional ties
79
in moral growth.
For instance, Rawls claims that emo-

tional attachments of warmth, trust and friendship and

principled guilt are integral to development at the highest
stage.

His three psychological laws depend upon love and

concern for others.
Piaget is more concerned to show the conditions under

which autonomous moral reasoning develops than to demonstrate
are if the average length of human life were appreciably
different from what it is." Ibi d. p. 76.
,

78.

Kohlberg, "Is-Ought," p. 191.

See Richard Ferelman, "The Development of Political
Ideology," A merican P o litical Sc ienc e Re view 63 (September,
1969)i750-7^7, for a discussion of the role of parental
warmth in the development of political ideology. Kerelman
is the only political scientist I have been able to uncover
who utilizes Piaget* s theory to understand political socialization.
79.
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logical connections between
moral concepts. Piaget
is
thus more concerned than
Kohlberg with the development
of
character traits and with the
role of habituation.
For
Piaget, the assumption is
that all persons have the
capacity
to reason, but whether
persons always develop and
utilize these
9
capacities is an altogether
different issue/
Development
depends in part on opportunities
to experience warm, egalitarian, reciprocal relations.
But action requires the
development of such traits as
will-power, consistency, caring,
dependability, reliability, compassion,
etc.
I would also
suggest that rational action requires
a certain amount of
habituation, practise in the skill of
reasoning; rational
action also requires a certain amount
of character-strength.
Piaget does not imply that individuals
will act in a predictable fashion when confronted with
moral choices. He gives
us no tools for predicting action as
Kohlberg claims
to do

(from knowledge of an individual's position
on a scale of

cognitive development).

W.

I

would suggest, however, that

Cognitive development theory sheds interesting light
on the
current debate about race and IQ. Kohlberg claims
that there
r
n h P between J and moral development, which makes
9
? i
sense ?i
if moral
development is the ability to manipulate concepts
If some persons lack the capacity - the IQ - to
develop morally
or conceptually, there are serious social implications.
The
issue is a thorny one with some interesting cases. Fight
there
not be persons - the mentally retarded - who are incapable
of
moral development? The boundary between those who cannot and
those who can develop will be a fuzzy one, however, as is the
boundary between retardation and normality. But it is this
boundary which permits policy-making based on the optimistic
premise that persons do have capacities for moral development?
it may be that those at the borderline might benefit from
social
policies designed to enhance opportunities for development,
despite the fact that some persons will remain incapable of
development

S«L
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Piaget implies that the more
opportunity an individual has
to utilize the tools of
autonomous^reasoning, the more likely
he or she will be to act morally. °
indeed, persons may
be

able to act morally before they
can reason about what they
are doing. As Alasdair tfaclntyre
argues
An agent can only do what he
can
children can often do what they describe. But
cannot yet describe
This example certainly necessitates
a modification
of the argument /that all
action is conceptual or
° hil ren ^arn whafis
avaUabi;
the t0 learn 4 The child's
^7
actions
?
counl a« %£?
identify them as s ^h
in ?erms of
scnptions... And this example thus
"
helps To Ji
a crucial point.
The limits of
what I ran
can Hn
do are set by the limits of
the descrip?
tions available to me, not those I
possess
at
anv
given moment. And the descriptions
available t7
6
Urrent
in
the
SOcial
groups
t0 which
°

f^iTT^'

^

•

o^^lT^l"*

I

belong^!

So,

individual development rests fundamentally
on social
development, and the availability of role-models
does

broaden the scope of what children

-

and adults

-

can do.

The

availability of role-models who act on the basis of
morality
can sensitize children to moral action before

they can reason.

Finally, persons need not always utilize the tools
of

reason which they have acquired.
that an individual

situation.

is"

Let us say, for example,

confronted with an authoritarian

One rational response is to use the conceptual

So;

This may help to account for the rigid authoritarianism
of the working class. Working class children may have
fewer opportunities, too, to develop their moral potentiality.

81.
Alasdair Maclntyre, "A Mistake About Causality in Social
Science," in Laslett and Runciman, Philosophy, Politics and
Society , 2nd Series (New York Barnes and itable, 1962) pp.
*^
59-60.
t
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repertoire appropriate to the
structured situation.
However,
an individual may also rationally
utilize the conceptual
tools developed in other
activities to cast critical
judgment on the present activity.
What I am suggesting is
that our ability to act rationally
is bound up in our
ability
to perceive alternatives.
Although one definition of
rationality is always given by the
situation - that action which
is
situationally appropriate - this
definition can always be overridden by looking at the situation
from another perspective.
This distinction is important not
only for comparing the two
models which I have explicated, but
has important implicate
for political action.
Persons with more highly developed
cognitive repertoires will have more
options open to them.
Which option they choose is not open to
prediction, but

understanding their choice and the options they
perceive
does require that we share their cognitive
framework.

This

framework will be a composite of the following
elements
1)

An ability to conceptualize at some stage of

development (at stage

3,

to give reasons which flow from the

principle of respect for persons)?
2)

An explanatory theory which fleshes out the ways

in which persons are being injured (at stage 3 this will
have

reference to mutual respect);
3)

A strategy for change which proposes ways in which

the injury might be alleviated (at stage

3

this will have
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reference to a theory of liberated social
structures).
IV.

Adequacy of the two models

My intention has been to accurately but not
impartially
lay out two contending theories of political
action.

intended to show that one of these theories

than the other.

I

have

is more adequate

The more theoretically adequate perspective

allows us to see alternatives to which the other
is blind,
while at the same time encompassing those
features of human
activity accurately pictured by the first. I would
now like
to develop this point more fully and to show the
ways in

which the Moral Agent perspective is more theoretically
adequate than the True Believer perspective.
IV. a.

The acquisition of political motives

Both the True Believer and Moral Agent perspectives
rest on the assumption that there is some relationship be-

tween social life and human consciousness and that some social
structures are conducive to human development while others
are not.

In other words, each has a built-in theory of

socialization and moral development.
The True Believer perspective rests on what

called the induction approach to socialization.

approach posits a pre-existing social order
ideas, rules, morality, etc.

-

-

I

have

This

institutions,

into which persons must be

inducted in order to become human.

We have seen that
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this socialization occurs
in two stages - primary
and
secondary - and that the
secondary stage is particularly
important in the development of
mature, autonomous, rational
motivation.
Primary socialization is rather
too authoritarian
for liberals who invest a
great deal in the political
values
of freedom, pursuit of
self-interest, and opportunity.
Secondary socialization - where
groups are open and multiple
- permits a range of choice and
a degree of autonomy not
encouraged by primary socialization.
But we have also seen that
autonomous action is not
absolutely free.
It is delimited by rules of the
game
which are embedded in the very structure
of pluralist
society and which are inducted along
with other content
into xhe motivational schema of persons
living in such
societies. These rules constrain political
action by es-

tablishing the legitimate means for pursuing
private ends
and the legitimate means for redress of
grievance (as well
as defining what constitutes a grievance).
They are
the

rules of bargaining and compromise, within a
competetive

political world, and moral-political rules like equality
of opportunity in a competitive private world.

learn these rules

-

If persons

and develop the character traits which

make it possible (although not necessary) for them to act
on these rules - we wind up with a rational politics of

constrained egoism.
But if society is not structured, if it breaks down,
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both autonomy and the constraints of
liberalism are eroded.
Under anomic conditions, persons lack
conventional standards
and clearly articulated interests.
They repress to a state
quite like childhood, where they suffer
a need for constraint.
These non-autonomous persons may find
this constraint in
political movements into which they move in
one disjointed
leap.
They are quite simply filled with a new moral
and

ideological content which satisfies emotional needs.
There is, however, a way in which consciousness
can
.change in a rational, constrained manner.

Persons who

experience status inconsistencies may come to recognize
that

they have an interest in pressing for change in terms of
existing moral-political rules.

They may, for instance,

apply the principle of equality of opportunity to themselves
in ways they never before regarded as legitimate.

The Moral Agent perspective posits a different range
of social relations and of human motives.

It encompasses the

True Believer perspective and moves beyond it in ways which

allow us to pick out features of political action to which the
True Believer theorist (and actor) is blind.
The Moral Agent perspective assumes that different

ways of seeing the world are conceptually connected, that
they develop out of each other and that some may be more
developed than others.

It is assumed that persons can develop

an ability to critically evaluate the rules of their own

society in terms of developing cognitions which move beyond
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justifications already embedded in social practise.
Piaget's theory of moral development helps us to
understand how persons can be socialized not just to know
the

content of social rules, but to understand the purposes
of rules and therefore be able to criticize those
rules

which construct their present social life.

We have seen

that Piaget, in contrast to the inductionists, argues that
it it not necessarily the role-taking possibilities provided

by society which encourage development but the quality of

role-taking itself.
mutual respect.

This quality varies from unilateral to

In relations of unilateral respect

-

relations

which approximate the image of socialization undergirding the
True Believer model

-

persons take on the roles expected of

them by those in positions of authority.

Rules and roles

are givens, and conformity to them is what counts in eval-

uating persons and practises.

Where there are open and plural

roles, persons do develop a type of autonomy, but it is an

autonomy which is at the nexus of other-determined roles.
In relations of cooperation or mutual respect

-

relations

built on mutual trust, compassion, friendly feelings

-

persons have the opportunity not only to take on the roles
of all parties

-

an opportunity which gives them a sense of

themselves as a person among persons
in defining those roles.

Here the

beyond the True Believer model.

IV

-

but to play a part

oral Agent model moves

Critical consciousness rests

not on cognitions of conflicts between existing rules, but
on cognitions about the ideals of social life.

13 5

As we develop, we come to see
that we have an interest

in certain types of relationships
with other human beings.
We come to perceive our own
development as intricately
bound up with the development of all
persons and to see

that life is impoverished for all who
participate in re81
lationships in which there is no respect.
We develop
a "social interest," an interest in
encouraging social

relationships in which persons can flourish.

This is an

interest which those who adopt a different theory
of human development and those who have not yet
developed a sense of

themselves as rule-makers will have great difficulty
comprehending.
Our developing sense of ourselves as persons undergirds
a morality based on respect for persons, a morality which

supports a critical perspective on existing social arrangements.
If existing social practises

-

including moral-political

rules like equality of opportunity

-

preclude the development

of human capacities, then we have reason to change them.

Having developed these capacities ourselves, we now can
perceive ways in which social practises fail to meet the

requirements of morality, which bring into relief the
injuries which are being done to persons.

If we also have

a strategy for change, we have acquired a reason to act,

a reason which moves beyond the justifications for political
82
action which are already legitimated by society.
The

We also have reason to support those early relations of
81.
unilateral respect which undergird later development.
82.
This discussion is closely related to the anomie-alienation
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True Believer theorist is trapped in
just those legitimizations, trapped by her own theory, of moral
learning.
The
rules of a particular society become immutable
facts,

hardly open to critical evaluation when they
meet the
requirements of the good society which flow from
the True
Believer model.
This model founders on its inability to
encompass interests which move beyond egoism and to
comprehend justifications which flow from ideal conceptions
of

social life rather than from norms already embedded in
social
practise.
IV.

b.

Reason, passion and action

These competing theories of the relationship between

social structure and political consciousness support

differing conceptions of the relationship between reason,
passion, and political action.

This in turn undergirds

differing notions of the ways in which political ideas
are held and acted upon.

controversy. Anomie theories rest on a contrast with
either an organically or mechanically integrated society
which is assumed to be good since persons need social
constraint.
These theories usually assume that freedom is
dangerous, or at least threatening to persons who may find
it difficult to develop individual standards of conduct
when society fails to provide these. Alienation theories rest
on the assumption that persons can develop alternatives to
their own social rules and evaluate existing arrangements
in terms of these alternatives, but the basis for radical
consciousness is always difficult to establish. Critical
consciousness, according to development theories, requires at
least some experience with non-alienated, egalitarian relations of mutual respect.
Out of this experience can flow
a principled morality which serves as the basis for evaluating
alienated social life, life which does not fulfill the needs
of developed persons.
#
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The True Believer model assumes
that action flows

directly from the passions

-

that 'frustration* produces

revolutionary violence (keeping in mind that
these passions
are rooted in particular social conditions) -

or that egoistic

reasons produce action

-

rational action is action based

on self interest (again rooted in particular
social conditions)
A political demand is rational if it utilizes
the existing rule
of the game

-

of opportunity
.

i.e.,
-

liberal-democratic

rules like equality

to maximize egoistic interests.

Rational

politics is the use of power to gain private benefits,

within the constraints of liberal rules.

We expect to

find actions designed to maximize individual and group
benefits, justified perhaps by the principle of equality
of opportunity, and constrained by the rules of bargaining,

majority rule, tolerance, etc.
But what happens when political actors question existing

practises using standards of legitimacy which are not shared

by all members of society?

When reasons for action offered

by political agents fall outside accepted conventions, those
who accept the conventions will tend to see actors as
83

crazy, wild-eyed fanatics, or at best Utopian visionaries.

Often unconventional behavior, especially behavior which
83.
cannot be subsumed under self-interest is explained in terms
of unconscious motives rather than conscious reasons.
"The
conscious reasons, which make it look like an action are regarded as being in some way irrelevant or illusory, an
excuse for what the man is going to do anyway. Some such
theory was advanced by Freudians who held that some reasons
for actions are rationalizations, a facade that we erect so
that we can satisfy dangerous wishes in a manner that is
socially acceptable." R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation
The Moral
(London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 195$) p. 59.
rationalization.
Agent mode does not exclude
1

,

,
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"Judged by the standards and needs of
the existing society
...revolutionaries are out of their minds.
To the enemy
of revolution the Reason of the
revolution appears to be
madness. M
In contrast to this image of the wild-eyed
radical,
is the image of the mature political
agent, rooted in

pluralist, conflicting roles (or at least
constrained by
the roles others play), and committed to the
liberal values
of 'freedom of thought,
'tolerance* etc.
It is assumed that
'

such an individual will adopt ideas hesitently,
although

with strong commitment, and be willing to test these
ideas
in the "free market place" of the political arena.

Radicals,

on the contrary, plunge themselves into an ideology
without

reservation

-

and probably with fleeting commitment

-

and

instead of testing ideas in the political arena, they pull
out of politics.

political action

Their ideas are designed not to guide
-

the pursuit of self-interest through the

use of power - but to avoid responsibility and power.

There is a sense in which all reasons rest on a back-

ground ideology which legitimizes certain demands and delegitimizes others.

But the background to self-interested

politics is unexamined.

Because of their conceptual biases,

True Believer theorists fail to see how their contrast model
-

the pluralist order and self-interested politics

become an immutable, near "natural" fact.
Breines,

"Would you Believe?" p.

9.

-

has

Any challenge
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to this order, any conception of
interests which moves
away from egoism (although a rare
occurrence of altruism
is permissible) is mistaken? action
based on such challenges
are mislead,
I

have hoped to show that the True Believer
model

rests on a clear ideological base, on an
unquestioned

conceptual framework which blinds theorists in this
tradi-

tion to alternative possibilities, alternative reasons
and
85

justifications for action.

Theorists in this tradition

. . .want
to understand the movement without changing
their own positions. Participants know this is
impossible. .. .To 'understand' movement ideology is
to make the conceptual switch. .which brings about fundamental or radical changes in orientation. °°
.

The Moral Agent perspective allows for these shifts and is

therefore a more adequate way of approaching political
ideologies.

It rests on the assumption that there can be

alternative motives for action, alternative types of
interests, and that at least some of these provide the

basis for rational political action.
This is not to say that radical perspectives do not
distort and blind also. As Sheila Rowbotham says, "Bewilderment and mystery surrounded the birth of women's
liberation.
It seemed to come out of an ideological lacuna
belonging neither to previous feminism nor to Marxism.
Orphan- like it had apparently sprung up from nowhere in
particular. .. .Feminists and Marxists alike were convinced
that when it grew up, and became sensible like them, it would
shed its ill-defined 'absurdities'." Woman's Consciousness,
Man's World (New Yorkj Penguin Books, 1973)$ p. ix.
531

86.
Luth er P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine, People, Power,
Change
Movements of Social Transformation Indianapolis
Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 1?6.
t

(
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The True Believer mode has a narrower
range within

which phenomena can vary.

Its concept of rationality

is rooted in egoism and is linked to
particular means as

the way of achieving egoistic ends.

The model is correct

to link rationality with concepts like

•

autonomy' and

•freedom* and 'free choice' since rationality does
presuppose

individual responsibility for action.

However, it is in-

correct to assume that 'autonomy' necessitates egoism and

that rational choices are always in one's self-interest.
•

The Moral Agent has a broader image of autonomy, and image

which sees autonomy as linked to the notion of social
being.

The Moral Agent perspective assumes that since

persons' needs, wants and interests are socially and

historically specific, so too is rationality.

And it

assumes that we can take an interest in the well-being
of others without being "altruistic."

Rationality is implicated in our social life.

Every

society sets limits on the kind of autonomy which can flourish
and sets limits on what can be chosen.

We cannot choose any

possible life and have others consider us rational.

The

point is that our conceptions of rationality are socially
and historically specific and that we need to look at the

True Believer image of rationality in this light.

Our

historically developing images of persons and their potential
undergirds developing images of rationality.

This again is

not to say that all action is rational, or even that all
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reasons are rational in the sense of
getting us what we
need in order to flourish, but simply
to say that persons
87
do or may have reasons for action
which move beyond egoism.
The Moral Agent model also more
adequately handles the
complex relationship between reason and
passion.

The True

Believer perspective tends to dichotomize
reason and passion,
to bifurcate them into the two models
of action

built into it.

?+i
ity,

W ° Ul
I
?
comments

^

J

U£?

make Some addit ional comments on rationalJ° are
which
not central to my
when we use phrases like -freely chosen, argument. First
••autonomous," fVe e
a
10
tc we m3 -y become trapped in an ahistorical,
indi?'
1C per ?P ect e on action.
This is dangerous because
TJ
«
it slides away from the notion of persons as
social and
historical beings and towards the liberal-individualistic
image of the person, an image which makes it difficult
maintains sociological perspective on social change andto on
changes
consciousness.
(Another danger is to move in the
direction of social determinism - for example, technologism and to see changes in individual consciousness as the
result
of events on the macro level alone rather than as the
result
of a dialectical relationship between individual consciousness and social life.)
•

'

*

^

m

I also want to be clear that there are "objective"
tests of
rationality, tests which appear to conflict with the idea
of studying action in its social and historical context in
order to understand it.
I agmee with Maclntyre that standards
of rationality are given by cultural norms, but that rationality
also involves conformity to universal logical criteria.
I
would add that rationality also links means to ends. However,
since the ends of human life are socially and historically
specific, this means-ends requirement is purely formal.
(See
Maclntyre, "A Mistake about Causality.")

Rational choice involves both form and content. However,
persons cannot choose what is not available for choice, and
availability flows out of the social context. The implications
for change are far-reaching since society then always limits
the content of rational choice in important ways. This
means that choice will never be absolutely rational - in the
sense of absolutely fulfilling human needs.
Our needs
develop as our social life changes, and any of these needs
are likely to fall far short of some abstract ideal, an
ideal which fails to find reality in social life and which
is therefore doomed to be misleading.

Ik 2
It does treat passions,

or 'wants', and feelings like

guilt, shame, obligation, etc., as rooted
in our social
life, but it has a limited conception
of the relation be-

tween cognition and passion which has special
import for
motives like 'frustration.' The Moral
Agent perspective is
better able to handle this relation - the relation,
for

instance, between frustration and our ideals
of social life,

between indignation and our cognitions of injury
to others

-

and the relation between our changing emotional
and cognitive
•

repertoire and our changing political purposes.

Although

the True Believer perspective does link changing emotions
to different modes of political action, it has a more
limited

understanding of the nature of these emotions.
The Moral Agent model also has a more adequate theory
of socialization, one which allows for critical consciousness.

The induction model of socialization is correct in putting
a great deal of emphasis on the acquisition of affective

commitments in political action.

Action does require our

having the will to act; we need to have acquired the strength
of character to do what we know is right even when it conflicts

with other things we want to do.

Guilt, regret, a sense

of obligation are part of moral action.

model does not exclude these elements.

But the Moral Agent
The theory of cog-

nitive development is compatible with an approach to social-

ization which sees the importance of a nurturant "family"
structure (although we could debate whether our nuclear

family best meets the requirements of the first stage of
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moral development) for the development
of ego strength
and character traits.
Our understanding that our own actions
may be undergirded by a developing conceptual framework
and by certain
affective commitments has implications for the
way in which
we hold our ideas and the way in which we
act.
The True

Believer perspective allows for a type of self-criticism?
so too does the Moral Agent perspective.

As we come to

see ideas as developing dynamically, we become
hesitent
•

about truth.

(My own hesitency in the face of Marxist

friends' surity of their own position is probably shared

by many; it seems to me to indicate an unwillingness to
accept any systematic program for change as the final answer.)
On the one hand, we are constrained from actions which would

undermine our image of moral personal relations
lies, breaking a trust, etc.

-

-

e.g., telling

and on the other, we are en-

couraged to engage in actions which represent our understanding
of the interrelatedness of human lives.
At the same time, we are aware that we are not always

rational agents, that we have needs

-

including unconscious

ones - which are rooted in our personal histories and in our

social lives in such a way that any program for action, any

political ideology which fails to take them into account is
doomed to failure or to thoroughly repressive measures.
Some of these needs are the flawed products of a flawed
society, but even though our needs are flawed, we cannot
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stand completely outside ourselves.

We can only test

ideas in light of personal experience and
stand as critical
agents in the face of any proposed truth.
Some proposals
for change will offend our understanding of
our needs;

others will express the best of our developing
needs, our

needs for relations of warmth, trust, compassion
and commitment.
To summarize, the Moral Agent perspective is
more

adequate than the True Believer perspective because it

better accounts for the development of critical thought,
because it incorporates reasons for action to which the
True Believer perspective is closed, and because it permits
us to see relationships between reasons and passions which

make more sense of what persons do when they act

-

in

general, because it opens us up to seeing more facets of

political action.

This is not to say that the True Believer

perspective may not adequately describe a specific political
action, may not often capture the nature of a given political

justification.

It is rather to say that the perspective

I

support opens us up to more potential descriptions, to more

possible categorizations of human activity.

I

should also

argue that political action can and does fall beyond the

limits of the categories established by the True Believer

perspective, an argument which can be more clearly defended

by looking at a particular political movement, the Women's

Liberation Movement.

CHAPTER

IV

THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
It should now be clear that any
answer to the

question, "What do women want," is going
to be trenendously
complex.
What I have done in the past two chapters
is to
develop two broad theories of political
action and to argue
that the latter is more adequate than the
former in terms
of its ability to provide answers to this
question.
I
•am

now ready to apply these models to an
understanding

of a contemporary political movement, the Women's
Liber-

ation Movement,

Again, it is important to be clear that

these models serve both the political analyst and political
actor.

Therefore, in what follows,

I

shall attempt to

develop each perspective as it is used both to explain
the rise of contemporary feminism and to justify the

actions of contemporary feminists.

I

shall want to show

that there is a conceptual development in the Movement and
that only a theory which can adequately capture this

development will adequately account for the movement itself.
I

also want to show that this development has provided more

and more adequate explanations of the position of women

in contemporary American society and more and more adequate

resolutions to the problems which confront us all.
particular,

I

In

shall want to show that three conceptions of
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women's liberation

'equality of opportunity,

-

ticity,' and 'dis-alienation'

-are

•

'authen-

more and more adequate

conceptualizations of what constitutes an injury
to persons
and what structural changes need to be
made
in order for

persons to flourish.

It

I. a.

The True Believer Model

The Frustrated Bitch Hypothesis

This explanation of the Women's Movement flows
out
•of the assumptions of the True Believer model.

ponents assume that women have too much freedom
are suffering the ill effects of anomie

-

Its pro-

indeed

and that the

Movement is a reaction to and an escape from freedom on
the part of immature persons.

The ideas of the Movement

are treated as simple rationalizations of fears and of

frustration arising from the challenges of freedom.

This

is probably the most common explanation of the Women's

Movement, at least as it is grasped by the public mind,
and most explanations in this mode are fairly unsophisticated.

They are cast in terms like 'castrating bitch,
•irresponsible child.'

'witch',

But an example of this mode which

This ought not be surprising given Kohlberg's theory of
cognitive development. Many people in a hierarchically
organized society will see themselves as somewhere around
Kohlberg's stages 2 and 3 and will tend to see others in these
terms
TT
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is quite sophisticated is Midge
Decter «s much-criticized

The New Chastity and Othe r Arguments

A

r

^ ns t

Women's

T

.<w_

at ion.

On page 52 of her rather interesting
critique of con-

temporary American feminism, Decter writes
No doubt women are far from having
attained a full
parity of opportunity. No doubt they
have
continue to be discouraged from undertaking been and
practise of certain professions. No doubt the
they are
in many instances paid less for the work
they do than
T eSe are
howeve r> is ^es of injustice
?
that lend JS'
themselves
not to the large-scale analysis
of a liberation movement but to the
particular and
practical application of pressure against the wrongdoers. .. .Where there is no disagreement as
to what
constitutes an injustice - as there is none with
respect to issues bearing on the rights of women
today
the constant vociferous harping on it tends to
lead
to the suspicion that one is here witnessing the
beating of a dead horse.
'

-

In other words, argues Ms. Decter, we all know what is
wrong
and we need only apply ourselves to remedying particular ills.
But the point of this dissertation is to illustrate exactly

how it is that we do not all know what is wrong, and that
each of comes to an understanding of social life which delimits
the range of things which we can and do consider wrong.
I

What

want to investigate here are the underlying assumptions

in Ms. Decter's work which lead her to state that we all know

what is wrong and then to reject feminist analysis which
picks out other features of social life as "wrong.
Women, argues Decter, are freer than they have ever

been trefore, free from both biological necessity and social
constraint.

The American female "...experiences life as a
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constant process o^deciaion
and so a constant assumption
of responsibility."
For example> in choQsing t<>
be a housewife, a woman makes
a very real choice,
"at any
moment, by her own volition,
she might be doing otherwise,"
unlike her husband whose life is
imposed by necessity. Her
worklife, once driven by the
biological and social necessity
of the family, is no longer so
driven, her sex life, unlike
her husband's is not driven by lust;
her life is neither
3
natural nor social contingency but
autonomous choosing.
The
sexual revolution has freed her from
social constraint in
her sexuality; technology has freed
her from biology; the
new woman is on her own. Women are now
the arbiters of their
own sexual conduct. Marriage has become
a freely chosen
contract for which partners bear the
responsibility of

^^^

success

o

ailure, and child-bearing, too, is a free
choice,

undetermined by either biological necessity or
a limited conception of woman* s proper role.
Since there were no standards of conduct, either
to
obey or to violate, since she herself was to be
the arbiter and the standard, she was Dressed into
a
species of self-knowledge it has been'one of the
purposes of sexual games and encounters to help her
attain to. Far from being a sexual object, as Women's
Liberation claimed, she was a sexual subject p_ar excellence

.

Midge Decter, The New Chastity (New Yorki Coward, IVcCann
2.
and Geoghegan, Inc., 1972), p. 49.
One wonders what has happend to those women who need to do
3.
both work and housework out of necessity. Decter also seems to
buy the myth that women, unlike men, do not have sex drives.
The idea that women are now free to pursue sex (which they
4.
don't want anyway) ignores their loss of bargaining power in a
sexist society. Without the power to say no, has woman exchanged
repression for greater oppression in a society where she still
needs to marry in order to maintain the middle class status
to which her father made her accustomed.
Decter, The New Chasti ty, p. 83.
5.
.

149

But this freedom from standards and
necessity, "...curiously
enough... makes her anxiety the greater."
She envies man
"...his blanket, unwilled, unthinking
entailment in necessity.
This is the inequality between them.
Were she to feel herself
so entailed, she would not feel resentful
but would simply,

and with the same lack of heed and moral
justification as he
does, provide herself with what she needed."
It is she

who is the subject, man the object; she who is
the chooser,
he who moves in a world of necessity.

And it is this freedom

coupled with envy of man's rootedness in a world of
necessity

which underlies the Women's Liberation Movement.
Women's Liberation constitutes a response to the
predicament of the modern woman that begins with a
falsification of the nature of that predicament.
The movement says that women are subjected to a
distorted, exploitative shaping by society which
they cannot, without an overturning of the oppressed
female consciousness, escape from. Whereas the
truth is that women are for the time being caught
in a transition in which they feel themselves too
little shaped by society, its demands on them too
indefinite, their demands on themselves (or lack
of them) far too operative, and they cannot even
get their consciousness organized.

Lacking both social and biological guidelines, women are
left adrift, anomic women primed for an ideology which

allows them to rationalize their failure to cope with

freedom and to put the blame for their inability to cope with
and determine their own lives onto external hate objects, i.e.,

men or the system.

This female escape from freedom is ration-

alized by a feminist ideology.
IT.

Ibid .

7.

Ibid

,

p.
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p.

52.
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patriarchy denies woman responsibility for
her own failures;
leasbian theory and auto-eroticism provides
escape from adult
sexuality and justifies it ideologically.
And what Decter
interprets as an anti-child, anti-biology ideology,
allows

woman to deny herself by denying motherhood.

ZFor7 women to announce that their very womanliness
results only from a bad and meritricious culture
is the expression of a deep hatred for
themselves.
Such an expression of self -hatred, is indeed,
exactly the primary emotion that informs Women's
Liberation diatribes against the impositions of
motherhood. .. .Denial of /sexual difference/- no
matter how nobly, or on the other hand, how trivially, uttered - becomes the denial of oneself,
one's nature and one's true possibilities; becomes
in other words, the denial of life itself. 8
Now it may well be that some members of the Women's Move-

ment are compelled by self -hatred, but this is not equivalent
to demonstrating that none are motivated by some alternative

conception of human excellence which they seek to attain
through the Movement.

Rather than a denial of responsibility,

an escape from freedom, or a fear of failure, femininist
ideology may reflect mature analysis of one's personal responsibilities to help create a free society where persons can succeed at being persons.
What we need to ask is why Ws. Decter cannot perceive

feminist demands as mature and rational.

This inability

rests on both her acceptance of anomie theory and the
True Believer contrast model of an integrated pluralist

society where persons are constrained by the rights and duties
B~.

Ibid

.

,

p.

180.
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accruing to roJ.es in a clear
division of labor. This is
quite clear in her criticism of
Feminist alternatives, and
especially in her claim that
Feminists seek to avoid res-

ponsibility and obligation. 9

In general... the new liberators
of women Hvpe
f Un ° f oW isation
tS2m.
?
selves
selves.... They do not...
desire a freer soeiotv
one that affords them a larger
and wider varletv
y
Un ty bUt rather
e in which ?hl verj
°»
5
i
terms 'freedom*
and 'opportunity'
fined so as to conform with their will be rede.10
desires.

?Hlf«

r

™

?f™W

..

that is the very crux of the matter;
Feminists are redefining the terms of political
discourse and that is a
And.

very dangerous move indeed.
in terms of their desires.

Moreover they are doing so
Satisfying one's desires is

quite clearly contrasted to fulfilling
one's responsibilities,
living up to the obligations and duties
of a relatively wellordered society.

Women's Liberation is cast as a demand not for
new
_
11
freedom, but for a new immaturity;
not for new definitions of memale roles

izing

-

-

roles which might be more human-

but for an excuse from performing given social

roles well.

Decter admits that one of the gravest problems

facing contemporary women is the need to devise new standards,
but she rejects Feminist demands as legitimate efforts to

Here Decter is criticizing Germaine Greer who she iden9.
tifies as "one of the movement's most favored ideologists."
This identification is unfortunate.
10.

Decter, The New Chastity , p. 56.

11.

Ibid., p. 142.
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develop such standards.
ed t0 evise a m °rality that
does not disnnfi??
qualify one 2
from excellence is a familiar
need
in
e
d
re t0 eBcape/."?hS a2uS
world'of-be^^^
r\
e eatting and
striving where the
-

agres«?^io
5 create
sions S£
that
conflict have also been a necessary condition for the sustenance
of life on earth
...is the demand... to remain
children."

Again, demands to alter the criteria
of human excellence
are classified as demands to avoid
being judged in terms
of -adult" accomplishment.
Women's Liberation becomes

not an effort to value the personhood
of women, but is cast
as a demand by women to remain little
girls - avoiding
work, escaping sexuality, denying their
responsibilities

in 'wiving
I

1

and 'mothering.'

would suggest that the quarrel between Ms. Decter

and the Women's Movement hinges on ideals of
freedom.

Ms.

Decter argues that her opponents do not want freedom or
equality.

Women's Liberation does not embody a new wave of
demand for equal rights. Nor does its preoccupation
with oppression signal a yearning for freedom. The
movement turns out to be about something else altogether; it is about, in fact, the difficulties
women are experiencing with the rights and freedoms
they already enjoy. 13

What

I

would suggest is that this classification of feminist

demands flows out of Decter 's own explanatory theory and
level of moral development.

Lacking a conception of the

Moral Agent, the person who can critically evaluate existing
social arrangements from an alternative point of view, Decter
TF,

Ibid .

13.

Ibid ., p. 43.

,

p.

56.
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must see the feminist critique as a
result of anomie.
Indeed, one gets a clear sense that, for

Decter, the basis

for a new morality already exists in the
division of labor
between male and female coupled with the
opening of new

opportunities for women in the man's world.

But

more than

this, Decter* s own sense of justice is
a liberal sense? she

accepts the liberal society as a just society;
with the

exception of a few minor problems which women could
quite
well eradicate if they exerted themselves, there
is not

much grounds for complaint.

Women have benefitted from the

social arrangements of contemporary society

-

as contract, from motherhood, housewifery

and they owe

men

-

roles

-

from marriage

who provide them the rights that accrue to these
-

certain obligations.

To deny the obligation, as

Decter claims feminists do, is not to assert alternative
obligations and responsibilities, but to deny responsibility
and to assert a "...freedom not to receive that which one

needs to receive and to give that which is needed of one
but rather freedom to be relieved

-

and in the name of some

Ik

•higher value*

- of

both."

Decter understands 'freedom

1

as freedom from arbitrary role assignment and she believes

that women are now so free.

She understands equality as the

equal opportunity to compete for all social roles, compatible

with the biological function of maternity, and she believes
that society is moving to make this possible.

In the end,

then, Decter asserts that the sexual division of labor is

W.

Ibid

.

,

p.

180.
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fair, that society is open to
moves in the direction of
freedom and equality for women, and
she rejects all arguments
against this society as the immature
wailings of persons
who cannot handle the freedom to
choose among roles and to
compete in a man's world.
I.b.

Rational feminism

-

liberal variant

have argued that Decter clearly accepts
the True
Believer contrast model of an integrated
pluralist
I

society where persons are constrained by
the rights and
duties which flow out of the division of
labor.
What I want
to argue now is that this contrast model
undergirds an image
of the way in which female consciousness
can change - in

which new demands can be developed

-

which is profoundly dif-

ferent from the image of feminist ideology as a
rationalization
of the fear of freedom.

This image rests on the belief that

with the breaking down of traditional sex roles, women are
now exposed to conflicting standards associated with many
different roles.

It is at the interstices of these roles

where woman finds her freedom

-

the freedom to choose among

conflicting roles each of which provides her with both a

new self-image and a rational interest.

New and rational

consciousness, then, can flow from exposure to the conflicting
role demands of a pluralist, fluid society.

Two theories

which utilize these basic assumptions to explain the rise of
contemporary feminism are the theory of status inconsistency
and the theory of relative deprivation.
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The theory of status inconsistency posits
that political

demands

may.

arise when persons experience statuses
which

carry differential rewards (prestige, wealth,
etc.) and
when there is an ideology which can be utilized
to justify
shifting the distribution of rewards from one
merit system
to another.

The objective condition of status inconsistency

is linked to subjective dissatisfaction with
existing con-

ditions and a demand for social change is based on
liberal

democratic ideals like equality of opportunity.

Thus women

can employ the principles of equality of of opportunity
and of

citizenship to press for a shift in the basis of merit from
"sex status" to status as worker and citizen

-

the right to

15

a job and to the vote.

In Power and Privilege, Lenski argues that, with trad15.
itional barriers to women crumbling on all sides - politics,
higher education, occupation, rights of property, divorce the question of women's status inconsistency has been resolved.
What barriers remain are either with woman herself - e.g.,
in her basic responsibilities in the family and in her biology
- or because there are biases against women among those in
positions of power. But these barriers cannot form the
basis of a legitimate complaint because the former are either
socially advantageous or "natural," and the latter do not rest
on legal supports and therefore cannot form obstacles to women
who exert serious effort. Women can use the legal system to
press claims against non-legal discrimination. Furthermore,
women can fulfill their need for status through an advantageous
marriage. For women, ascribed status is as good as personally
achieved status and merit for satisfying the need for selfesteem and prestige.

Although women may not have achieved full equality in the
"...worlds of work and politics. .. .the majority of women do
not seem greatly concerned. The explanation for this apparent
paradox lies in the family system which. .makes it possible
for most women to attain their goals through marriage as easily
as most men can attain theirs through work and political
activity. ... This probably explains why the feminist movement
has lost most of its vigor
for the v ast ma jo rity of women,
the battle for equality has been won. " (p. k26 J~
.

1
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This theory has been considered especially
appropriate
to an understanding of contemporary
feminism since so many

feminists are women who have succeeded (or who
have the
skills to succeed) and who now complain
that their status
as women is unsatisfactory.

One theorist who has had a

tremendous impact on the way the Women's Movement
has been
perceived and who uses the theory of status inconsistency
as a tool for explaining feminist consciousness is
Betty

Friedan.
Friedan' s key assumption is that autonomous persons can

and do develop under existing social arrangements, or, at
least
that there is no serious conflict between conventional standards
of achievement and ideal standards of autonomous moral action.

However, woman's socialization can get in the way of her

achieving these standards.
The purpose of socialization, according to Friedan, is
The assumption is that women's statuses are no longer inconsistent; a successful businesswoman need not think of
herself with a sex status lower than her occupational status.
Married women who get their status from husbands need not
feel that this is inconsistent with their sex status. Obviously the problem for Lenski is that he does not see a sexcaste stratification system but only stratification in terms of
production and consumption which could give rise to demands
for equality (it is interesting that he inherits this problem
from the socialist part of his "synthesis"). The whole issue
of women as a "class" or "caste" is ignored since women's legal
status is now (assumed to be) equal to men's, and there are no
power relations involved.

Lenski' s book appeared in 1966 shortly before the revival of
American feminism. It is Jelling that his theory of status
inconsistency did not predict this revival. I would suggest
that he failed because it is not possible to predict what
choices persons will make about the standards of excellence
they might wish to attain to. Nor could Lenski predict because he failed to see existing power relations and discriminations which flow out of these relations.

15?

•^.development of autonomous persons,
persons who have a
•'firm core of self,

or 'I,"

who have an individual identity.

l^oral development requires
a transition from the
outer-direct-

edness of conventionality to the
inner-directedness of
autonomy.
Autonomous women, Friedan argues drawing
from
Abraham Maslowe's notion of self
-actualization
...prefer to be treated "Like a person,
woman." They prefer to be independent not like a
their own two feet, and generally do not Stand on
care for
concessions that imply they are inferior,
weak or that
C
ake Care ° f them ^lves.
This is not to
imply that they cannot behave conventionally.
Thev do
n C
S?
° r desirab? e
any
reason,
but they
do
do'not
not take the
?h
ordinary conventions seriously..!.
Rules per se generally mean nothing to
these women.
It is only when they approve of the
rules and can see
and approve of the purpose behind them
that they will
e
rn,
/ ey/ar stron S' Purposeful and do live
?
hv ^n?^ ; ;
6Se rUlGS
autonom ™s and personally
arrived at!!?.
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This passage has the ring of Moral Agency,
but

I

want to

point out some essential differences between
it and the
image of morality developed in Chapter III,
differences which
place Friedan* s conception of morality within
the boundaries
of the True Believer contrast model.

We need to consider what

standards Friedan.' s autonomous woman might use to critically
evaluate conventional rules, especially those rules which
define her role as woman, and we need to consider how Friedan

pictures the development of critical consciousness.
For Friedan the standard for evaluating female rules is
the standard of human excellence already embedded in existing

Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New Yorki Dell
Publishing, I963), p. 293.
17.

Ibid

.

,

p.

307.
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social practises.

It is the standard of
manliness.

dominance women are more like
men

-

High

"Above all, the high

dominance woman was m ore
psychologically free - more
autonomous,"
and exhibited more of the
8
traditionally "male- character

traits/

Nost women lack these qualities,
their socialization insures
the forfeiture of^a mature self
which is not biologically
but
culturally male.
If the standard of excellence
is already given, women's
exclusion from achieving these
standards constitutes an injury.
Since women are socialized to choose
between their humanness
as self-actualizers and their
femaleness as biological beings
-

child-bearers

ness.
T6\

-

female socialization is the denial
of human-

Priedan argues that this -humanness"
is a high order
Ibid .

t

p.

308.

S
Goldb erg's The Inevitability of Patriarchy
9
i
% w?y??
(New
York,
William borrow, 1973 ) is an attempt to "prove"
t hat
feminism is doomed to fail because women's ability
to succeed
petlti ° n S limited
lack of the maiehormone
+
i
+
testosterone.
Patriarchy
is biologically necessary and does
not constitute an injury. While Mr. Goldberg
may be correcl
that feminists have not paid adequate attention
to biology,
he fails to consider what the implications
are of positing a
non-competitive, non-hierarchical society as the
goal.
Goldberg
also deploys the emotional needs thesis to
explain wh^ women
are so willing to adopt untenable positions.
"That
few academic intellectuals have accepted the feministeven a
with its illogic and its misrepresentation of fact is analysis
explicable
only in the terms of emotional necessity. It is
intellectually
defensible in no terms at all." (p. 134) And in a footnote on
the same page,
"The
political ideologue never did care about
ideas, logic, or the integrity of intellectual pursuit.
The
layman who seeks rationalization for emotional necessity has
always embraced the most improbable explanation for as long
as it catered to his needs while he demanded of the unpalatable
theory a proof that the very nature of scientific theory precludes."

i^

20.

^

Socialization, not power relations, is the source of
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"need," and she explains the plight
of modern woman as the
frustration of this need.
positing the male virtues
as needs, and in arguing that
these needs are frustrated
for
women, Fri e dan casts the male
virtues as universally human
arid implies that any good
society will be so constituted
as
to promote the masculine virtues the "will to power," -selfassertion," "dominance," and "autonomy."
Some of these traits
are those we would hope to find in
all mature persons, and
Friedan takes the negative bite out of
others by denying
that they imply "...aggression or competitive
striving in

m

the usual sense

"

But one might well wonder in what

sense they are to be taken, especially in light
of the strategy for social change which flows logically from
the assumptions that these are the traits to be nurtured.

Before we look at this strategy, however, we need to
see how the idea of sex-role socialization supports a
theory
of rational changes in consciousness.

Friedan wants to show

how women can become aware that their human needs are not
injury.

There is no attempt to investigate either the

notion of patriarchy or the institutions of capitalism in
terms of female oppression.
While I do not want to criticize Maslowe's needs theory
21.
here, it is important to see that Friedan ignores the social
nature of needs - that certain aspects of femaleness become
needs also, needs which any program for social change cannot
ignore.
22.

Friedan, The Feminine Mystique

,

p.

299.

.
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.

*eing met.

At first it seems that
this awareness arises
from the frustration of
needs which results in
a "disease
center or else atrophy of
the person. But "diseased"
or
sick persons seldom change
themselves, or at least they
seldom choose healthy means.
For Friedan it is women who

have experienced growth in
some sphere of their lives
who
make rational demands for
social change. This assumption
is compatible with both the
True Believer and Moral Agent
models, but when we investigate
the type of growth experience
Friedan picks out, it is apparent
that her theory of changing
consciousness is based on True
Believer assumptions. Women
who demand change have experienced
the status inconsistencies
which can undergird a critical
evaluation of some social
practises, but only in terms of other
practises already
embedded in social life.
These are educated women who are
individualized in their
educational experiences, separated out from
the class of

women and permitted some sense of achievement,
only to find
that when school is done and they resume their
female
role

they must become "...an anonymous biological robot
in a
docile mass."

These women, strong in their individualism,

assertiveness, achievement orientation, however, are able to
say an unequivocal "no" to the housewife image.

"Something

very strong in a woman resists the death of herself."

24

And

in this "no" is implied a "yes," a yes to new individual life
23^

Ibid., p. 296.

24.

Ibid., p. 297.
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plans which combine career and
marriage, competition in a
roan's world as well as
rootedness in woman's. These women
make demands for social arrangements
which will alow them
to "...compete then, not as a woman,
but as a human being,"
demands which make it possible for them
to pursue careers, to
achieve high status in an existing
stratification system.

Social change occurs first on the
individual level
individual women seeking careers - and
then moves

-

to the

political

groups of women demanding the establishment
of
those conditions which permit them to achieve
individually.
-

"Not until a great many women move out
of the fringes into

the mainstream will society itself provide
the arrangements

for their new life plan."

world of work

-

Not until women enter the

particularly the professions

-

will society

provide for day care, for child care on the campuses, for

maternity leaves, etc., for those institutional reforms which
permit women to compete on equal terms with men in all the
things men do.

The strategic goals for the Women's Liberation

Movement, then, are to establish those conditions of equal

opportunity under which women are no longer handicapped by
their female sex roles.

(What is interesting about Friedan's

strategy is the rather blatant ignorance of the fact that

working class women have always worked and that society
has seldom provided them with the social arrangements for

which Friedan now calls.)
25~.

Ibid.

,

p.
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A related theory of changing consciousness
is the

theory of relative deprivation.

In an article entitled "A

Feminist Analysis of Relative Deprivation
in Academic Women,
Judy Long Laws attempts to utilize this
theory to explain
how professional women come to perceive
inequities in their
status as professionals and the kinds of
demands which flow
from this perception.
While the theory of relative deprivation does
differ

from the theory of status inconsistency in important
respects,
they are quite similar.

The most important point of similarity

is the assumption that persons seek pleasure
and avoid pain

and that one pleasure is self-esteem and prestige.

The theory

of relative deprivation assumes that a person's
"...relative

gratification or deprivation results from social comparison,"
and that "...social comparisons are made in such a wav as to
26

avoid pain and provide pleasure."

Like the theory of

status inconsistency, the theory of relative deprivation

assumes that the impetus for social change lies in comparisons

with standards of excellence already existing in society.

The

criteria for what is worth having are already established by
social practise.

Whether Laws consistently maintains and

adequately defends this position will be considered in a moment.
Laws develops a typology of four postures which academic

Judy Long Laws, "Feminist Analysis of Relative Deprivation
26^
in Academic Women," The Review of Radical Political Economics 4
(July, 1972), p. 107.
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women might adopt when confronted
with the dilemma of
social comparison. These comparisons

can be either individual

or group based

-

e.g., they can compare themselves
with fellow

male academicians, female students,
housewives, etc.
If,
for example, the academic woman
compares hereself with
housewives, by the "laws" of motivation
outlined above,
so long as the academic woman does not
see herself as a

member of this group, "...the result is a
feeling of
personal gratification and of superiority to
the

deprived

group.

Both these feelings militate against the woman

-professor's perceiving similarity and solidarity
with

other women and contributes to her resistance to
the Women's
Lib appeal to 'sisterhood.'"

Should she compare herself

to women students, the academic woman should feel
herself

relatively advantaged in terms of academic achievement since
the "laws" of comparison will lead her to make judgments

which provide pleasure

-

in this case, the judgment that she

is better than other people.

Comparison is motivated by

ego-gratification and precludes "class" solidarity.
Academic women faced with discriminatory practises,
however, may compare themselves to academic men, and this

may produce feminist consciousness.

This depends on which

of four possible comparisons are made.

really a male in women's clothing.

Laws'

"Token" is

She sees herself as an

"exception" and compares herself only with men.

Since she

accepts male norms of achievement, she does not feel deprived
27.

"

IbldTT P. 109.
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if she or other women experience
discrimination.

The "Old

Feminist" also accepts male standards,
and she too does not
feel deprivation. Her response
is to accept the challenge
and
beat men at their own game, she
rejects completely her status
as a woman.
The "Pussy Cat" is politically
immobilized because she totally accepts male norms,
but unlike the Token
she does not think of herself as
an exceptional case, nor
does she want to outdo men like the
Old Feminist.
She is

a non-achiever who legitimizes
discrepancies in status by

focusing on the rewards of non-power

-

typically the "benefits"

of avoiding responsibility.
The "Women's Liberationism is also
achievement oriented,

but on Feminist terms

-

e.g., her standards of scholarship

are not the traditional standards of her discipline
but the

standards of Feminist scholarship.

Her reference group

that group with which she compares herself
inists, not male academicians.

-

-

is other Fem-

But we need to ask whether

this choice of standards and of reference group is consistent

with the theory of relative deprivation.

I

would argue that

it is only if we very. loosely construe relative deprivation

to include deprivation in terms of some ideal standard as
well as in terms of existing standards and groups.

The key element in the first three types is the legitimacy

of existing standards.

The Token, the Pussy Gat, and the Old

Feminist feel relatively deprived in terms of these standards,
but their response to this feeling can hardly be said to be

unfiltered through cognitions, particularly cognitions of what
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constitutes an injury.

The Women's Liberationist adopts

alternative standards through which
she perceives existing
practises as injurious. The distinction
between the Women's
Liberationist and those women who accept
existing standards
as legitimate is very useful, but
Laws has not clearly
explained how it is possible for women
to come to adopt

alternative standards.

She has made a rather large step

away from the theory of relative deprivation,
a step not
grounded in a theory of how persons can come
to adopt standards
not already legitimated by social practise.
Laws argues that social distance (anomie) can
help
to account for this shift.

For academic women to develop a sense of deprivation
aua women. .clearly two sorts of changes are required*
(1) an increase in the felt distance from the grouo
of male colleagues, and (2) an increase in the sense
of similarity or shared fate with other women. 2 °
.

But might this increasing distance be explained as a rational

decision to choose alternative standards rather than an
instance of anomie?

It seems to me that the experience of

deprivation in terms of a social category (sex) must be
filtered through an ideological perspective which includes
some notion of solidarity with women, and it is this per-

spective which ought to form the focus of analysis rather

than being snuck in through the back door and explained in
terms of avoiding pain and feeling pleasure.

Why, for

instance, should a woman who gains pleasure from being an

exception suddenly shift to the less sure pleasures of

W.

Ibid ., p. 116.

166

identifying as a woman?

Laws' answer is that she is
avoiding

the pain of being rejected by
men and gaining the pleasure
of self esteem in "rap groups"
and this explanation of
female solidarity has plausibility.
But it is both a circular and jopst hoc explanation which
in the end itself
requires explanation. Women shift their
identification
to avoid pain and receive pleasure.
How do they know that
identifying with women will accomplish this?
(Indeed, it

may raise tension,

anxiety, frustration, etc.)

Certainly

they can only know this insofar as the
choice of reference
group is theory imbued. One's choice
of reference group,
then, is not determined by expected
pleasure or pain, but is
at least in part directed by our
cognitions.
That is, it is
a choice based on one's perception of
the kind of person one

wants to be and the kind of social life one
wishes to be
implicated in.

Of course, we expect to find this pleasurable.

Why one woman perceives practises like unequal
pay or
unequal rank as legitimate and another regards them

as illeg-

itimate requires investigation into the issue of legitimacy.

Questions of identification (reference group) and Feminist

scholarship need to be treated as involving more than the
pursuit of pleasure.

It seems to me that the whole notion

of Feminist scholarship rests on the capacity to criticize

existing norms.

Moreover, Feminist scholarship must spring

in part from woman's need to understand herself as a woman,
a need which itself rests on prior identification of oneself

16?
as a woman rather than as an
academician for whom biological
differences are irrelevant.
It is this identification
as
a rational process involving
cognitions and theorizing
which needs more thorough examination. 29

Finally, we need to come to grips
with the ways in which
these theories of status inconsistency
and relative depriva-

tion affect the analyst's ability to
-see" other explanati ons
of contemporary Feminism and alternatives
to

liberal proposal s

for social change.

If we look at a 1973 article by
Friedan

entitled, "Up from the Kitchen Floor," we
can see that for
Friedan, at least theory and program seriously
limit her

sympathy with other branches of the Women's
Movement.
In that article, Friedan traces her own
development

since the publication of The Feminine Mystique

,

the hos-

tility she faced from other women, overcoming her
own
It is interesting that Laws applies her
29.
theory onlv
to academic women.
Certainly academic women do most keenlv
experience inconsistent statuses - as women and
as
fessionals. But how, then, does the consciousness proof
professional women get raised? Perhaps Laws* theory isnonuseful for pointing out the difficulties of raising
women's
consciousness since housewives, for example, have few persons
with whom to compare themselves. Since they generally share
few attributes with their husbands - in the way that academic
women share attributes with academic men - on what grounds
can they use men as a reference group and feel relatively
deprived as women? Perhaps we have highlighted an important
problem
consciousness-raising, but Laws still ignores the
fact that many non-professional women do participate in the
Movement. Moreover the Movement does make demands that move
beyond equal pay, affirmative action, etc. It is necessary,
I think, to make the comparisons between demands for new
standards of academic proficiency and demands for non-hierarchical organizations, for example, and demands for equality
with men. Both demands question existing practises in ways
that equal pay for equal work and affirmative action do not.

m

J
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fear of being alone and getting
a divorce, her developing
sense that society needed to
change if women were to

change,

and her establishment of N.O.W.

But after this review
of

her private and political actions,
Priedan gets down to
the nitty-gritty of the article,
a scathing criticism of
radical women, -...those who preached
the man-hating sex/
class warfare /and whp7 threatened
to take over
New York

N.O.W.
,

and National N.O.W.

,

and drive out the women who

wanted equality, but who^also wanted
to keep on loving their
husbands and children."
She links these radicals with
CIA subversion, accuses them of
power-tripping, and finally
describes Radicalesbians as "...merely
acting out sexually
their rebellion and resentment at being
'underneath'
in

society generally, being dependent on men
for their personal
definition."
Merely "acting out" frustrations the

liberal categorizes the radical as a True
Believer.'

Now it may well be that Lesbian women are
acting out

their frustrations and that some Radical Feminists
hate men,
but what I want to suggest is that Friedan is
not open

to seeing this frustration and hatred as a
legitimate

response to what Radicalesbians and Radical Feminists
regard
as a male-dominated caste system.

Friedan gives the very

distinct impression that anyone who comes out in favor of
Betty Friedan, "Up from the Kitchen Floor," New York
Times Magazine March 25, 1973, pp. 32-3.
30^

.

31.

Ibid .

,

p.

Jk.

169

in„u^

Lesbianism must be uxxven
driven bv
oy an illegitimate
a+
"pseudoradical
infantilism."
(i think that it is
interesting
that

Friedan's list of those to be
castigated does not include
a single Marxist, although
Millett and Firestone do move
in that direction.
Either Friedan does not know
that
Marxist Feminists exist, or she does
not consider their
analysis worth any attention.)
For Friedan, much has been accomplished
in the ten years
since the publication of The Feminine Mv.t^
,,..
Indeed( at

a recent N.O.W. conference,

she called for an end to the

Women's Movement and asked for a movement
of men and women
together.
Now this is an admirable goal this goal of

human liberation

-

and one which meets the requirements
of

the Moral Agent mode

-

but it is a stance few Radicalesbains

33
or Radical Feminists could adopt at this
juncture in history.
Because they approach the women's problem from
radically

different theoretical perspectives, Lesbians and
Radical
32 r Midge Decter provides us with the contrast to pseudoradical infantilism. This is her image of the mature
political
agent, committed to liberal values, adopting ideas
hesitently,
although with strong commitment, and willing to test these
ideas in the "free market place" of the political arena. Such
an agent is like Decter' s description of the early Feminists
who "...were forced not only to demand the vote, but to establish in theory their right to it, as they did their right to
be educated, to own property, to run for public office, or to
sue someone in a court of law." (p. 52)
Today's Feminist
plunges herself into an ideology without reservation and
pulls out of politics ideas do not guide political action but
serve as a means for avoiding responsibility and power.
1

Compare this with the position Sidney Abbott and Barbara
33.
Love express in Sappho Was a Right-On Woman (New Yorki Stein
and Day, 1973)
"Under present conditions, a Feminist may
well ask
Is heterosexuality a valid life-styeli
Feminists
»

1
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Feminists and Friedan can scarcely
communicate. Unwilling
to accept - or even to
consider - the possibility that
men
might have power over women,
Friedan focuses on the eradication of continuing discriminatory
practises that impede
woman's achievement in the male
sphere. Her theory of
status inconsistency is not a
theory of
power, there are no

power relations which prevent the
shift from femaleness to
••humanness."
Neither capitalism nor patriarchy
are considered
as possibly providing the
structural underpinnings
to the

"problem without a name."

Lacking a theory of power, Friedan

casts Radicalesbians as pseudoradical
infants and ignores
Marxist analysis entirely.
Friedan* s castigation of radical women
flows from

her fear that the media will identify the
Movement with
these individuals rather than with its
"responsible"

members,

and that identification with man-hating will
drive other

women away.

There is validity in Friedan »s position

-

few

women can afford to adopt man-hating as a practical
life
posture (and man-hating may not be part of a developed moral
point of view)

-

but to castigate those on the outer fringe

as infants and CIA agents makes a mockery of political

ideology and serves to drive a wedge between left and center
of the Movement, playing on women's fears of their own

who cannot tolerate traditional male dominance have a good
reason to see heterosexuality as masochistic and Lesbianism
as rational." (p. 152)

Whether this power takes the form of a sex-class or
sex-caste system is one of the more interesting debates taking
place in the Movement on the level of explanatory theory.
3^.
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sexuality.

What we ought to do is to look carefully
at
Radicalesbian analysis (and the Radical Feminist
tradition)
in terms of both explanatory theory and level
of moral development.
As I shall indicate below, there are problems
with
the analyses on both counts, but I suggest that
because they
move beyond liberalism, persons like Friedan are bound
to have

trouble coming to terms with them and to reject them out
of
hand.
I.e.

Bitchiness as a justification for feminism

While it is hardly likely that any political activist

would define her own actions as the irrational outburst of
frustrated desire, there are those who do justify their

feminism as an assault on the social constraints which limit
"authentic" human activity.

If ividge Decter's critique of

contemporary American feminism rests on the belief that women
are suffering the ill-effects of anomie, then Germaine Greer's

The Female Eunoch is a glorification of anomie as a radical

alternative to the constraints of liberal society and as a
35

route to "authenticity."

Greer's conception of liberation flows out of an image
of the autonomous person and a view of the proper relation

between persons and society which is indebted to the True
Believer model, while at the same time arriving at a radically
This discussion of Greer ought not to be taken to
35.
imply that there are no pure Hoffer-type True Believers in
the Women's rovement. What I want to do here is to illuminate
the ways in which fundamental theoretical assumptions delimit
political strategies and conceptions of liberation.

1?2

different image of 'liberated'
life.

Essentially what

Greer does is to throw out the
contrast model of liberal
rationality and bourgoise conformity
and opt for anomic
freedom.

.

Greer's model of the autonomous
person is one in whom
mind and body, reason and passion,
thought and action are
united.
She is critical of any separation
of these elements
of human personality, especially
separations which appear in
the male-female dichotomy.
What is interesting, however, is
that Greer clearly thinks that all ocial
constraints maintain
this separation, despite her appearing to
suggest a radical
alternative.

Anything which separates mind and body, reason and
passion, thought and action constitues an injury
to persons.

The male-female polarity constitues such an injury.

This

polarity is the product of culture and socialization.

Woman

is deeply embedded in a conventional social order which
de-

humanizes her.

For instance, in learning a language, woman

learns the weapons of self -abuse? language constructs for

her a reality of shame and self-loathing.

Faced with this

abuse, woman abdicates even conventional responsibility

and retreats to an asocial world of phantasy

- a

private

woman's culture in which resentment becomes a way of life,
in which frigidity and verbal assault become the real weapons

in a battle of the sexes.

Yet it is these women, women

who destroy both their men and themselves, whom Greer
expects to free themselves.
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The question is how
is a radical
transforation of
woman's consciousness
to take place.
Unfortunately, her
socialization codes poorly
for her becoming an
authentic
actor.
The Female Eunoch is
a de-sexualized person,
civilized, repressed, if
sexual energy is lefe,
then civilisation
is death, socialization
the destruction of
persons
Com .
pared to the child's existence,
the socialized adult's
life
is clearly impoverished.
.
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Greer here offers a useful critique
of conventional morality,
but her argument is undermined by
her theory of moral development.

In the first stage of development,
according to Greer

the child introjects parental values
in order to get what s/he
wants.
In the second stage, children - especially
male children who are more encouraged to break from
parents - develop

independence and some level of autonomy; Greer even
goes so
far as to mention the importance of group activity
in the

development of male children.

W.

For girls, however, the only

GeFmaine Greer, The Female Eunoch (New Yorki Bantum
Books, 1970), p. 71.
(Underlining mine.)
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free experiences are in school,
and while these do create
contradictions and possibilities, the
effects of freedom
are largely eradicated during puberty
when social pressures
result in internalized repressive norms.
The Female Eunoch
is created.

Lacking a theory of moral development which
moves beyond
repression and the creation of egoism, Greer
can only offer
women a solution which requires that they step
outside their
socialization and refuse to obey their own internalized
constraints.

"Eternal Eros is imprisoned now in the

-toils of the sadomasochistic symbiosis,

and if we are to
oo

rescue him and save the world we must break the
chain."
Now there do seem to me to be certain problems
in this

"chain-breaking," especially for the deeply repressed Female
Eunoch.

But Greer thinks she has resolved any tensions by

pointing to the remnants of childishness in women.
important since it is the child

-

This is

and not the mature adult

-

who provides Greer with her contrast model of the free agent
(with a touch of rationality added).

Greer's notion of "womanpower" rests on this faith in

woman's childlike, passionate nature.
is more limited than males

-

Since her socialization

because she is more isolated

It is important to note the distinction between repression
and oppression.
Repression is something one does to oneself
- albeit within the context of a social life; oppression is
something someone else does to you - it implies politics,
or power relations.
37.

38.

Greer, The Female Eunoch

,

p.

99.
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from social life

-

she retains

a

degree of contact with
a

world that more rational
males have lost.
Although "...
woman's oceanic feeling for
the race has little
opportunity
for expression," this quality which is dampened down and
perverted into male egoism - is
what a humanist revolution
can be built upon. Freeing
woman from social constraint
frees up the "natural instinct"
for humanity which undergirds Greer's dream of a more
communal social

life.^

Greer seems to want things any
number of ways at the
same time. Woman is destroyed by
her socialization -

de-sexualized

-

but she is salvageable by alienation
from

social life.

Greer sees hope in woman's isolation
in the
nuclear family, isolation from the social
pressures which
lead men to conform to the reality
principle, isolation from
development as a social being. But Greer
ignores repression
in the family and the intricate ways in
which family and
culture, work-family-culture, sex and family
are interwoven.

Her focus on sexuality as the energizing force
in Women's

Liberation ignores the non-sexual aspects of human
life and
female personhood. She ignores the relation between

familial

repression and oppression in the economic sphere, and the
possible ways in which sexual repression

produce a sexual division of labor

human activities

-

-

-

which may indeed

is implicated in other

socialization of children, work-life, etc.

In other words, Greer ignores politics.

W.

Ibid

.

,

p.

115.

This assumes that persons have a natural instinct for
community and that this instinct can be freely pursued.

176

Her faith in woman's
passionate nature undergirds
Greer's rejection of politics
and Feminist analysis
in
favor of doing one's own
thing, of .'acting freely."
Greer
sweeping indictment of the
Women's Movement rests on

,

s

the

anarchistic, individualist
conception of autonomy which
she
deploys to justify her own
flouting of convention and constraint.
She is critical of analysis
which she argues arises
from a warped experience, which
is "...devised by minds
1
diseased by the system......
But one wonders if Greer
really means to argue that some sort
of truth, or objectivity,
is possible if one frees
onself from social constraint,
if
one de-socializes oneself.
If analysis

-

and

I

would insist, the emotions

-

flow

out of one's life experiences, then
feminist analysis must
flow out of the warped human experiences
of women.
I fail
to see how Greer herself has been
freed from her own peculiar
life experiences.
She is admittedly an exception - and
rather
proud to be one - a woman trained as a man,
able to "get

ahead" to "make it" in both senses of that
phrase in a
man's world. While she does seem to develop
an analysis of
woman's condition and to offer a strategy for
changing that

condition

-

women should form solidarity groups organized

around f oodshopping, laundry and childcare
C), reject violence
and all forms of male behavior

-

but one gets the vivid

impression that these suggestions fail to take root in
Greer, The Female Eunoch

.

p.

316.
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Greer's own life.

Her own personal experiences surely

lead her to treat these suggestions
as secondary to the
primary thrust of liberating women by
"...replacing...

compulsiveness and compulsion by the
pleasure principle....
The essence of pleasure is sponteneity.
.. .^hich7 means
rejecting the norm, the standard that one
must live up to
^2
and

establishing a self-regulating principle."

But there are tremendous problems with this
suggestion.
First, Greer .lacks an explanation of how
women can free
•themselves to be spontaneous; her understanding
of woman's

•oppression is inadequate.

There are statements like*

"Women must reject their role as principal consumers
in
the capitalist state."

Yet no links are drawn between

consumption, capitalism, and sexual repression.

Greer

argues that "Women must have room and scope to devise a

morality which does not disqualify her from excellence, and
a psychology which does not condemn her to the status of a

spiritual cripple...,"

but one wonders how the pleasure

principle is to serve as a guide to the new morality.
seems that Greer must move in the direction of hedonism

It
-

like the child whose wants (or pleasures) are thwarted by

parental demands and who rebels against parental injunctions,
Greer's autonomous agent rebels against social constraint
in pursuit of her own wants.

But if our "wants" are somehow

rooted in our social life, how can they be pure and "authentic?"

W.

Ibid ., p. 3^7.

43.

Ibid

.

,

p.

119.
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Haw can they form the basis for
truly human activity?
children are not always kind, considerate

Surely

and humane, why

assume that the child-like woman will
be?

Civilization must be rejected; women are
called upon to
begin all over again, as if they could,
under
anomic con-

ditions.

Normlessness becomes the condition of human

•freedom,' the first requisite of moral
action is rejection
of all existing moral injunctions.
But once existing norms

are rejected, how is one to construct a society
within
.

which authentic action is possible?

(Note that Greer has

no criteria for deciding which, if any, existing
moral

injunctions might be worth retaining.)

Greer suggests that

such a society could be built on love, defined as
follows.
The proper subject for love is one's equal, seeing
as the essence of love is to be mutual, and the
lesser cannot produce anything greater than itself....
It is the only foundation for viable social
structures,
because it is the manifestation of common good. 44

This passage sounds a good deal like the respect for persons

which undergirds the Moral Agent model, but, while Greer is
careful to show how love becomes perverted in patriarchal
society, she is not terribly cautious in her description
of the type of social arrangements which would allow love to

flourish.

Her vision of a Calabrian commune is complete

with peasant family performing maintenance and child-care
duties thus freeing up her

"brilliant" women friends to both

reproduce themselves and remain liberated from child-rearing.

W.

I bid .',

p.

330.
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Certainly there are problems with
this image of the liberat ed
life, especially for the
"local family who work house
and
garden.

Greer fails to show what these love
relations will
look like; will they be relations
without conflict,

relati oris
in which there is no need for
principles of choice be cause
all wants are so harmoniously
conjoined? How will the?se
love relations ramify into the economy,
how will they form
the basis for an unexploitative economic
life? What is the

relationship between the personal and the
political for
Greer? How is love to re.ioin the polarized
sexes?

(The

assumption that the sexes are polarized is open to
critical
scrutiny; one wonders how persons can be minds without
bodies, reasoning and impassionate

,

etc.)

Greer argues that

love will bring "...the cunt into its own..." and
"...humanize
the penis, take the steel out of it and make if flesh again."

Despite her cast igat inn of women, despite her own sense
of superiority to other women, Greer sees woman as more

human than men, and therefore proposes feminizing power
hungry males.

This is an interesting proposition, but one

which does not rest firmly on an image of the social arrangements under which this could occur.
Greer's argument for a new woman, for a new moral it
(and for a new man) is both ahistorical and asocial

-

it

assumes that woman can stand outside her culture and develop

£5T TbidT,

p.

338.
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something entirely "new" and
"free" and thoroughly unconstrained. Morality is total
freedom; there is no sense
of obligation, no sense that
persons' wants may conflict
and that we may need some
criteria for choosing among
them.
Greer's failure to explicate a new
morality lies in her
attempt to couple an unalienated
notion of personhood with
a hedonistic, relativistic morality.
This combination will
just not wash since it fails to flesh
out the conditions

under which unalienated personhood can
be achieved.
does it lay out guidelines for choosing

Nor

among social institu-

tions *nd for justifying political actions.

Women should

just do their own thing.

Germaine Greer has not been hedged in by social
convention; she prides herself on her fortuitious
escape from

woman's loti

"...a Negro who cannot do the lindy-hop or
46
sing the Blues...."
Nor has she suffered sex discrimination

in non-sexual spheres.

"As an academic,

I

daresay

I

have

found /an alternative to the drudgery of woman's work./
do receive equal pay.

I

I

was appointed in preference to male

competition and nothing can prevent me from being promoted in
4?

the natural course of events."

Greer is her own best

approximation of the autonomous person

-

flouter of convention,

flaunter of her sexuality, unmarried, undisciplined, and
rather scandalous.

One may well wonder how applicable this

model is to the average British

W.

Ibid

.

,

p.

111.

P.

139.

-

or American

-

housewife.
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To summarize, theorists in the True Believer
mode

fail to adequately comprehend the Women's
Movement because

they lack both an adequate explanation of woman's
oppression
and a fully developed moral perspective 'from which
to

criticize existing social practises.

Theorists like Germaine

Greer begin to understand that there are power relations
in
our society which need to be understood, and she is
critical
of existing moral rules; yet she lacks a developed
perspective

from which to arrive at an alternative morality.
once progressive and retrogressive.

She is at

She emphasizes the

.freedom side of morality or autonomy to the extent of

loosing sight of the person as a social being with obligations and commitments to others,

a

being who requires certain

kinds of human relationships in order to grow and flourish.
Theorists like Decter and Friedan err in the opposite direction, emphasizing the obligation side of morality to the

exclusion of critical consciousness.

Both accept an explan-

atory theory which sees societies ranging between anomic
chaos and integrated pluralism, an explanatory theory which

blinds them to alternative possibilities.

Decter and Friedan

also lack a theory of power relations, a theory which could
link socialization to the distribution of burdens and

benefits.

II.

An alternative image of rational feminism

The F'oral Agent model outlined in Chapter III provides
the theoretical foundation for an approach to political

action ana an understanding
of the Wcnen-a
i- -re fruitful
than the accounts

,,;

oveme nt which

offered above.

Although
Proponents of these accounts
wo uld claim to incorporate
the
argents of each of the others.
I would argue that
the Moral
Agent m0 del aids us in
making up for the deficiences
of the
True Believer model,
deficiencies which have to do
with
understanding the distinctions
made in goals and
justificationg
of feminist action. The
approach to political action
which
I have labeled the
Moral Agent model assumes that
feminism
varies with historical time
and place, that motives
and the

language in which motivation
is couched changes also,
and
that motives are not abstract
and universal but rather
develop
over time. This model also
provides a framework for an
understanding of how the image of
rational action outlined
above itself flows from the
theorists' own ideological commitments and stage of moral development.

want to suggest that the Moral
Agent model is a more
fruitful approach to understanding the
Women's Movement because it does several important things.
First, it rests on
a social and historical perspective
on ideology, and on
persons. Second it flows from a more
adequate explanatory
theory.
And third, it is rooted in a more developed
morality.
I

No social movement can be explained by
a one-dimensional

theory.

Different motivations and justifications can be found

in any movement both during the same historical
period and
as the movement develops over time.

One needs to understand

these changing justifications
in movement ideology
the movement.

-

as they find expression

to understand the changing nature of
48
Some form of a verstehen
approach needs to
-

be adopted in order to understand a
social movement since

very different actions and very different
futures flow out
of different actors' conceptual frameworks.
If a

group of

persons engages in action, they must have ideas

-

unless one

wants to argue that political action is a product
of material
forces alone.

I

have assumed that this is not the case.

Out of different feminist critiques flow different

strategies for social change; these critiques in turn flow
out of different life experiences which produce different

understandings and evaluations of sex oppression.

If the

analyst does not share these understandings and evaluations,
s/he is necessarily going to commit mistakes in categorization
(so long as the actor is not engaged in pure rationalization).

S/he will misconceive the action because his/her categories

will guide perception in terms of his/her own understanding.
Now it may well be accurate to portray some feminists as

seeking to escape from freedom, or, on the contrary, as

seeking to redress inequalities within the confines of an
established procedure for deciding the legitimacy of claims.
But this cannot account for those feminists who may be

developing new moral ideas

-

who may be extending the notion

of 'liberation' in new directions, not out of anomy but out

For a defense of verstehen as an empirical methodology,
see Arthur diQuattro, " Verstehen as an Empirical Concept,
Sociology and Social Research 5? (October 1972)i32-4l.

48.
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of having experienced egalitarian relationships
and

snnng developing meanings.

Of the modes of explanation

of political action which were developed
in Chapters II and
III. I would argue that the second is the
more fruitful
since it permits us to see and understand
actions to which
the first is blind.
To meet the requirements of the Moral
Agent mode

of analysis, an explanation of Feminism
has to do several
things.

It has to treat persons as social and
historical

beings whose needs change over time, and who have
the

capacity for development
themselves.

-

who can, in freedom, create

It needs to treat persons as having feelings

and ideas, some of which are more developed than others,
but all of which are part of being human.

It has to treat

persons as capable of entering into egalitarian relations,

relations which are rewarding and liberating for all
parties

-

as capable of having social interests and moving

beyond alienation.

And it has to treat persons as having

both the capacity for feeling indignation when others are
injured, and for feeling warmth and trust.

In other

words, the explanation needs to treat persons from the

moral point of view described in Chapter III.
A pamphlet published by the Women's Liberation Basement
Press clearly points up the importance of restructuring
human relationships in order for women to develop their consciousness.
"The Small Group, Three Articles by Lynn O'Connor,
Pam Allen, Liz Bunding," (Berkeley! Women's Liberation Basement Press, no date). The small group plays a vital role in
"$91
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Explanation in the Moral Agent mode also develops
an alternative image of 'liberation' based not only
on this
developed moral perspective but on an explanatory theory
linked
to the idea of alienation.

Although it would require another

dissertation to do justice to the notion of 'liberation'
use here,

I

I

would like to rest my case for an alternative

image of liberation without too much argumentation on the

Marxist concept alienation.

The alienated person is one

who is separated from her species being

-

for example, a

women, privatized and individualized in a home which is no

longer a relationship of social beings but is more and more
a fragmented,

individualized, alienated relationship, is

an alienated being.

Alienation is another way of describing

non-reciprocal, inegalitarian, egoistic relationships.

In

contrast, the dis-alienated person is a cultural being,
a social being who creates herself consciu

through action

rather than being created by physical or economic need.
is autonomous,

She

de-individualized and social, as contrasted

to self-interested and privatized.

The image of the liber-

ated woman is a person in whom culture and the expansion of

human activity or choice supercedes nature through transformations of all spheres of woman's oppression and exploitation, making possible an autonomous, social life.

If Piaget

is correct, this dis-alienution requires reciprocal, egal-

itarian, social relationships.

Human liberation involves

See also Pamela Kearon,
a developmental tool in the Movement.
"Power as a Function of the Group," Notes. 2nd Year f pp 108-110.
.
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the realization of female
liberation through the eradication
of all oppressive and
exploitative conditions.

What we could ask now is what
exactly is it that make s
for female alienation in our
society,
it is around thi s
question that many of the hottest
debates
in the Women' s

Movement have revolved, particularly
debates between Marxists
and Radical Feminists.
I am not so much interested
in
the fine points of this debate although this is certainly
essential in terms of developing an
adequate explanatory
theory - as I am in developing a sense
of the way in which
Feminist ideas have developed dialectically
over
time.

What

propose to do now is to look at several
Feminist
analyses in terms of whether they satisfy
the requirements
of the Moral Agent mode.
Each of the analyses laid out
I

below moves beyond explanation in the True
Believer mode,
but I shall suggest that some remain relatively
inadequate
as examples of the Moral Agent mode, either
because they

fail to adopt an adequate explanatory theory or to
rest

on a fully developed moral perspective, or both.
A reader might note that I have not included any of
50^
the classical Marxist statements on women's oppression or
any contemporary Trotskyite statements. This is an intentional
oversight. Had I been primarily concerned with explanatory
theory, both would have been included. But since my primary
concern is with the dialectical development of Feminist
ideas today, I selected material which was both contemporary
and which presented problems in both explanatory theory and
level of moral development. Marxist perspectives are covered
in my treatment of Juliet Mitchell.
I am more interested
in patterns of ideological change than I am in specific
explanatory theories.

18?
The Radical Feminist
branch of the Women's
Movement
does move in the direction
of meeting these
requirements
especially as it moves beyond
liberal equality of
opportunity
to an understanding of
the relationship between
patriarchy
and alienation.
The alienation which flows
out of patriarchy
and which is embedded in
sex roles finds its
expression in
woman as "other; unable to
name herself and to engage
in
freely chosen activity.
•-

While

I

do not want to suggest
that Radical Feminism

is a monolithic political
position lacking in internal
debate

and controversy,

Dialectic

I

o f_Sex is

think that Shulamith Firestone's
The
the classic statement of this
position.

Firestone's book is an attempt to
synthesize Marx and Freud.
She begins with the Marxist
notion of alienation as separation,
but she finds the roots of this
alienation not in production
but in reproduction, in sexual dualism.
Out of
this bio-

logical dualism flows an ideological
superstructure which is
also divided into two spheres - the
female Aesthetic Mode
and the male Technological Mode - and
a division of labor
into men's work and women's work.
Both ideology and worklife are a reflection of the biological
dualism which for

Firestone produces woman's oppression.
Woman's reproductive capacity is the root of
her
oppression.

In order to achieve female liberation* then

reproduction must be brought under control.

To do this,
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women must sieze control of the
Technological mode and use
it to end the oppressiveness
of child-bearing and
the

alienated life built upon it.
But Firestone also offers what
she claims is a Freudian
interpretation of the family as the
source of the "pshchodynamics of power." This
psychodynamics which is also
rooted in the biological division
of labor, gives rise to
all power relations - age, race,
class,
,

etc.

To end

oppression, then, women must work to
eradicate the biological family. Biology is doubly damned.

What we need to ask is whether this
analysis is an
adequate expression of the Moral Agent mode.
I think that
there are several glaring problems which
prevent classifying
Firestone as a Moral A*ent theorist. First,
Firestone lacks
a clear image of the person as social
and historical being.

Biology is abstracted out of social relations
and assumes
the status of first cause; it has no history,
no social

specificity.

Reproduction is always oppressive.

Since

women are always biologically female, they appear as
static
images in history.

Changes in female oppression occur

through the mechanism of technology rather than through
the conscious intervention of human actors.

31

This tech-

Firestone calls her theory a "dialectic of sex," a
51.
problematic identification with Marxist epistemolo^y at best.
Juliet Mitchell criticizes her for being far more a "materialist" than an historical materialist, far more a dualist than
a dialectian - both valid criticisms.

nologism creates
problems for
r Firestone's
,
rirestone's understanding
id60l0Sy
S0 ° ial Change
A h0 h
aoes
oe
attempt to iUustrate
the development of
feminist

"

^

-

^

" -

apical Feminism, there
is an unresolved
tension here. The
20th Century resurgence
of Feminism is cast
as »... the
inevitable female response
to the development
of a technology capable of
freeing women from the
tyranny of their
sexual-reproductive roles both the fundamental
biological
.condition itself, and the
sexual class system
built
upon,

and reinforcing, this
biological condition." 52

But if

feminism is a reqr>nn<?
+n +
u
response0 to
technology,
how is it to capture
technology for its own
wn purposes.dutou^? How
u„,. are
purposes determined?
In her move away from
female oppression and
towards a
concern for the oppression
of all p erS ons, Firestone
reduces
all oppressions to one
form - the psychodynamics
of sexual

power.

She rejects socialist
analysis as "not radical
enough" because it fails to
root oppression in sexuality
(indeed, this is an inadequacy
of classical Marxism),
and
because "...it does not relate
the structure of the economic
class system to its origins
in the sexual class system,
the
model for all other exploitative
systems, and thus the tapeworm
that must be eliminated by any
true revolution.
pressing
the Fem inist call for a move from
the "personal to the political,"
h
e Dial6CtlC
(NSW York
°f
B^tafBoo£8 ? l9y

" m

nrr3ir

53.

Ibid., p. 37.

'
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Firestone defines the personal as
both the model for the
political and as the cause of the
political.
She is not

really clear which it is to be,
nor is she clear on how the
sex and political class systems
interrelate dialectically.

Her analysis is uni-dimensional and
mono-causal rather than
one which captures the complexity
of human
existence.

She

has reduced life to biology, for
example, she offers a rather
lengthy discussion of racism in which
she reduces racial
oppression to -sexism in the family of man."
Here she reaches
out to Blacks in an attempt to understand
the linkages between
various forms of oppression, but she does it
in a way which

delegitimizes important differences among these.
naive "totalism.

«

This is a

To say that oppressions are linked is not

necessarily to say that they all flow from the same
source,
and that is what Firestone has done.

Finally, Firestone has problems with the requirement
of respect for persons, for their capacity as feeling,

responsible agents with the potential for development.

It

seems to me that any argument which rests on technology does
two things

first, it denies human beings a central place

-

in history, a responsibility for their lives; second, it

denies them the rich, varied and often painful feelings they

experience in a life whose problems are not always amenable
to technical solutions.

Are the problems which confront

Juliet Mitchell in Woman's K:;l.ate (New York Pantheon
5^.
BbokB, 1971)
uses this term" to denote an analysis which
expands upon one form of oppression as the root of all others.
i

t
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women as persons resolvable solely
through a technology which
eradicatesthe biological roots of
oppression? To argue that
they will is to ignore the fact that
woman is more than a
biological being. She is the person who
has had primary re-

sponsibility for child-rearing and this is
more than a biological function.
It is a role which has profound
implications
not only for women but for children as
well.
Women have had a
unique relationship to children and this has
created needs (I

want to be terribly clear that this need is
not "maternal instinct"), needs which any proposal for social
change must

take into account.
We need to ask whether Firestone's proposals
adequately

deal with these needs, including children's needs
for the conditions which promote their development. Firestone
»s technolo-

gical solution seems to usher in an era of baby farms
and child-

rearing by "experts."
by patriarchy

-

She argues that children are oppressed

economically and physically dependent, deprived

of their sexuality, repressed in their daily lives, but
will

technology and entry into work-life resolve these problems and
encourage their flourishing as full human beings?
says that ghetto kids are freer

-

Firestone

freer in their sexuality,

which is "groovy" but is sexuality all there is to human development?

Firestone has failed to come to grips with either

woman's or children's needs regarding child-rearing.
And her theory of sexual 'liberation' raises serious
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questions as to where men will
be in the liberated society.
One wonders whether Firestone
sees men as having a capacity
to develop, and therefore
deserving certain types of treatment.
Firestone does not want for women
what men now have - she does
not want equal opportunities to
achieve in a man's world,
indeed, the man's world

-

i.e., the capitalist class sytem -

is vehemently rejected as a
reflection of man's need for power.
But does she want men? At first reading,
it seems that the

goal is the reintegration of the male-female
duality into
a unified whole - "...reintegrating
the personal with
the

public, the subjective with the objective,
the emotional

with the rational

-

the female principle with the male."

55

But one is left with a nagging feeling that
Firestone thinks
men essentially unsalvageable, that they are
inherently
flawed.

Unlike economic class, sex class sprang directly
from a biological reality
men and women were
created different, and not equally privileged.^ 6
i

Aside from the dubious assumption that privilege is biological
and not social, we need to ask, if oppression is so clearly

rooted in biology, must one eradicate biology before one can

elminate any of the forms of oppression, and, if male privilege
is biological, is there any basis for rational discourse

between male and female in the process of change?
In arguing that biology causes oppression, Firestone

verges on an argument quite similar to Steven Goldberg's in
55^

Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex

56.

Ibid.

,

p.

8.

,

p.

210.

193

The^Inevi^bilit^
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except that she thinks

that Culture can supercede Nature
if women organize to
gain control of technology.
Indeed at one point Firestone
does say that men cannot love perhaps because of "...Male
hormones??"
Because she works from a natural
dualism,
Firestone cannot account for how it
might be possible to
humanize the male. If maleness means
power and femaleness
means non-power, how are the
non-powerful to achieve power
and what effects might this have
on the presently powerful?
How can the female principle humanize
the male principle
when both are biologically determined?
A dichotomized

world does not carry within it the seeds of
either its
own destruction or development.
A logical extension of Firestone •s position
is the
58
Radicalesbian alternative.
If the psychodynamics of

power accurately accounts for man's power hunger,
and
if the family is rooted in biology, since we have
neither

the technological means of eradicating biology nor the
pol-

itical power to control and determine technology, female

liberation can be achieved by no longer relating to men.
A Feminist politics is necessary only where there is
59
power, and there is power only where there are men.
Con-

sider the following long passage from Jill Johnston's Lesbian
Nati on.

W.

Ibid.

,

p.

135.

Not all Radical Feminists adopt Lesbianism.
58.
There has
been much debate in the Movement as to whether Gay Women are
a radical Feminist vanguard, whether one needs to be Gay in
order to be a Feminist, whether Lesbianism is necessarily
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practical problems in a woman's
society.
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sexual dualism.
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^victim

My message

womeTif

oppression are rooted in a male-dominant
Without men, women would suffer no
injuries,

there would be no political issues
because biology would not
be implicated in power relations.
Without men, women could
1
enjoy authentic, loving, egalitarian

relationships/

the Radicalesbian position.

Thus,

But is this a pseudoradical,

infantile position as Friedan suggests in
her offenseive
against the Lavender Menace? That depends
on whether the

position flows from a developed moral perspective
and rests
on an adequate explanatory theory.
Unfortunately, Johnston falls short on both accounts.

Although she is critical of Greer's blatant heterosexuality,
radical.
Or where Lesbians pattern their relations on the heterosexual,

59.

Schuster! 1973)?°?'.

^

sbian Nation, (New York, Simon and

Whether Lesbian separatism is a political position is
61.
debatable. Decter may be correct in chastizing Lesbians for
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Johnston often sounds very much
like Greer.
is at once progressive and
retrograde.

ism as the only route to true
equality

She,

like Greer,

She proposes Lesbian-

"The lesbian is the

woman who has experienced real
equality in relationships in
which no party has the biological

or social advantage which
62
characterizes heterosexual coupling"
- as the means
for ab63
olishing sexism in truly egalitarian
peer relations.
But
Johnston's focus on equality, on
peer group relations, seems
tacked on to an account of a rather
uninvolved, uncommitted,

inegalitarian personal life.
Perhaps Johnston is at a point of
transition from
one mode of consciousness to another,
but she has not yet
made the transition a way of organizing
her own life. Moreover, her explanatory theory - which I
would argue flows
directly from her life-long lesbianism, her
realesbianism -

inadequately accounts for women's oppression and
also establishes a view of men which fails to treat them
as persons.

"It

is difficult to conceive of an 'equal' sexual
relationship between

m

two people

which one member is the 'biological aggressor.'"

being anti-political. But if one engages in political struggle
to establish the conditions for female love, then Lesbianism"
is strongly political. Moreover, if politics is broadened to
include egalitarian, participatory and liberating activity,
then Lesbianism may be political in this sense.
62.

Johnston, Lesbian Nation

63.

Ibid

.

,

p.

178.

64.

Ibid

.,

p.

154.

,

p.

157.
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Even with liberal reforms, "There'll
still be a man.
biology is defintely destiny.

And

Johnston has felt her own oppression
most vividly as
a biological being, or, rather, as
an individual in

rebellion against her biologically determined
identity.
Out of this felt oppression flows an
analysis which sees

persons almost entirely as biological
creatures,

biology leads to evil, woman's to good.
biology, eradicate evil

-

Man's

Eradicate male

a simple solution to the world's

woes which flows from an inadequate explanatory
theory.

But

this is not to say that Johnston is a pseudoradical
infant.
Rather,

I

would argue that she is struggling with a terribly

difficult transition from her own individual sense of
sexual

oppression to an understanding of human oppression.

would

I

label her a man-hater.

Nor

Her position viz men is more

like the righteous indignation which arises when we see

someone as responsible for injuring us.

Yet one wonders

whether she thinks men could avoid doing this injury.

Homo-

sexual men can; Gay men have abrogated their male prerogatives
and their position of power.

So at least some men are capable

of developing, at least in the direction Johnston sees as

development.

relationships?
I

theory.

But can men and women develop in heterosexual

Johnston certainly claims not.

think Johnston's great failure lies in her explanatory

Her move has been from gayness to feminism and

her political theory is couched in these terms.

W.

Ibid ., p. 175.

By defining

197

woman totally in terms of her sexuality,
Johnston fails
to make important links with other
modes of oppression and
to work out a political strategy
for change.
In a sense, Johnston is right when
she says, "We don't
have to have anything to do with
men at all. They've taken
excellent care of themselves. .. .The
liberation of women is
66
„
for women, not for men."
Certainly, women have to avoid
a naive altruism and certainly there
are problems in

working with men for female liberation.

No group which has

been advantaged by inequality is going to
readily give up
its prerogatives, especially when these
satisfy deep-seated
psychological needs. Moreover, female liberation
does have

something to do with women acting for themselves,
but we have
already seen that such action can move beyond egoism
and

6?

towards social interests.

Feminist consciousness does

have to begin with woman's oppression, and woman's
oppression
is at least in part rooted in personal life,

Ibid.

,

p.

but Johnston's

177.

Female liberation does have something to do with women
67.
no longer defining themselves in terms of men, no longer
serving men and no longer allowing men to name them, to give
them their identity. But as Anne Koedt points out, Radicalesbians continue to define woman in terms of who she sleeps
with, no big change from heterosexual definitions.
The goal,
argues Koedt, is personhood, not homo-, hetero- or bisexuality.
'

The phrase the "personal to the political" is extremely
fuzzy indeed.
It simply demands clarification.
For example,
Johnston implies that sex relations are power relations - the
is the political.
Moving from the personal to the political,
then, is understanding that one's inability to cope is not
a personal problem but one rooted in a sex-caste system.
Juliet Mitchell uses the same phrase to describe the move
68.
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dualism is too simple

-

man is bad, woman is good.

Glori-

fication of the victim inevitably
fails to account for the
negative effects of oppression on
persons.

Woman is more than a sexual being.

Johnston's analysis

is non-contextual; there is
no image of woman at work,
no
attempt to understand the relationship if any- between

woman's sexual alienation and her
alienation as worker,
either house-private or job-public.
Without this

context,

it really does look like men and
women have nothing in common,
.

no shared alienation (although even
this is experienced
from different sexual perspectives).
The personal may be
the political, but there is still a world
of work and

public activity into which the personal feeds,
a world of
power, inequality, burdens and benefits, a world
which

vitally affects women.
Nor is there any consideration of woman as mother,
of the particular relationship woman has had to
socialization
and the needs that this creates in both mother and child.

Johnston has a tendency to define needs as biological.
If technology has made reproduction outmodes, if we don't

need men because they just aren't as essential to reproduction
as we thought all along, what happens to men, what is the

relationship between mother and child?

If needs are

social and historical, Feminism has to come to grips with

from consciousness of sex-private oppression - which she agrees
is the first oppression women sense - to political consciousness or an understanding of the public-power relations within
which sexual oppression is embedded. These are quite different interpretations and make for confusion in Feminist
discourse
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needs which are embedded in parenthood
and with heterosexuality as a need deeply embedded in

all of us who are

not "non-political" or realesbians.

Looking for first causes is always
problematic.

Cer-

tainly work life is vital to women,
Lesbianism becomes a
more viable life style
(as most Lesbian activists are
well aware) as women have opportunities
to enter occupations
which pay enough to support themselves
and their
children.

Equal pay cannot be irrelevant to Lesbian
women, nor is it
possible to win the struggle for equal pay
through separatism,
unless one establishes totally self-supporting
Lesbian work
collectives. This has been done in several
places, but

wonder how viable these can be on the mass level.

I

We need

to get clear on the relationship between woman's
public work
and her need for a man to support her and her children.

We

cannot avoid this issue by passing off woman's need for
man
as biologically outmoded.

We also need to get clear on how

people become heterosexual.

They do, and this presents

problems for any Lesbian strategy.
needs, which

-

We do have heterosexual

regardless of their no longer having biological

roots, which is debatable

-

are needs nonetheless.

If the Radical Feminist and Radicalesbian perspectives

fail to meet the requirements of the Moral Agent mode both
in terms of explanatory theory and the requirements of

morality, is there an analysis which does meet these re-

quirements?
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A^ossible candidate
drogyny

is Alice Rossi's
eonceptien of an70

or her "hybrid model of
equality.-

Rossi's p i ea

i

for a move beyond separate
spheres for males and females
and
beyond equal opportunities for
women in the man's sphere,
and
to an androgynous personhood.
This personhood combines
the
human qualities found in both
males and females.

sexes.

This assumes the traditional
concetrtion* r>f
and fem i«ine are inappropriate
to the kind
ofwoitr
ln in thS SeCOnd half of the
twentieth
.
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Since it is sex-role socialization
which stands in the way of
androgyny, Rossi's call is for the
re-socialization of persons
into those character traits which would
make it possible
for them to develop their full human capacities.

Unlike Friedan, Rossi does not take the standard
of

human excellence to be male.

She rejects the idea of equality

as woman's entry into the man's world.

^assimilation

model
that the institutional
developed over decades
males, constitutes the
Whether the call is to

equality/makes an assumption
structure of American society,
by predominantly white Protestant
best of all possible worlds.
blacks or to women to join white
<-° f

Alice S. Rossi, "Equality Between the Sexes An Immodest
Proposal," in Robert Jay Lifton, ed., The Woman in
America
(Bostoni Beacon Press, 1964); pp. 98-l*Fn
69^

t

Alice S. Rossi, "Sex Equality The Beginnings of Ideology,
in Constantina Saf ilios-Rothschild, ed., Toward a Soc iology
of Women (Lexingtoni Xerox, 1972), pp. 3^-353.
70.

71.

i

Rossi,

"Equality Between the Sexes,"

p.

99,
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men in the mainstream of American
society, both
racial integration and a feminist
ideology
ogy accept
a?cep
the structure of American society
as it now exists
The assimilation model rejects
the psychological
theses of innate racial or sex
differences implicit
in most versions of the pluralist
model, but it
accepts the social institutions formed
by
J the
ascendant group. fi

Woman is biologically different from
man, but her particula
capacities ought to be recognized and
valued while some
compensations might need to be made in order
for her to

develop fully in all spheres of human activity.

But recog-

nizing and valuing sexual differences is
carefully distinguished from separate spheres, from what Rossi

calls the

"pluralist model of equality," and which is similar
to the
call for separate but equal educational facilities
for the
races. The standard of human excellence is not
male? rather

men have much to learn about their own personhood and
have
-been equally injured by the pluralist model.

Rossi also works from a social and historical per-

spective on women.
in the same way.

Biology has not always oppressed women
Rather the biological role of mother has

taken on a new status in contemporary society.

(One would

wish that Rossi had developed this understanding more thoroughly and had dealt in more depth with the relationship

between capitalism and biological oppression.

This

would clear the way for a more adequate understanding
of the power relations which undergird sex-role social-

W.

Rossi,

"Sex Equality," p. 351.
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"What has not been seen is
the general point
that for the first time in
the history of any known
society,
motherhood has become a full-time
occupation for adult women.It is not biology or
motherhood per se which oppresses
women,
but the social definition of
woman as biological being, as
mother.
Full-time motherhood is injurious
to women, it is
injurious to children, and it excludes
men from their full
humanity.
(Again, Rossi fails to consider
who might benefit
from this arrangement.)

nation).

Rossi, then,

seems to satisfy the requirements
of a

developed moral perspective.

Her arguments for female lib-

eration are baeed on respect for persons
as social and historical beings.
But she clearly lacks on explanatory
theory of
how she came to this position and this in
turn colors her
image of the ways in which others 'perceptions
of themselves
and society can be altered and serve as
a base for social

change.

Rossi combines a developed moral point of view
with

an inductionist approach to socialization, and this
will not
do as analysis in the Moral Agent mode..

For example, she

argues that women who now challenge existing roles have been

profoundly influenced by their fathers.
It is possible that those women who have led exciting, intellectually assertive and creative lives
did not identify exclusively with their traditional
mothers, but crossed the sex line and looked to their
fathers as model sources for ideas and life commitments of their own.
This is to suggest than an
exclusively same-sex identification between parent

TT*

Rossi,

"Equality Between the Sexes,"

p. 106.
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and child is no necessary condition
for
mentally healthy or creative adults. 7^ either

This image of the way in which healthy,
creative adults
may develop undergirds Rossi's claim
that female liberation
can only be achieved if children are exposed
to new role
models, models which expand their self
-conceptions beyond
traditional sex role stereotypes.
This view of changing

consciousness supports her call for greater male
participation
in the lives of their children and for more open
role-social-

ization in the schools.

Yet it fails to come to grips with

how critical consciousness is possible.

Is cross-pressuring,

or

exposure to male roles, enough to induce a critical
perspective
on social roles?

Rossi's theory of socialization is rather

more a variant of status inconsistency theory than a theory
of radical criticism.

Altering role models may help break

down rigid sex-role identifications, but one wonders if this
is all there is to critical consciousness.

We have seen that

the Piagetian image of socialization also depends on exposure
to a variety of roles, but the important step is to move

beyond role-taking to role-making.

It is this step which

requires critical consciousness, an ability to critically
evaluate social roles and rules from the moral point of
view, and makes possible demands for a more radical form

of mutality and egalitarianism than role-choosing can permit.
Finally, Rossi has failed to develop an adequate under-

standing of the power relations which undergird sex-role

W.

Ibid., p. 133.
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socialization, and the interests
which are served by this
socialization.
She begins to move in this
direction in her
critique of pluralist ideology
which "...often disguises
a social system in which one
group dominates - the upper
classes (white Anglo-Saxon Protestants) and minority
ethnic, religious or racial groups
are confined to the
lower classes."
And she begins to make links
between
work life and sexism.
eS Ame
can soc iety persist
!^°
ri
erroneous myths
concerning female

in maintaining
sexuality, contrary to research evidence, as it does
women to believe their children's

in,

development
requires their daily attendance upon
?he^ again
0 reSear h evidence?
I
believe
thf answer
?
li2T?+£hG econo ™ lc
d emand that men work
at
perllll
?
i
8
e 3
efficiency and creativity.
l
°J
lZ
? i hlS r e(l uires a s °cial arrangement
?L family
in which the
?
system serves as the shockabsorbing handmaiden of the occupation

^

system. ?6

Rossi also recognizes that there are
social handicaps
like race and class, but she has not
investigated the links
between these and the handicaps of sex. She
has not analized whether these phenomena are part of
all industrial

societies or whether they are particular to
capitalism.
Rossi, then, fails on the level of explanatory
theory

-

in

her explanation of critical consciousness and in
her explan-

ation of the sources of injury to women and to persons.
75~.

Rossi, "Sex Equality," p. 3^9.

76.

Ibid., p. 350.

"Women in Science Why so Few," in Constant ina SafiliosRothschild, Towa rd a Sociology of Women (Lexington Xerox.
1972), pp. IIH-I53:

77.
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In her treatment of ideological
development and in her
explanation of female oppression,
Juliet Mitchell moves be-

yond Rossi's explanatory
inadequacies.

Yet at the same time,

Mitchell maintains a developed
moral point of view, although
some of the elements require
more development.
Mitchell gives central place to
ideological change in
her discussion of contemporary
Feminism.
Only through analysis of the legitimizing functions

of ideology, she says, can

one begin to understand how persons
alter their lives and

circumstances.

Ideology is a determinant in our lives,
as
important to understanding social change
as is the economic
substructure of classical Marxism. "The
dominant ideological
formation is not separable from the dominant
economic one,
but while linked, it does have a certain
degree of autonomy
and its own laws."
Understanding social change requires
taking seriously this ideological autonomy
and these "laws"
of development,

Mitchell's own explanation of ideological change is
identified by the short-hand phrase "the role of
contradiction.
At first inspection, her theory of contradiction
appears to

have much in common with Lenski's theory of status inconsistency.

Women who experience different opportunities in

different spheres of their lives

-

e.g., the opportunity

for sexual freedom as contrasted to a limited occupational

freedom

-

may make demands for freedom of choice in areas

now closed.

W.

Or, using the language of relative deprivation,

Mitchell, Woman's Estate

,

p.

156.
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women who have the same education
as men will expect the
same social rewards and feel
deprived when these are not
forthcoming.
At first, Mitchell claims, the
contradictions of capitalism are recognized by middle
class women through the
medium of bourgeois ideology.

ideology of equality. .. overt discriminatory
3
Ck
The egalitarian ideology
SY
lots not
??tween
ap b
the 'reality and the
•illu2?^55
f K
?
illusion offered,
but on the contrary, is the way
in which both the discrimination
and 'the opposition
1Ve
The belief in the rightnels and
the
£Li?^?-l
1
0 J'
1 ty that WOmen sh ^e has
enabled
thSS
t^t i and hence has acted
them to feel ?'cheated'
as a
precondition of their initial protest. 79

Itt^l

\»T ^

'

S ^!

Rebellion is at first a demand for simply
more of what
80
people already have? it is quantitative.
The women's
rebellion initially asserts liberal values the cult

of individuality, of subjectivity, of
personal freedom

and choice, of doing one's own thing.

First a demand for

equality of opportunity, the Movement moves in
the direction
of subjective liberation a la Germaine Greer.

But this dir-

ection is a false one since it is a bourgeois
consciousness
manipulable for capitalist purposes.
Late capitalist ideology precisely urges one to be
free in faith, personal and individual emotion, and
to think that one can be this without a socio-economic
transformation.

Emotions cannot be 'free' or 'true* in isolation; they
are dependent today on a social base that imprisons and

W.

Ibid ., pp. 40-41.

80.

Ibid

.

,

p.

154.

20?

determines them. The liberation of
emotionalitv
ransf Ration that apparently takes
place
nn
on f*
its own (withm the superstructure
alone) is
impossible.
Indeed, the belief in its possibility
liy
is an ironic self-parody 81
'

.

But how does bourgeois consciousness
transform itself into
radical consciousness; how does equality
of opportunity or
doing one's own thin* become the
equality of respect for
persons? Mitchell describes this
transformation as a

change from the 'personal* to the
'political,' a move
from subjective feelings of oppression,
through individual
'

and group solutions, through "totalism,

«

to a unified

analysis of oppression in all its forms,
and to political
solutions.
This transition requires new conceptualizations,
new cognitions.

HHT,

p.

38.

Note the treatment of emotions as social.

Jean Elshtain's typology of Feminist strategies is
82.
usefu]
here.
Elshtam argues that Feminist strategies are of three
types - personal (solutions at the individual level), subsystemic (working it out in the family), and systemic (ranging
from legal rights to demands for a radical restructuring
of society).
This is a fruitful way of looking at the change
from the personal to the political, but one which runs into
problems in clarifying the difference between reform and
revolution. What we need is some way of distinguishing
between a reactionary and a progressive change - one that
is on the road to liberation and one that buys off dissident
elements thus making capitalism, for example," operate more
efficiently. There is also the problem that even a reactionary
reform which pays women more - it is easier for capitalism
to provide more pay than it is for it to provide more meaningful work - makes life somewhat easier for those who receive
even limited benefits. One's judgments on these matters will
in large part determine what actions one decides to support.
Jean Elshtain, talk at a "Working Conference on Women,"
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, January 25, 1974. See
also Sheila Rowbotham, Wj)man^s_C_onsciousne3s Man's Worl d for a
discussion of some of the difficulties in staking out a
,
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These new conceptualizations may
come from other
political movements. Since the Women's
Movement does not
take place in a cultural vacuum
but in a pluralist society,
there is opportunity to borrow from
the experiences of
others - from "...the 'politics of
experience,' the spontanist
methods of anarcho-syndicalism and the
Situationists, the

separatism of Black Power, the socialist
theory of the unity
of all oppressed peoples, the concept
of itself as a grassroots, potentially mass movement"

is developed.

Women have

to be ready to utilize these more radical
analyses, however,

and this is where Mitchell runs into some
trouble.

Mitchell explains

this readiness in terms of the

middle class woman's training and experience in
manipulating
ideologies.

She argues that in a pluralist society, one in

which there are numerous contradictions, different spheres
present radically different possibilities for freedom.
Change may come about when persons become conscious of these

contradictions and when ideas which flow from one can be

utilized to criticize the other.
own examples

j

To give two of Mitchell's

Our society permits a great deal of freedom

in the sexual sphere, and the idea of sexual freedom does

contradict limits on freedom in other spheres.

But the

transference is not so simple as, say Germaine Greer thinks
it is.

Mitchell does not believe that freeom automatically

ramifies into other spheres; sexual freedom, for instate is

position on equal pay for equal work.
83.

Mitchell, Woman' s Estate

,

pp.

13-14.

ea E1 ly adapted to a
consu rap tion an, fu„ ethic,
compatible
with capitalism.
Second, bourgeois marriage
is a free

contract entered into by
legal equals, but once
married,
women are immersed in a
radically unequal division of
labor
- between home and "work,.. m ale
and female - which contradicts
the equality of the marriage
contract, and in radically
unfree
sexual relations which contradict
the freedom of romantic love.
These contradictions form the
basis of a dialectical process
of change.
Middle class women are the first
to become aware of
these contradictions because
they have had the greatest
exposure to liberal ideology and
because they have been
educated to manipulate ideologies.
Demands for social change
85
flow out of the needs to which
bourgeois ideology gives rise.
But Mitchell has yet to demonstrate
how it is possible, or
likely, that women who are trained
to manipulate the concepts of bourgeois ideology will learn
the concepts of a
06
radical ideology.
Does she mean that the language of social

change is a simple extension of the ideals
of liberal society?
There are parts of Mitchell's discussion which
suggest this?
e.g., her discussion of revolutionary demands
as demands

for what people already have only bigger and better.

^

If this

IbidT, p. 147

The ideology of the family - individualism and
85.
privacv
gives rise to needs which the family cannot meet.

-

Indeed, there may be negative consequences of libernl
86.
feminism.
Middle class women may get what they want and reinforce
much of the status quo.
87.

Mitchell, Wom an's Estate

,

p.

154.
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If this is a variant of the
Marxist "quantity into qualitythesis, it needs further development.

Mitchell sometimes seems to be arguing
that radicalism
is a simple unification of
the liberal values freedom
and

equality, and that the language of
liberalism can be used
to express radical demands.
Yet at the same time she gives
us examples of several ideological
developments in American

feminism which can hardly be interpreted
as liberal ideas
consciousness-raising (which does not take persons'
wants
as givens but assumes that persons can be
moved

-

to new levels

of awareness through the revolutionary
practise of "speaking

bitterness" in words normally repressed by society);

88

male

chauvinism and male supremacy (theories of sex-caste
power);

sexism and patriarchy (also theories of sex-caste
and sexclass power); feminism (a call for a radical restructuring
of social relations); separatism (the need to
organize

around specific oppressions without falling back on selfinterest); collectivity and no-leadership structures (re-

jection of the implicit assumption that hierarchy is inevitable).
One wonders if these are ideas that analysts in the True Be-

liever tradition would find credible.
However, Mitchell's idea that change flows out of exist-

ing social arrangements is compatible with the case

developed.

I

have

Changed conceptions of justice or of liberation

do flow out of bourgeois conceptions, at least in a bourgeois

W.

Ibid

.

,

p.

62.
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89

society.

Moreover, Mitchell is quite clear
that radical
and bourgeois consciousness differ
in terms of their recognition of interests.

Mitchell argues that at first feminist
consciousness
is self-interested.
It flows out of the particular
position
of women in capitalist society and
makes demands for women.
Radical - or political consciousness on the contrary,

"responds to all forms of oppression."
If we simply develop feminist
consciousness we will
get not political^ consciousness, but
the equivalent
oi national chauvinism among
Third World nations
or economism among working class
simply a self -directed saze, that organizations;
sees only the
internal workings of one segment; only
this segh
ment's

self-mterest. 90

Once feminist consciousness begins to
seek an understanding
of oppression as it finds meaning in a
total social context,
it moves beyond group interests to solidarity
with all

oppressed groups.

This conceptual move is Mitchell's con-

tribution to a developed moral perspective from which to

understand the Women's Movement as it transforms itself
from interest group to radical social movement, from egoistic group interests to the interests of persons in a just

social order.

While there may be problems with Mitchell's

formulation of feminist ideology and with her analysis of
the move from the personal to the political, the approach

W.

IbldT

,

pp.

90.

Ibid.

,

p.

33-35.
94.
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remains one of the best examples of the

Agent mode

r.'oral

available in terms of this move beyond egoism and toward
social interests.

Mitchell's explanation of changing consciousness is
different from the one

I

support but the two are compatible.

She does have some suggestions as to how moral consciousness

might ^develop, but unfortunately she does not expand upon
them.

She discusses the role of consciousness-raising

groups in the development of class consciousness and "total92

ist" ideology.

In the small, non-hierarchical group,

women probe their personal oppression; out of this comes
an awareness that they are oppressed as women
of the roots of this oppression follows.

non-hierarchical group?

,

and analysis

But why the small,

Is this simply a rhetorical stance?

Mitchell is weak here and would be considerably adided by
a developmental hypothesis.

To understand how women's

interests can develop without being diverted either by

altruism (Friedan has recently come out against Women's
Liberation and taken the stand that N.O.W. should fight for
"human liberation") or "class" interest (certain radical-

Lesbian positions which give men up as unsalvageable

)

requires a deeper analysis of the small group and these

non-hierarchical relations, a more clearly developed hypothesis about how women, working together in egalitarian
It would be interesting to see where her Freudianism
91.
would lead her. Unfortunately, her second book, Psychoanalysis and Feminism (New York» Pantheon Books, 197^) is
also disappointing.
Fitchell, Woman's Estate p. 59.
92.
,
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relationships, may develop a consciousness that
society

impoverishes life for all persons and not just
women.
I

want to add an important caveat at this point
and

that is that the small, non-hierarchical
group need not

always contribute to human development.

In discussing

Piagefs focus on the peer group, many of my students
point out that peer groups often have informal
leadership
structures, or even informal tyrannies
the bullies.

-

the big boys and

And as Jo Freeman has so cogently argued,

structurelessness can often devolve into oligarchy. 93
This "tyranny of structurelessness has been noted
and

reflected upon by Movement members.

It is indeed a prob-

lem; women bring the problems of the wider society
with

them to the small group and these can produce "ego-

tripping" and petty tyranny.

Yet consciousness of this

dilemma of small group organization can lead to the establishment of procedures designed to avoid the worst excesses.
Nor should it be implied that the idea of no-leadership

structures has not been seriously thought through or does
not require further analysis.

Problems have arisen here as

women develop leadership skills within the movement itself;
often these women are rejected by other Movement members.
There is no doubt that part of developing a moral perspective
on female liberation involves working out these issues of
Jo Freeman, "The Tyranny of Structurelessness,"
Second Wave 2 ( 1972 ) 20-25 42

937

:

.
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informal oligarchy and the appropriate role of leadership
in egalitarian relationships.

Mitchell has not dealt with either of these issues,
yet she has contributed much to this moral perspective.

Her own feminist ideology moves beyond individualism and
self-interest to social interest, beyond equality of

opportunity or hedonism to an alternative justification
of feminist action.

And her understanding that the pro-

gress of the movement is a transition from the personal tc
the political, from the "instinctual" to the "rational" seems
to capture the idea of cognitive development

exploring in this dissertation

-

I

have been

the move to new levels

of reasoning can answer to the conflicts between one's

needs as a person and the constraints of the existing

social order.
In one sense Mitchell's analysis is compatible with
the True Believer model.

The "instinct of oppression"

is the result of status inconsistency.

The True Believer

analyst can follow this argument and can also follow

Mitchell into her discussion of individual anarchism.
But once Mitchell moves to analysis of the Women's Move-

ment as a critique of the limits of bourgeois ideology
and posits alternative modes of social organization

coupled with alternative moral constraints

-

the con-

straints of reciprocal, non-alienated feminist consciousness
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the True Believer analyst is bound
to cry either "Utopianism"
or "Ideology:- since the notion of
interests upon which the
alternative rests is alien to him or her.

Mitchell's analysis of the difficulties
of raising
women's consciousness is excellent.
Her understanding 0 f
women's treatment of work life and the
implications of
this for class consciousness is a
fruitful insight into
the problems of raising the consciousness
of working class

women.

So long as women enter the work force
as individuals

to satisfy personal or family needs

-

-

they will continue to

remain outside social relationships and consciousness

will remain at a low level.

Women's consciousness "...is

determined outside the labour force; outside a situation
of potential class-consciousness

-

it is determined in the home.

Within this home there are inherent contradictions, but so
long as the home remains a privatized and individualized

experience it cannot by itself provide the basis for political
95

consciousness.

W.

Women who have the opportunity to

Mitchell, Woman's Estate, p. 181.

Whether the family is a humanizing or de-humanizing
institution is highly debatable. Some Feminists (e.g.,
Susan C. Bourque and Jean Grossholtz, "Politics as an
Unnatural Practise! Political Science Looks at Female
Participation," Pol itics and Society k /Winter 197^/i225~
266) argue that women are more developed morally than men
because of their rootedness in the family. Others find
this proposition dubious at best on grounds similar to
Mitchell's and with which I agree. The issue, however,
is somewhat ill-met since it rests on different conceptions of morality. Indeed, women may have more "moral"
character traits because they engage in social relations
95.
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participate in social relations will
lead the feminist
revolution since they will face and
perceive the contradictions between the reality and ideal
of the family.
But they will need an ideology to
frame these contradictions;
therefore, middle-class women, committed
to realization of
the bourgeois ethic for themselves
and their families will
by most likely to perceive these
contradictions. For
example, the ideology of the family,
with its claims to

whicFare~more loving, more personal, warmer

- but that depends
VleWS moralit ^ as involving only character
?raSs
^its like compassion, or whether other traits like imDersonality discipline, etc. are central.
On the other hand,
a
7 S a f
,° rm ?? masoning and if reasoning involves
having experienced egalitarian relationships,
can a family
situation provide these relationships?

W?^

-

The tension between these two nositions comes
out
in Rowbotham's Wojnanjs Consciousness, Tan's V/or ld. clearlv
She argues
that
some ways the family is a better world because
it is
not caught up in the depersonalization of
an industrialized,
capitalist society.
It is the site of love, warmth, humanism,
and as such mitigates the evils of capitalism
and makes life
bearable.
"The family is a place of sanctuary for all the
hunted, jaded, exhausted sentiments out of place
in commodity
production.
Chased out of the dominant mode of production
where there is no room for emotion, such characteristics
as
love, tenderness, and compassion assune a mawkish
guise from
confinement. .. .But this distortion of human relations still
represents the only possibility of personal life."
Yet at the same time woman confined in the family is(p.de-59)
prived of the social relations out of which political
consciousness develops.
"The non-recognition of women's
labour in the home leaves them with no sense of value as
a group at all." (p. 69)
Consciousness cannot be organized
around nothingness. Privatized within the family, woman is
"...rather like those mental patients and prisoners who are
terrified to live without the safe and known routine of
their institution.. This is our kind of 'institutionalization.'
Certanly this is not a firm foundation upon which
(p. 79)
to built an autonomous morality.

m
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individualism and privacy is recognized by the middle class

woman as a contradiction to the way she experiences the
family and this gives rise to new consciousness.

However,

this analysis could be aided by an understanding of the

ways in which different life experiences lend themselves
to moral development,

especially since working-class women

too immediately experience the contradiction between

family ideology and family reality.

With a developmental

hypothesis, we could begin to get at some of the difficulties in raising working-class consciousness not only in

terms of the primary identification of working-class women
in the home

-

for this identification also holds for most

middle class women

tionships
experience.

-

but in the nature of the social rela-

which working-class and middle class women
The radicalism of the early trade union

women might then be understood as flowing not only from
their excusion from the wife- mother-role, but from their

opportunities for egalitarian relationships with other women
in a work life structured somewhat differently from today's
96
assemly line.
And -the focus of much contemporary feminist
9o~i
It would also help to account for the very radical
position of women's trade uniions in the 19th Century,
especially as compared with the middle class movement
which arose out of the abolitionist movement. Indeed,
one might well wonder where we would be now if 19th
Century feminism had picked up on the ideas coming out
of trade-unionism rather than those of liberal abolitionism.
See Emma Goldman's Living H"y Life (New York, Dover Publications, 1970) 1.
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literature on personal rather than on
work life is given
theoretical support if it is here and
not in work life
that women experience some real
freedoms - freedom in
education, in control of sexuality and
reproduction, and
some real equality and sociality
in relations with other
women through the Women's Movement.
And it is these relationships which establish the cognitive
base for perceiving
the contradictions inherent in family
and work
life.

The theory of contradiction, with its
focus on the

middle class woman at the nexus of bourgeois
social contradiction, is open to serious criticism from
both left
and right.

Yet it remains a serious attempt to
explicate

a changing ideological framework for politi-a 1

acting a»H

as such begins to meet the requirements of the
Moral Agent

mode.

It is an attempt to understand how ideology
can

move beyond democratic-liberalism to an alternative
conception
of a just social order, and it is also a clear illustration
of how one can understand and interpret less developed

conceptual frameworks from the perspective of a more developed one.

Mitchell's concern for human freedom also satisfies
the requirements of the Moral Agent mode.

Woman, argues

Mitchell, is unfree insofar as she is alienated

-

i.e,

separated from her species being, from creative, purposive

responsible activity

-

and she is alienated because her

biology has become her definition.
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Unlike her non-productive status, her
for maternity is a definition of woman.capacity
But it
is only a physiological definition.
Yet so
long as it is allowed to remain a
substitute for
action and creativity, and the home an
area of
relaxation for men, women will remain confined
to
the species, to her universal and
natural condition. 97

Woman is alienated in reproduction so long
as her capacity
for reproduction confines her to "...her
universal and
natural condition," removes her from the
realm
of choice

and activity.

She is alienated in her sexuality so long
as

there is a necessary link with reproduction.

She is alien-

ated in the socialization of children because
"...her bio-

logical 'destiny* as mother becomes a cultural
vocation...."

Biology undergirds woman's alienation only insofar
as it
is implicated in a specific social and historical
reality.

The biological function of maternity has been "...a
universal,

atemporal fact, and as such has seemed to escape the
98

categories of Marxist historical analysis," but now that

technology has made biology a potentially historical category, culture can supercede nature.

Women now have the

opportunity to develop in the realm of freedom, a realm
which, while based on a technology which puts biology

under her control, requires conscious intervention in history.

Change is not accomplished through the deux ex

machina of technology, but rather through woman's rational

understanding of the way in which her oppression operates,
97T

Fitchell, Woman's Estate

98.

Ibid.

,

p.
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,

p.

109.
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particularly the way in which the structures
of the family
interrelate with the structures of capitalism.

At present,

woman is denied her personality through
her definition as
biological being - she is denied significance

as a social,

cultural, and historical being capable of
creating herself
through human activity. But she can gain
personhood by
corning to grips with this definition and
challenging its

roots in the unity of the family as a social
stucture.
The four elements of women's condition cannot
merely
be considered each in isolation; they form a
structure of specific inter-relations.' The contemporary
family can be seen as a triptych of sexual, reproductive and socializatory functions (the women's
world) embraced by production (the man's world) precisely a structure which in the final instance
is determined by the economy.
The exclusion of

women from production - social human activity and their confinement to a monolithic condensation
of functions within a unity - the family which is
precisely unified in the natural part of each
function, is the root cause of the contemporary
s ocial definition of women as natural
beings.
Any
emancipation movement must still concentrate on
the economic element - the entry of women fully
into public industry and the right to earn a living
wage. .. ./But/ reproduction, sexuality, and social-°
ization also need to be free from coercive forms
99
of unification

Woman's freedom requires a move away from the natural and
towards the social and it is this move which undergirds

her potential equality as person.
We have to read into ritchell somewhat to see what

she envisages as an egalitarian society, but her socialist

stance does require a leveling of income rather than equality of opportunity to enter into the competition for present
99.

Ibid., pp. 149-150.
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rewards.

Persons deserve a "living wage."

They also

deserve equal opportunity, but these are
not opportunities
for positions in the existing stratification
system, but

rather opportunities to develop their full
human capacities.
This requires that they be implicated in
the kinds of personal
and public activities which encourage development.
And

that can be done only by ending the division of
labor be-

tween male and female

-

males in the public sphere of work

(although women are obviously there also, but most
often

doing "women^s work"), and women in the private sphere
of
•the

family.

100.
Whether the division of labor between male and female
is inherently alienating is debatable.
It seems to depend
on whether men and women have natural capacities to perform
certain kinds of work, and this is exactly the thesis that
Mitchell criticises. But even if work is linked to biology
and genetics (the parallel is the relation between IQ and
the ability to perform in middle class functions) it seems
to me that we can criticize an inequality which utilizes natural capacities as the basis for rewards, especially since
societies always do value some achievements more than others.
Natural capacities to peform those things which a particular
society values ought not be linked to greater desert as a
person.
However, this opens up a can of worms which I need
not deal with in this dissertation.

Another problematic issue is whether entry into work-life
(the public sphere) necessarily adds to woman's development.
Socialists assume that work-life is essential to the development of political consciousness radical feminists do not
agree since women experience their primary oppression in
the family.
Mitchell's theory of contradiction is an attempt
to work out the relationship between work-life, family and
consciousness. Another interesting approach to this issue
can be found in Rowbotham's W oman's Consciousness, Tan's
World which also attempts to understand the ways in which
a female consciousness rooted in the family creates problems
for raising female consciousness in the public sphere.
It
j

,
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In part this division of labor is eroded by attacking

the family as a monolithic fusion of structures.

Rejecting

the socialist call for "abolition of the family" as "...

maximalist in the bad sense, posing a demand which is merely
a negation without any coherent construction subsequent
101
to it,"
Mitchell calls for alternatives to the mono-

lithic fusion of sexuality, reproduction and socialization
in the family.

^Equality/ will not come from its /the family's/
administrative abolition, but from the historical
differentiation of its functions. The revolutionary
demand should be for the liberation of these
functions from an oppressive monolithic fusion.
...What we should seek for is not the abolition
of the family, but the diversification of the
socially acknowledged relationships which are
today forcibly and rigidly compressed into it.
This would mean a plural range of institutions where the family is only one such institution,
and its abolition implies none.^ 02
Mitchell does not attack the functions these structures
perform

-

people have sexual needs, they do need to re-

produce, and children need to be socialized

(her concern

for children's socialization is clearly in contrast to

Firestone's solution that children be brought into the
public sphere;

Mitchell, however, has not developed the

relationship between male liberation and socialization and
Rossi could help her out here).

What she attacks is woman's

seems to me that work life is productive of radical consciousness to the extent that it does encourage social relations,
and that the same is true of private life.
101.

Mitchell, Woman's Estate

102.
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immersion in the family which is a realm of
unfreedom.
Female liberation means expansion of the
realm of choice
within the context of a social order which
can satisfy
human needs in the four areas of production,
reproduction,

sexuality and socialization.

To ignore needs in any

structure is to fail to liberate women; to focus
on one
structure as the key to female liberation is to
ignore
the dialectical relationship among structures.
As we have seen, Mitchell works from the
assumption

that persons can develop interests which move beyond
egoism
and a political consciousness which, by recognizing
the

relationships among these four structures, can commit them
to the liberation of all oppressed groups.

(She is,

un-

fortunately, not specif ic about where racial oppression

might fit in; her focus is on sex and class.)

The

task for feminists is to organize around woman's specific
oppression, but any solution to this oppression, embedded
as it is in a capitalist structure, must move in the direction
103.
Mitchell does not provide an analysis of the links
between class oppression, racism, agism, sexism, etc., but
these issues are being worked out in the Women's Tovement.
Of particular interest are the formation of new feminist
organizations by women who are at the nexus of these
various systems of oppression - Black women, working class
women, older women.
It seems clear to me that one's explanatory theory establishes the basis of solidarity among
these women and the sorts of actions one engages in as an
expression of that solidarity. For example, Black and
white women can join together on abortion reform only to
the extent that Black women do not see abortion as an
attempt at genocide, or only so long as white women perceive that Black women might have legitimate reasons to
suspect this possibility.
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of making links between woman's
oppression and working

class oppression.

The Movement thus moves beyond middle

class demands for equality of opportunity
to an under-

standing of the inter-relatedness of oppressions,
to

solidarity amongst the oppressed.
Finally, Mitchell's critique of the family is
clearly

rooted in an alternative conception of human
relationships
-

relationships seen from the moral point of view.

What is

alienating about the family is not only that it denies

woman her personhood, but that it provides a false
equality
and freedom within the context of capitalist productive

structures, when there are possibilities for real equality

and freedom in all social relations.

Women's liberation

is not liberation for women; freeing

women from the unitary

structure of the family frees them from the task of holding

together a unity which is destructive to all its members.
The family... has an economic and ideological role
under capitalism. Roughly, the economic role is
the provision of a certain type of productive
labour-force and the arena for massive consumption.
This is specifically capitalist.
The economic
function interacts with the ideology requisite to
produce the missing ideals of peasant, feudal
society; a place to equally and freely enjoy private
property. xu+

But this ideology (in the Marxist sense) is mystifying

-

it hides the reality of inequality and unfreedom under

capitalism, and encourages "...the increasingly disruptive
105

individualism

of its members."

104.

Mitchell

105.

Ibid

.

,

1

p.

Woman's Estate
153.

,

It inhibits freedom and
p.

155
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equality in work-life, sexuality, reproduction,
and socialization and supports a generally de-humanized

life for

all.

Mitchell has adequately dealt with what might
be
termed the top-side of dis-alienation, the side
of freedom
and equality.

But we need to consider a bottom side of

liberation, the side where we find emotions and persons
as historic individuals.

Mitchell does begin to deal with

the emotions in the final chapter of Woman's Estate
when
she considers the ways in which oppression marks those

who are oppressed, makes liberation a serious struggle.
The difficulties that confront us are not just the
opposition of the system we are confronting, but
also its influence.
It is this latter difficulty
that I think we are in danger of ignoring. The
conditions of our oppression do condition us....
You cannot inhabit a small and backward world
without it doing something to you. 105
(

But the writer who has perhaps best captured the
difficul-

ties of liberation is Ingrid Bengis, especially in her

treatment of the relationship between liberation and

personal history.
The rational mind is capable of making astounding
leaps.
I can espouse communism one evening and
radical conservatism the next. I can theorize
about the future of the family from dusk until
dawn.
I can create and destroy whole new systems
of thought, systems of being, systems of living,
allwithin the course of a dinner conversation^
Similarly, I can create and re-create 'new women'
to suit the perspective of the period.
What I
Ibid
"To recognize that we are the victims
p. 162.
of our own masochism is our political beginning." Howbotham,

3.06.

.

,

Woman's Consciousness

,

p.

42.

22?
-

cannot do, however, is become the person each
decade newly assumes I ought to be.
I cannot
be the completely feminine woman of the fifties,
the emancipated, sexually free woman of the sixties,
and the militant, antisexist woman of the seventies.
I cannot ignore the fact that my own life has unfolded slowly, that it has been a part of all those
trends and none of them.
I cannot ignore the fact
that essentially the same me has persisted
throughout the upheavals, throughout the analyses
of historical circumstances and evaluations of
what a woman's life ought to be. °'

Understanding that we are the same person throughout the
process of social change carries with it important implications for what we might demand of social change.

We

•might expect that change will better satisfy those needs

we do have, that altering social relations will better

provide for the fulfillment of what we perceive as our
needs.

Here Bengis provides an insight which is rare in

Feminist analysis, an insight which has to do with our
felt need for commitment, for the stable relationships

which form the underside of dis-alienation.
Still, the need for continuity, for love, for
something with at least enough solidity to make
permanence seem possible, even if it usually
isn't attained, persists.
No matter what our
concepts of freedom are, there is no way to
ignore the simple fact that it takes a long time
to get to know someone, to understand their
strengths and weaknesses and coordinate them
with your own, to balance the weight of closeness
and separateness, to arrive at some degree of
sexual openness.
The prospect of repeating the
process over and over again is exhausting, even
for a fertile imagination. 108
Tb?.

Alfred

Ingrid Bengis, Combat in the Erogenous Zone (New Yorkt
A. Knopf, 1972), p. 203.

108.

Ibid., p. 237.
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Here the language is of sexual relations,
but remove the
sexuality (although this would be some part
of any liberated human relationship), and I think
that we have a

remarkable image of the kinds of constraints that
human
needs place on human relationships.

109

This passage is

lent support by Piagefs theory of human
development, a

development which requires careful nurturance in
an

atmosphere of warmth, commitment, stability; it in
turn
gives us reason to be critical of any proposals for

absolute freedom a la Germaine Greer.
A good society would provide stable, mutual relation-

ships which would nurture development over time.

These

relationships might be especially important at the two
extremes of the human life span

-

in our early years when

warm, loving "parents" are essential to the growth of ego

strength and our ability to care for others, and in our
old age when we need strength and support in the face of
death.

We are social and historic beings then in this

very individual sense.

We have a memory and we have a

future; and our relations with others are a vital part

of the past and future.

Bengis posits human 'needs' for love, warmth, com109.
passion, for emotional expression through 'authentic',
human relations. But it is not clear whether she views these
•needs' as universal or as cultural specific.
She is rather
clear that their fulfillment is frustrated by male-female
power relations. See Zillah Eisenstein's discussion of
Bengis' conception of needs in "Connections Between Class
and Sex Moving Towards a Theory of Liberation," paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political
1
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Our ability to comprehend and be attracted to
new

ideas is also affected by our individual historicity.
Ideas are held by real people with real needs

.

Some of

these needs are the flawed products of a flawed society
and stand in the way of our rationality.

When our images

of ourselves are warped, it is difficult for us
to com-

prehend what an •authentic

1

self might be or to develop

images of others which could serve as the foundation for
solidarity.

But, even though we are flawed, we cannot

stand outside ourselves; we can only test ideas in the
light of personal experience and stand as critical agents
in the face of any proposed truth.

Some of our personal

experiences will lend themselves to rational evaluations,
to autonomous criticism based on more developed needs;

other experiences point up needs with which proposals for
change must come to grips.
are the final criteria

Our feelings and our needs

for the validity of an idea

-

not

in the subjectivist sense but in the sense that any proposal

for change must take into account the needs, wants and

purposes which persons do have.

Radical proposals for

change expand these needs to incorporate unfolding capacities,
but unless these capacities are rooted in real needs, wants
and purposes, we are engaged in Utopian ism.
Some proposals for change will offend our understanding

of our needs; for example, my students often react quite

Science Association, Women's Caucus Panel, New Orleans,
Louisiana, September '+-8, 1973. ( Mimeographed •
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negatively to Firestone's technological solution
bearing.

It seems quite inhuman to them,

to child-

and indeed it is

in light of their understanding of their own,
quite human,

needs.

Bengis' discussion of abortion is to the point

-

abortion reform appears to understand woman's need to
control her own body, but in treating abortion as
a simple

medical technique somewhat akin to a tonsillectomy, the
state ignores' woman's need to have shared in a meaningful

human relationship.

"Will /abortion/ change the fact that

for many women, the adaptation to the physical fact of

being aborted, requires another adaptation.
separation from the life of her body."

.. a

sense of

110
In her mind

woman needs the child as proof of her man's faithfulness;
to undergo an abortion, she must separte herself
-

from these real needs, inauthenticate herself.

-

her body
(One

solution is to provide alternative support institutions

which is what feminist abortion counselling is all about.)
Our feelings are implicated

in our ideas and actions.

Some of these feelings stand in the way of rational thought

and liberation.

Bengis writes

What I discovered in the midst of my drive toward
emancipation was that sex, love, hurt, and hate
were the real stuff I was made of; that fairness,
rationality, and the willingness to share or give
away what one had never been sure of possessing
in the first place, were all secondary characteristics, carefully cultivated to be sure, but capable
of collapsing the moment stronger passions reared
110.

Bengis, Combat

,

p.

68,
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their heads.
Yet this ability to feel, to respond to
others in anger,
hurt, resentment and love is part of who we
are and must
be understood.
Persons do not transform themselves radically; they remain the same person as they
move to different levels of self- and social awareness.
It is a constant
struggle to maintain our better image of ourselves
and to

maintain our morality in the face of situations which
give
rise to real fears, insecurities, anxieties
and jealousies.

But personalaity and morality also depend on
these capacities
to feel.

Persons may carry with them the baggage of old

emotional repertoires into new relationships, new modes
of sociaUife, but some of these will be liberating
while

others will serve as barriers to development.

We are

historic beings; we are always the same person even as we
develop.

Bengis and Mitchell seem to me to capture the image
of changing consciousness implicit in the Moral Agent model.

The essence of moral action lies in awareness that we have

needs, that others are implicated in these needs, and that

we satisfy our needs
our social life.

-

as well as create new ones

-

through

There are possibilities and responsibilities

for evaluation, for struggle and for change.

Awareness of

these possibilities grows out of the conditions of moral

development
111.

Ibid

.

-

,

opportunities for egalitarian human relationship
p.

201
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coupled with an explanatory theory which
fleshes out the
notion of persons and of injury and gives
substance to a
-

critical perspective on one's own society and
the possibilities for flourishing within it.
The Moral Agent mode of analysis lends
support to actions
which promote institutional changes designed
to promote egalitarian, reciprocal relationships and expansion
of the realm
of freedom for women (and other oppressed
persons), and estab-

lishing community.

Often Moral Agents will engage in

actions proposed by other groups

abortion reform

-

-

e.g., child care and

but these actions are justified in the

broader context of human liberation rather than as a means
of simply freeing women from the family so that they
may

achieve in the professional world.
The Moral Agent cannot be doctrinaire in her defense
of liberation.

Aware of the ways in which ideas develop,

she cannot propose any final solutions.

113

As we end one

alienating relationship, we sense a need to end others

-

demands change in a dialectical process of consciousnessraising, new needs, new demands for social change.

transformation is a dynamic process.

Social

And we cannot predict

the outcome of this process since the dialectic moves in a com-

plex manner.

To know this lends a hesitancy to the way we

Having lived in a relatively small town for over a
112.
year now, I have some doubts as to how clear radicals have
been in their conception of community. Although it can
enrich human relations, it can also be f righteningly
intrustive.
113.

I

have always been impressed, yet put off by the

propose our strategies, gives us a
tremendous sense of
responsibility to be constantly re-evaluating,
re-formulating our ideas and strategies.

absolute assuredness of my Trotskyite friends that they
have found the solution to all the world's woes.

CONCLUSIONS
In the past three chapters

I

have attempted to

explore two profoundly different images of human
action
and the implications of each for our understanding
of

contemporary American Feminism.
specific actions, this is because

If I have net looked at
I

have thought it adequate

to investigate possible justifications of these
actions

and the complicated relationship between explanations
of

human oppression, moral judgments and the emotions.
next task is obvious

-

The

it is to look at the actions of

women in the real world of politics and to see how these
various justifications are deployed in the process of
social change.

I

have hoped to lay the groundwork for

that endeavor.
If,

as Peter Winch suggests, the social theorist

is

an observer who is trying to understand what is going on
in the world she sees, she has to inside the conceptual

framework of those who are involved in action.

She need

not act herself on these beliefs, these moral notions, these

emotions, but she does have to have them; i.e. she must be
able to use them to guide her own action even though she

chooses not to.

The theorist who is at a different level of

cognitive development, who operates from a different conceptual framework, will fail to understand what action is
about.

Her social theory can point out gaps in the explanatory

theory used by the activists, her theory
can even be instrumental in moving them on in their own
cognitive development.
But the theorist and the activist
are at cross-

purposes if there is no shared sense of what
the action is
about.
Theory may then perhaps explain failure
without
sharing concepts in the action framework,
but to explain
the attempt requires understanding the
framework within
which the actor moves and thinks.
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